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evaluate this literature and its claims against a clearly defined normative benchmark of considered opinion.
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capable of using it effectively. In the second half, I test this assumption against even grimmer doubts over civic
competence—namely that citizens lack the ability to think critically or that their conscious or unconscious
desire to defend preordained political positions easily trumps the motivation to be accurate. I present three
experiments that challenge these claims, in favor of a Bayesian model of information processing. Across the
experiments, I find that people update their beliefs and attitudes in light of presented arguments. People did
not mindlessly accept whatever arguments they encounter, nor did they categorically reject uncongenial
arguments. Instead, they accounted for the (un)certainty of evidence as they form their posterior opinions,
even when it disconfirms their prior opinions.
Taken together, the empirical evidence presented in this dissertation suggests that citizens’ failure to act as
competent decision makers is more likely due to the lack of necessary and balanced information, rather than
their own unwillingness or inability to use such information.
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ABSTRACT 
 
ASSESSING CIVIC COMPETENCE AGAINST THE NORMATIVE BENCHMARK 
OF CONSIDERED OPINIONS 
 
Jin Woo Kim 
 
Michael X. Delli Carpini 
 
There is widespread skepticism about civic competence. Some question if citizens 
are informed enough to make considered decisions. Others doubt citizens’ ability to 
rationally evaluate relevant evidence and update their opinions even when they have 
necessary information. The purpose of my dissertation is to critically evaluate this 
literature and its claims against a clearly defined normative benchmark of considered 
opinion.  
In the first half of the dissertation, I revisit the benchmark of informed citizenship, 
arguing that seemingly knowledgeable citizens, as traditionally defined, may fail to 
consider a balanced range of arguments due to partisan biases. Accordingly, I draw a 
distinction between two dimensions of political knowledge; information—the classic 
definition and measurement; and what I call consideration—awareness of balanced sets 
of arguments. I empirically establish the discriminant validity of consideration as a 
separate and distinct dimension of political knowledge, and show that information and 
 vii 
consideration have different consequences on policy opinions—a finding that calls for a 
better conceptualization of what it means to be well informed. 
The importance of having political information ultimately hinges on a critical 
assumption that people are capable of using it effectively. In the second half, I test this 
assumption against even grimmer doubts over civic competence—namely that citizens 
lack the ability to think critically or that their conscious or unconscious desire to defend 
preordained political positions easily trumps the motivation to be accurate. I present three 
experiments that challenge these claims, in favor of a Bayesian model of information 
processing. Across the experiments, I find that people update their beliefs and attitudes in 
light of presented arguments. People did not mindlessly accept whatever arguments they 
encounter, nor did they categorically reject uncongenial arguments. Instead, they 
accounted for the (un)certainty of evidence as they form their posterior opinions, even 
when it disconfirms their prior opinions.  
Taken together, the empirical evidence presented in this dissertation suggests that 
citizens’ failure to act as competent decision makers is more likely due to the lack of 
necessary and balanced information, rather than their own unwillingness or inability to 
use such information.  
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Chapter 1    Introduction 
 
 
He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that.  
 
—John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 
 
 
An essential part of navigating everyday life is making decisions based on 
information at hand. At least for important decisions, people gather and synthesize some 
information. The key word here is “some.” Many things are unknowable within the limits 
of human capability. And even for readily available—i.e., “Googleable”—information, 
learning everything there is to know is impossible for all but the most trivial topics. Thus, 
we humans have to live with the choices we make with imperfect knowledge. It is the 
source of constant regret when new information makes it clear that we had made a bad 
decision. Even when this does not happen, uncertainty usually remains as to whether we 
made the right call. 
Given this human condition, what decision-making strategy would at least 
increase the chance of making a good decision? The starting point of this dissertation is 
the normative assumption that giving due considerations to both pros and cons of a 
decision is an imperative element of sound decision making, even if the fact remains that 
an individual can cover only so much information. I call an opinion formed in this way a 
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“considered opinion” and use it as the benchmark against which to assess civic 
competence. Outside politics, at least, this point seems noncontroversial. That is why 
cancer patients undergoing chemotherapies receive explanations about the side effects as 
well as the intended treatment effects. That is also why an institutional review board 
requires researchers to specify the potential benefits and harms of conducting a particular 
study. Weighing pros and cons is a basic, although not perfect, guard against making a 
blatantly bad and avoidable choice.  
The normative case for my argument can be somewhat more ambiguous in 
politics, due to the subjectivity involved in declaring a political decision “good,” the 
prevalence of false information and conspiracy theories that presumably do not deserve 
close attention, and so on. But few would argue that taking account of diverse aspects of 
a potential political decision leads to more undesirable than desirable outcomes, as a 
matter of general principle. The importance of considering conflicting ideas is also a 
basic ingredient of most democratic theories. In one of the most memorable defenses of 
free speech, John Stuart Mill (1869) argued that even seemingly faulty claims are worthy 
of a fair hearing, because they ultimately provide the opportunity to perceive the truth 
more clearly.1 In more recent years, deliberative theorists have similarly argued that 
cross-cutting political conversation is central to the democratic citizenship (Benhabib 
1996; Fishkin 1995; Gastil 2008; Guttmann and Thompson 1996; Habermas 1989).2  
                                                 
1 Mill’s argument would lose its ground, however, if people tend to ignore 
counterevidence to defend their prior beliefs, as the motivated reasoning hypothesis 
contends (Taber and Lodge 2006; Nyhan and Reifler 2010). Chapter 3 addresses this 
concern directly.  
2 For example, Habermas (1984, 25) holds that “[a]nyone participating in argument 
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There is also empirical evidence that an eclectic thinker who knows “many little things” 
outperforms a dogmatic thinker who knows “one big thing,” as judged by the accuracy of 
political predictions (Tetlock 2005; Tetlock and Gardner 2015). 
But even if drawing on a diverse informational base can be conducive to forming 
a better opinion in theory, it is entirely different matter as to how prevalent that exercise 
is in citizens’ actual political decision-making processes. There is widespread skepticism 
about civic competence, underscoring the seeming implausibility of the expectation that 
the average citizen makes considered decisions about political matters. Some question if 
citizens are informed enough to make considered decisions. Others doubt citizens’ ability 
to rationally evaluate relevant evidence and update their opinions even when they have 
necessary information. Raised in some of the seminal studies in political communication 
and public opinion (e.g., Converse 1964; Berelson et al, 1954), these concerns have been 
recurrent themes in the literatures on political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 
1996), public deliberation (Delli Carpini et al. 2004; Fishkin, 1991), and political 
information processing models (Taber and Lodge 2006; Zaller, 1992).  
The purpose of my dissertation is to critically evaluate this literature, and provide 
empirical evidence that overcomes some of conceptual and/or methodological challenges 
of prior research, allowing for a better understanding of whether people fail to act as 
competent decision makers, and if so, in what way. 
                                                 
shows his rationality or lack of it by the manner in which he handles and responds to the 
offering of reasons for or against claims. If he is ‘open to argument,’ he will either 
acknowledge the force of these of reasons or seek to reply to them. … If he is ‘deaf to 
argument,’ by contrast, he may either ignore contrary reasons or reply to them with 
dogmatic assertions.” 
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1.1    Forming a Considered Opinion 
 
Before getting into the specifics of my research, I begin by presenting a model 
that specifies the process of forming a “considered opinion.” Throughout this dissertation, 
I use a Bayesian model as a standard procedure of integrating one’s prior knowledge and 
new information.3 Bayes’ theorem is an equation that calculates a conditional probability 
of an event given another event, according to the law of probability. It is useful for 
studies in public opinion formation because it can be applied to generate a 
mathematically coherent prescription of how one should incorporate new evidence into 
one’s prior belief. Under Bayes’ rule, the updated conclusion (posterior belief) is 
supposed to be the precision-weighted average of the prior belief and new evidence. In 
other words, one should update one’s belief such that one’s conclusion leans more 
heavily toward new information to the extent that the evidence is clear and one’s prior 
belief is uncertain. 
For a more formal demonstration, consider the issue of the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), also known as “Obamacare.” Suppose that a Bayesian voter—let’s call her 
Gina—will support the legislation to the extent that it is beneficial to her. Let θ be the 
unobserved true net benefit for Gina.  
                                                 
3 Scholars disagree about whether certain patterns such as biased assimilation and attitude 
polarization constitute a violation of Bayes Theorem (Bartels 2002; Bullock 2009; Gerber 
and Green 1999; Taber and Lodge 2006; Taber et al. 2009; Tetlock 2005). This 
disagreement arises because the properties of a Bayesian model vary depending on the 
restriction on how people interpret information (i.e., likelihood functions). I address this 
issue in detail in Chapter 3. 
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The net benefit θ can be expressed as the weighted average of various benefits 
reduced to some common denominator (see Achen 1992; Downs 1957, 37; Gerber and 
Green 1998). I define these benefits broadly; they may include values, self-interests, 
public interests, altruistic motives, or even simple tastes (see Mansbridge 1983, 25-26).4 
The true net benefit is what Mansbridge (1983, 25) refers to as “‘enlightened preferences’ 
among policy choices, ‘enlightened’ meaning the preferences that people would have if 
their information were perfect, including the knowledge they would have in retrospect if 
they had a chance to live out the consequences of each choice before actually making a 
decision.” Clearly, this definition “can never be put into practice” because “[n]o one can 
have perfect information.” The best Gina can do is to educate herself with available 
information, though the quality of her opinion will be limited by the existing knowledge. 
Now, let 𝜇0 be Gina’s initial estimate of θ Following previous studies using the 
Bayesian framework (e.g., Bullock 2009; Gerber and Green 1999), I assume that this 
variable is normally distributed: 𝑁 (𝜇0, 𝜎0
2), where the mean is Gina’s best guess, and the 
variance is the uncertainty of the initial belief. Given she has not received any 
information about the policy she would acknowledge that 𝜇0 may be far off the mark. So 
𝜎0
2 is high.5  
                                                 
4 The net benefit of a policy will vary across individuals, to the extent that it has 
differential effects for different people, and/or people use differential evaluative criteria 
to judge the importance of these effects. 
5 I follow Zaller’s (1996, 21) distinction between exposure and reception in that the latter 
“involves actually ‘getting’ or taking in’ or ‘cognizing’ the given message.” Therefore, 
when I say Gina received an argument, I mean that she was exposed to the argument and 
she paid attention comprehending its key reasons and conclusion. Also note that I use 
“consider” and “receive” interchangeably. 
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Gina becomes informed about the policy as she encounters new information that 
suggests that the benefit (or harm) of the new policy is 𝑥1. I assume that 𝑥1 is normally 
distributed: 𝑁 (𝜃, 𝜎1
2), where the variance 𝜎1
2 captures the precision of the new evidence 
in information i. For example, if information 1 provides overwhelmingly clear evidence, 
the variance 𝜎1
2 will be very small. Gina will update her belief by calculating a weighted 
average of her prior belief 𝜇0 and information 𝑥1. Her posterior belief can be represented 
by a normal distribution with mean 𝜇1 and variance 𝜌1, where 
 
𝜇1 = 𝜇0 (
𝜏0
𝜏0 + 𝜏1
) + 𝑥1 (
𝜏1
𝜏0 + 𝜏1
)              (1.1a) 
 
𝜌1 =
1
𝜏0 + 𝜏1
,                            (1.1b) 
  
and where 𝜏0 = 1/𝜎0
2 and 𝜏1 = 1/𝜎1
2 are the precisions of the prior belief and the 
argument, which determine the weights on the prior belief and the new message. If Gina 
was initially unsure about the benefits of ACA (low 𝜏0), but then encounters new 
information with extremely precise evidence (high 𝜏1), the new message will be heavily 
weighted, virtually determining the mean of her updated beliefs 𝜇1. Given 𝜏1 > 0, the 
precision of her belief becomes smaller (𝜌1 < 𝜌0). 
 Now suppose Gina repeats this process for a stream of information 1, 2 … , 𝑛, 
where n is the number of arguments she receives, 𝑥𝑖 is a draw from a normal distribution 
𝑁 (𝜃, 𝜎𝑖
2), and 𝜎𝑖
2 is the (apparent) uncertainty of information 𝑖. The posterior belief 
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given n number of messages is distributed 𝑁 (𝜇𝑛, 𝜌𝑛), where 𝜇𝑛 and 𝜌𝑛 are the mean and 
variance of the posterior distribution, and 
  
 
𝜇𝑛 = 𝜌𝑛 (𝜇0𝜏0 + ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝜏𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
) , and              (1.2a) 
 
𝜌𝑛 =  
1
𝜏0 + ⋯ 𝜏𝑛
.              (1.2b) 
 Again, the model implies that the posterior belief is the average of the initial 
belief and the collection of information, weighted by precisions, and that Gina will 
become even more certain about her belief after considering a range of new information 
(𝜌𝑛 < 𝜌𝑛−1, when 𝜎𝑛
2 is finite). Now let η be the posterior belief given all available 
information, the best possible assessment of the true benefit. A “considered” opinion is a 
“good” decision because it is more likely to be closer to η than a random initial guess and 
an opinion of one “who knows only his own side of the case” (Mill 1869).6  
 One important strength of this model is that it parsimoniously expresses the 
informational conditions under which Gina’s preference becomes a considered opinion. 
First, n in Equations 1.2a and 1.2b should be greater than zero and 𝑥𝑖 should include both 
                                                 
6 This term will tend toward θ, as the quality and quantity of available information goes 
into infinity. The correspondence between η and θ depends the quality of public discourse 
which, practically speaking, is not the responsibility of the average citizen, but instead of 
political elites and experts. This is clearly an important issue for democratic politics (e.g., 
Page and Shapiro 1992, Chap. 9), and although it is not my focus here, I do briefly return 
to this issue in the concluding section. 
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positive and negative values. Second, Equations 1.2a and 1.2b should hold; in other 
words, Gina should form her opinion by assessing the quality of information, and 
assigning appropriate weights to her prior beliefs and new messages. These two 
conditions have been the hallmarks of competent citizen decision making in the studies of 
political communication, and public opinion, and will respectively be the foci of Chapters 
2 and 3 of this dissertation. 
 
1.2    Preview of Chapters to Follow 
 
The general public appears too uninformed about most aspects of politics to be 
able to form a “considered” opinion about a policy in question (Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1996; for a recent review see Achen and Bartels 2016, Ch. 2). Concerns over low levels 
of political knowledge, at least as traditionally conceptualized and measured, tell only 
half the story, however. Even the knowledgeable might fail to serve as competent 
decision makers, if information selection is generally biased toward their partisan 
identity. To the extent that this concern holds true, the opinions of an “informed” 
citizenry (e.g., Althaus 1998; Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Gilens 2001) 
may differ from those of a “considered” citizenry. Chapter 2 examines this possibility. It 
presents evidence drawn from the 2004-2005 Health Dialogue Project, underscoring the 
potential tension between two dimensions of political knowledge; information—the 
classic definition and measurement; and what I call consideration—awareness of 
balanced sets of arguments. 
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Even if citizens have unbiased information, one might doubt their ability to use it 
rationally, evaluating relevant evidence and updating their opinions as appropriate. 
According to empirical research on persuasion and information processing (e.g., Bartels 
2002; Kunda 1990; Lord et al., 1979; Taber and Lodge 2006; Zaller 1992; see Mutz 
2008, 534) how people do—instead of should—respond to persuasive arguments appears 
to be inconsistent with the democratic ideal. Some models suggest that people lack the 
ability to think critically (Zaller 1992) or that their desire to defend preordained political 
positions easily trumps the motivation to be accurate (Taber and Lodge 2006). Despite 
such widespread skepticism, how close to the democratic ideal the average citizen might 
reach if high quality and balanced information was given remains elusive because the 
benchmark against which to judge the quality of political reasoning is often a moving 
target (see Kuklinski and Quirk 2001). In Chapter 3, I present three survey experiments 
that challenge the models assuming people’s internal failures of reason, in favor of a 
Bayesian model of information processing.  
 Finally, Chapter 4 discusses the implications of the results for relevant literatures, 
noting the limitations and caveats, and making suggestions for future research. This 
chapter concludes by reflecting on the normative implications of the findings for 
democracy.  
Before moving on, let me acknowledge that the idealized the model of informed 
citizen who knows “what the issues are, what their history is, what the relevant facts are, 
what alternatives are proposed, what the party stands for, and what the likely 
consequences are” (Berelson et al. 1954, 308) is not uniformly accepted. Some scholars 
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note that this characterization is not well reflective of classical democratic theorists 
(Pateman 1970, Ch. 1) and the civic virtue of informed competence is a relatively new 
invention that took shape in the Progressive Era in reaction to the enthusiastic party 
politics of the Gilded Age (Schudson 1998).  
Some scholars go further and question the usefulness of focusing on political 
knowledge to assess citizen competence. For one, it is unrealistic to expect citizens stay 
informed about political issues when information is costly and returns are often minimal 
(Downs 1957). The portrait of the informed voter underlying the “folk theory of 
democracy” is, it is argued, based on a fundamental misunderstanding of human nature 
(Achen and Bartels 2016). Others have suggested that the scholarly attention to political 
knowledge misses the points that voters can use information shortcuts to make rational 
decisions (e.g., Lupia and McCubbins 1998), and that each individual voter’s errors 
stemming from the lack of detailed knowledge cancel out when aggregated into public 
opinions overall (Page and Shapiro 1992; but see Bartels [1996]; and Delli Carpini and 
Keeter [1996]). 
I do not dispute the general point that people have better things to do than 
studying the minutiae of countless policy issues. Yet even the most skeptical observers of 
public opinion, who do not see much value in ordinary citizens’ input into political 
decision making, do recognize that there is an essential democratic function in giving 
politicians “strong incentives to avoid doing what is widely despised” (Achen and Bartels 
2016, 319; see also Zaller 1992, Ch.9). But this “modest victory for political 
accountability” (Achen and Bartels 2016, 319) requires that citizens stay informed when 
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evidence of an elected official’s gross incompetence and/or corruption arises, and 
rationally update their beliefs about the official. Thus, even the minimalist defense of 
democracy appears to assume that citizens have some information about some political 
issues. Again, the key word here is “some.” But how much is enough?  
While not claiming to know the answer, I would argue (along with many other 
scholars) that the range of such issues need not stop at politicians violating ethical norms, 
but should also include some knowledge about policies that have the potential to 
significantly affect the individual and collective lives of the public (e.g., healthcare) and 
even the globe (e.g., climate change). Absent this, there would be little incentive for 
political elites to refrain from making decisions that can, unwittingly or not, do a 
disservice to their constituents’ essential interests.  
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Chapter 2    Revisiting Political Knowledge 
 
 For many, a key element of good decision making is political information (e.g., 
Bartels 1996; Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). In the running example 
presented in Chapter 1, the importance of information is well reflected in the prediction 
that Gina’s belief will be refined as n in Equations 2a and 2b increases. On the flipside, if 
uninformed, Gina’s belief will mostly consist of random error, probably quite distant 
from η. This prediction accounts for two important consequences of widespread political 
ignorance (i.e., small n) that previous studies have identified. First, citizens’ political 
opinions are usually incoherent and unstable, consisting of what Converse (1964) calls 
nonattitudes—a characteristic that is more common among less informed citizens (Delli 
Carpini and Keeter, 1996, 231-237). Second, voters hold policy positions that they would 
not have supported if they knew more about the issues, leading to collective conclusions 
that diverge from hypothetical “fully informed” public opinions (Althaus 1998; Bartels 
1996; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, Ch. 6; Gilens 2001; but see Levendusky 2011 and 
Pierce 2015 for critiques on this literature). 
 In practice, even highly knowledgeable citizens are not expected to be “fully 
informed” in the strictest sense. As Berelson et al. (1954, 232) put it, “[v]oters cannot 
have contact with the whole world of people and ideals; they must sample them.” So even 
if Gina was extremely well informed, the range of relevant information she brings to bear 
is likely a small subset sampled from the universe of all possible information of 
relevance. Like survey sampling, representativeness is a critical benchmark here; a biased 
 13 
sample, no matter how large, cannot form a valid estimate of the unknown parameter of 
interest. But usually “the sampling is biased” (ibid, 232), and the most well known cause 
of such bias is partisanship, which “raises a perceptual screen through which the 
individual tends to see what is favorable to his orientation” (Campbell et al. 1960, 133). 
Since Larzarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet’s (1944, 89-90) seminal work, scholars have 
raised the concern that citizens fail to consider balanced sets of competing arguments 
because they selectively expose themselves and/or attend to information that is consistent 
with their partisan identity (e.g., Bennett and Iyengar 2008; Iyengar and Hahn 2009; 
Jamieson and Cappella 2008; Jerit and Barabas 2012; Sunstein 2001; Taber and Lodge 
2006; see Hart et al. [2009] for a meta-analysis). And recent research indicates that well-
informed citizens are less likely to expose themselves to opposing political viewpoints 
than others (Mutz 2006, 33; Taber and Lodge 2006). 
 Biased “sampling” of this kind (i.e., partisan selective exposure) can present a 
serious challenge to making rational political decisions. Suppose Gina is a Democrat who 
avoids uncongenial arguments, and thus the information Gina receives systematically 
underrepresents information about the undesirable consequences of the ACA. In this 
scenario, per Equation 1.2a, her estimate of 𝜃 is likely biased upward, possibly far off the 
mark of her real interests.7 
                                                 
7 This is not to say there is no possibility that Gina “gets it right” without considering 
both sides of the arguments. Indeed, it is quite likely that after taking up oppositional 
information, Gina maintains her initial conclusion, if the new information turns out to be 
much less certain and/or relevant to her than congenial information that she had 
previously considered. My point, however, is that Gina cannot know if she “got it right” 
unless she hears the other side. Without the complete knowledge of his evaluative criteria, 
I (the researcher) cannot know if her decision is good either. While consideration of 
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 An unbiased but relatively small sample of arguments can be more useful than a 
large but biased sample. For instance, suppose that there are N number of voters, who 
have identical interests and evaluative criteria as Gina, trying to determine whether the 
ACA serves their best interests. Assume they are unbiased Bayesians, although they 
consider just a few relevant arguments. For each individual, argument consideration 
results in only a slight improvement (e.g., a few percentage points increase) over a 50-50 
chance, because of individual errors stemming from their random initial guess, and 
sampling variability in argument selection. But so long as these errors are random, they 
will cancel out when aggregated. So the average of Ian-like voters’ opinions will quickly 
approach η even when individuals draw on small amounts of information—more rapidly 
so if the initial guess is given smaller weight than new information. 
 This idea may be reminiscent of Page and Shapiro (1992), who argue that 
collective public opinions are “rational” despite individual ignorance and uncertainty. A 
difficulty with this line of argument, however, is substantiating the assumption that 
individual errors are randomly distributed (see Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1996). While Page and Shapiro do acknowledge misleading and manipulative 
information as one of the prominent threats to the validity of the random assumption, 
their discussion is focused on the biases of available information and of those who 
produce it—not those who consume it. Partisan bias on the part of the citizenry, however, 
                                                 
competing arguments is neither the necessary nor sufficient condition for “getting it 
right,” but it raises the chance of better decision making (see Tetlock 2005). 
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also undermines a crucial condition under which aggregation can mitigate individuals’ 
lack of information. 
 
2.1    Balanced Consideration as a Hallmark of Political Knowledge 
 
 My argument is in line with a central claim found in the scholarship on 
deliberation; that the quality of democratic decisions depends on consideration of diverse 
viewpoints (e.g., Fishkin, 1995; Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Mutz 2006, 7-10; 
Sunstein 2001). At the same time, it points out an important limitation in the classic 
conceptualization and measurement of political knowledge (and Equation 1.2a), which is 
that they do not take partisan bias into account.8 In order to incorporate the possibility of 
biased reception of information, I categorize the n cases of received arguments into two 
groups: k cases of pro arguments (x > 0), and n – k cases of con arguments (x < 0), where 
𝑛 ≥ 𝑘.9  I rewrite Equation 1.2a as 
  
𝜇𝑛 = 𝜌𝑛 (𝜇0𝜏0 + ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝜏𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝜏𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=𝑘+1
) . (2.1) 
 
Assuming competing information flows in the public discourse are evenly 
balanced (e.g., Zaller 1992, 187), the set of pro and con arguments Gina considers should 
                                                 
8 Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, 10) define political knowledge as “the range of factual 
information about politics that is stored in long-term memory.”  
9 See Gerber and Green (1999, 195) for a similar formulation. 
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be roughly balanced (k ≈ 𝑛 − 𝑘).10 This requirement is violated, for example, when 
Democrats systematically learn more pros than cons (k > n – k), while Republicans do the 
opposite (k < n – k). The classic definition does not make this constraint explicit, leaving 
open the possibility that seemingly knowledgeable citizens in fact know only one side of 
the story.  
 
Figure 1: Political Learning with and without Partisan Bias 
 
 
 
For conceptual clarity, I draw a distinction between two dimensions of political 
knowledge. One is information about politics and public affairs—the classic definition—
leading to what I call “informed opinion.” The other is consideration of the central 
arguments in favor and against a political decision—leading to what I call “considered 
                                                 
10 This doesn’t imply everyone will converge to the middle because the weights 
associated with each piece of information are assumed to vary across individuals. 
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opinion.”11 Figure 1 visually demonstrates two hypothetical relationships between 
information and consideration, with and without partisan bias in political learning; 
coordinates in the first quadrant represent the number of pro (Y) and con (X) messages 
one has received. In the left panel of Figure 1, partisans are equally likely to learn 
evidence that supports the opposing party’s position as evidence congenial to their own 
party. The right panel visualizes biased learning in its most extreme formulation where 
strong partisans ignore unfavorable arguments altogether.  
The first goal of this chapter is to examine how citizens actually match up against 
these distinct possibilities, using an argument repertoire measure tapping people’s 
awareness of pro and con arguments about a universal healthcare system (see Cappella et 
al. 2002 for validity and reliability tests of this measurement). This is essentially a 
discriminant validity test, establishing the (lack of) correspondence between information 
and consideration, which may call for better conceptualization and measurement of 
political knowledge. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Zaller (1992, 40) defines “consideration” as the “reason that might induce an individual 
to decide a political issue one way or other,” which is formed when political arguments 
are accepted. Unlike Zaller, however, my definition does not require acceptance of an 
argument, only careful contemplation. This conceptual difference leads to different 
operationalizations of consideration; unlike the survey item used in Zaller’s study to 
measure considerations— “what idea came to mind as answering the question” — I draw 
on the open-ended questionnaires that explicitly ask the respondents to mention 
arguments for and against their own view, which enables me to capture the range of 
reasons a respondent could offer (Cappella et al. 2002). 
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2.2    Estimating Considered Opinions 
 
 If reality resembles the left panel of Figure 1, the issue of improving public 
opinions largely boils down to correcting for simple political ignorance. This is the 
condition under which one can treat “informed opinion”— the opinion one would hold if 
he/she was informed in the traditional sense—as the normative benchmark. Empirical 
research on the effects of factual knowledge (or ignorance) on public opinion and vote 
choice shares this assumption (e.g., Althaus 1998; Bartels 1996; Claassen and Highton 
2006; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Gilens 2001). These studies statistically impute a 
counterfactual “fully informed” public by comparing each respondent’s actual preference 
with an opinion that a “fully informed” individual sharing the same combination of 
characteristics is predicted to hold. The gap between such hypothetical fully informed 
preferences and the respondents’ observed preferences is taken to be evidence that 
information, or the lack thereof, matters for public opinion. 
 On the other hand, if political learning is closer to the right panel, “informed 
opinion” is likely to belie the benchmark. It is important to note that the methods that 
statistically impute informed opinion are essentially changing the observed opinions of 
lesser informed respondents to those held by well-informed individuals with similar 
demographic and social characteristics. Therefore, the estimates of “informed opinion” 
should reflect the characteristics of well-informed people, such as their political interest 
(Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), their news media use (Price and Zaller 1993), their 
information processing strategies (Sniderman et al. 1991) and most importantly for my 
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purposes, the extent to which they consider conflicting perspectives (Mutz 2006; Taber 
and Lodge 2006). To the extent that the citizen learning process is not evenhanded, it will 
remain uncertain as to how much statistically simulated “fully informed” preferences 
reflect the undesirable effects of partisan bias in information reception (see Pierce 2015). 
In keeping with the conceptual distinction between the two facets of political 
knowledge, I distinguish “considered opinion” from “informed opinion,” and define a 
citizen as having the former if he/she has received a balanced set of competing arguments 
offered by the oppositional sides. Using two empirical strategies, I estimate considered 
opinions to gauge how balanced consideration affects public opinion. In doing so, I 
impute “informed” opinions as well, following previous research (e.g., Bartels 1996; 
Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), to examine whether they converge to (or diverge from) 
“considered opinions.” 
The first strategy I use for observing considered opinions is statistical imputation 
methods, similar to Bartels (1996) and Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996). In my case, I use 
consideration instead of information to simulate what choice people would make if they 
had considered a broad and balanced range of pros and cons. Specifically, I estimate the 
effects of considering arguments for a universal healthcare system, and the effects of 
considering arguments against. And based on the estimated parameters, I simulate a 
“considered” public opinion by setting the numbers of pro and con arguments underlying 
people’s opinion to be equally high for everyone and calculating the average of the 
imputed opinions. 
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A key difference between this approach and previous models of “informed” 
opinions is that it directly addresses the potential effects of imbalanced learning by fixing 
argument awareness to be balanced—a defining property of a considered opinion. That 
said, as with prior work (Bartels 1996), the imputation methods involve some strong 
modeling assumptions, and thus the estimates may be susceptible to a variety of 
specification errors. Perhaps the most prominent threat is an omitted variable bias (see 
Levendusky 2011); those who have considered more (pro or con) arguments about the 
healthcare issue may have idiosyncratic demographic and psychological traits, and these 
characteristics, not consideration per se, may produce what is observed to be considered 
opinions.  
As a second empirical strategy, I draw on an experiment where individuals are 
randomly assigned to participate in public deliberation—an intervention that is designed 
to produce “refined” public opinion that “has been tested by the consideration of 
competing arguments and information conscientiously offered by others who hold 
contrasting views” (Fishkin 2009, 14; see also Barabas 2004; Cappella et al. 2002; 
Fishkin 1995; Fishkin and Luskin 2005; Luskin et al. 2002; for a review see Delli 
Carpini, Cook and Jacobs [2004]). Research based on experimentally induced 
deliberation implements this conceptual framework (Barabas 2004; Cappella et al. 2002; 
Fishkin 1995; Luskin et al. 2002) by creating carefully balanced argument pools, using 
trained moderators, and encouraging participants to be open-minded. Although 
participants still may not take opposing arguments seriously, it is safe to assume that 
deliberation can surmount at least one likely cause of imbalanced considerations—
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selective exposure—as diversity of viewpoints is a minimal requirement that 
distinguishes it from other forms of political communication (Thompson 2008). 
While statistical methods for imputing informed opinions and public deliberation 
are sometimes seen as addressing the same underlying phenomenon of political ignorance 
and its consequences (e.g., Althaus 1998, 547-548; see also Gilens 2001; Sturgis 2003), 
according to my conceptualization, they emphasize different elements of political 
decision making. Certain procedures in public deliberation are specifically designed to 
combat such problems as biased selection of information, which may creep into the 
estimates of “informed” opinion. Norms, such as equal exchange of diverse viewpoints 
and careful consideration of competing arguments are theorized to be the defining 
principles of successful deliberation (Benhabib 1996; Gastil 2008; Gutmanm and 
Thompson 1996; Habermas 1989). To the degree that the difference between the two 
research paradigms is substantial, “informed opinions” will not correspond to 
“deliberative opinion.”   
At the same time, the role of argument consideration in actual deliberative 
forums is debatable (Mutz 2008; Sanders 1997; Price et al. 2006; Wojcieszak 2011). 
Although deliberation by definition solves the selective exposure problem, it does not 
necessarily guarantee balanced reception (see footnote 2); people may attend selectively 
to congenial information. Or they may respond predominantly to superfluous information 
(e.g., partisan cues) without really processing the content of the messages (Petty and 
Cacioppo 1986; Zaller 1992). The difficulty comes from the fact that there are no 
acceptable grounds for declaring a priori what “considered opinions” would look like 
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(see Kuklinsiki and Qurik 2001; Price and Neijens 1997), which makes the prediction of 
opinion changes impossible in most cases. That said, there is evidence that formal 
deliberation and exposure to disagreement in other contexts enhances the understanding 
of opposing arguments (Cappella et al. 2002; Mutz 2006, 73; Price et al. 2006) and that 
opinion shifts during deliberation are driven by consideration of well-justified arguments 
(Westwood 2015). 
One way to solve this dilemma may be to compare the results of the two 
approaches (deliberation and statistical imputation), which bring different (normative and 
methodological) assumptions to get at the same thing—collective opinions of a 
hypothetically more deliberative citizenry. The two approaches will generate similar 
results so long as both approaches successfully estimate considered public opinions. And 
to that degree, each may provide complementary evidence to the other. The imputation 
strategy can generate an expectation about how evenhanded argument consideration 
during deliberation affects opinion changes ex ante, without making an assumption about 
which collective opinion is “better” for the public. The experimental approach allows us 
to observe actual opinion changes that arise when people are exposed to diverse 
viewpoints, without modeling assumptions. Drawing on different methods can be seen as 
a kind of a convergent validity test: If inconsistent, at least one of them has to be relying 
on wrong assumptions. If consistent, one may have increased (though by no means 
certain) confidence in the results.  
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2.3    Data and Methods 
 
Data for my analyses comes from the 2004-2005 Healthcare Dialogue (HD) 
Project, a multi-wave study that combined Internet surveys with online deliberation 
experiments.12 Participants in the HD Project were drawn from a representative sample of 
adult American citizens (aged 18 or older), maintained by Knowledge Networks (now 
GfK ).13 Because of the software used for the online discussions, those without access to 
a personal computer were excluded from the sample. Nevertheless, the characteristics of 
the HD sample reasonably resembles the 2004 American National Election Study sample 
and the 2004 Current Population Survey benchmark on key demographics and 
partisanship (see Appendix A). At the screening survey, 3,429 respondents were invited 
to take part in the study, and 2,193 completed the baseline survey. The final response rate 
for the baseline survey was 33.5% (AAPOR RR3). Table 1 summarizes the timeline of 
the major events of the Healthcare Dialogue Study with respect to the analyses I 
conducted.  
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Data used in Chapter 2 of this dissertation comes from the Health Dialogue Project, 
supported by grants to Vincent Price and Joseph N. Cappella from The National Science 
Foundation (Grant EIA-0306801) and the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the 
University of Pennsylvania. I thank everyone previously involved in the Health Dialogue 
Project. They, not me, conducted surveys, experiments, and content analyses.  
13 The project included a purposive sample of healthcare policy elites including policy 
makers, experts and industry representatives (N = 314). Because the focus of this 
research is policy preferences of the general public, I use only the population sample. 
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Table 1: The Health Dialogue Project 
Date Event Key Variables / Discussion Topics N 
7/14 to 8/12 (2004) Baseline Survey Political Information 
Argument Repertoire 
Opinion: Nationalized Universal Healthcare (1) 
Party Identification 
Control Variables 
2,193 
9/17 to 9/23 Deliberation 1 The most pressing problem  376 
11/30 to 12/6 Deliberation 2 Policy proposals for the selected problem 355 
2/4 to 3/1 (2005) Post Survey Opinion: Nationalized Universal Healthcare (2) 1,340 
  
 
Experimental Design 
A subset of participants in the baseline survey (N = 1,844) was asked to 
participate in subsequent pre- and post-discussion surveys.  Among these individuals, 
1,237 were randomly assigned to attend four rounds of online discussions that took place 
between September 2004 and May 2005 in addition to the surveys. Those in the treatment 
group were divided into 72 discussion groups. The first (September 2004) and second 
(November 2004) discussions pertained to issues surrounding health insurance. In the 
first discussion, participants deliberated about the most pressing problem related to health 
insurance, and each group identified one problem as a top priority. Twenty seven groups 
named the large number of Americans without insurance coverage, while 45 groups 
named the increasing costs of health insurance. In the second round, participants 
discussed the pros and cons of several policy proposals designed to address the specific 
problem selected by the group in the first discussion. Each discussion was held for an 
hour, facilitated by a moderator. Each deliberation participant made 18.6 (first round) and 
20.2 (second round) statements on average at each event. Since I rely on open ended 
questions tapping awareness of arguments for and against a “universal, federally funded 
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health insurance,” my analyses exclusively drew on the first two deliberation meetings 
and the two waves of surveys conducted before the first and after the second deliberations 
(see Table 1).14 Appendix A shows that the treatment and control groups are balanced on 
pre-treatment covariates among those who responded to the baseline and post surveys, 
minimizing concerns that uneven attrition between groups is responsible for the results 
shown below.  
 
Non-compliance.  
Although substantial efforts were made to motivate participants to attend the 
discussions by accommodating their schedules, sending reminders and offering incentives 
(e.g., $15 in wave 2), among the 1,237 invitees, only about 30% were present in 
deliberative meetings (376 in the first and 355 in the second). I take three estimation 
strategies to deal with the non-compliance issue. First, I regress opinion change on 
random assignment, estimating the Intent-to-Treat Effect (ITE). Albeit valid, ITE is a 
smaller than average treatment effect (ATE) because many of those assigned to be treated 
never receive the treatments. Second, I use a two-stage-least-square (2SLS) estimator 
where random assignment is used as the instrument for attendance. This approach 
recovers the ATE on the Treated (ATET). One must assume, however, that compliers and 
non-compliers would be affected by the treatment in the same way in order to generalize 
findings to the population. To estimate the ATE, I use simple Difference-in-Differences 
(DD) estimators treating deliberation attendance as the independent variable, which can 
                                                 
14 The third and fourth discussions and surveys were concerned with prescription drugs. 
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be generalized to non-compliers. The downside is that this strategy is essentially 
“observational”; since deliberation attendance is likely endogenous, it requires an 
additional identifying assumption that the overtime opinion change would have been the 
same for attendees and non-attendees in the absence of deliberation.  
 
Measures 
 Support for universal health insurance. At the baseline survey, participants 
indicated their views on “a universal, single-payer system of national health insurance 
paid for by the federal government.” The same question was asked in the post survey, 
which was fielded about two months after the round two deliberations. This variable was 
coded on a scale from 0 (“oppose strongly”) to 1 (“favor strongly”), with the midpoint 
representing “don’t know” responses. 
 Consideration of pro and con arguments. After being asked about one’s opinion 
on universal health insurance, those who were favorable to the program were then asked 
to offer all the reasons they have for being in favor of a universal, national health 
insurance program. They were then asked to give reasons “other people” might have for 
being opposed to the program. Similarly, participants who were opposed to a universal 
health insurance program were asked to give rationales for their own and for others’ 
views. Those who did not take a position were asked to name the reasons why other 
people might favor a universal health insurance, followed by a question asking about 
reasons for being against it. Thus, all respondents were invited to offer both pro and con 
arguments about a federally funded health insurance program, regardless of their opinion.  
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 The number of pro and con arguments was counted by four independent coders, 
using the coding procedure developed and implemented by Cappella et al. (2002). 
Answers without evidence (e.g., “it makes sense”), restatement of opinion, repetition of 
the same ideas, and the like were not counted. Evidence coupled with stated or implied 
explanation as to why that evidence supports/opposes universal national health insurance 
was counted as a reason (argument). A subsample of 50 responses was randomly drawn 
and coded by all of the coders to test inter-coder reliability. Krippendorff’s alpha value 
for reliability was .83 for pro reasons, and .85 for con reasons. Overall, people supplied 
similar numbers of pro arguments (M = 2.30, SD = 2.69) and con arguments (M = 2.17, 
SD = 2.74).15  
 Political information. The Healthcare Dialogue Project assessed general political 
knowledge as well as specific healthcare issue knowledge in the baseline survey. General 
knowledge was measured by an additive index of the number of correct answers to the 
five questions recommended by Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, 306). The seven 
questions tapping healthcare issue knowledge included knowledge about provisions of 
the Medicare bill signed by President Bush; which organization was responsible for 
deciding whether drugs are ready for use; the political office held by Tommy Thompson; 
the amount of Medicare’s fund; the Bush administration’s position on stem cell research; 
                                                 
15 Of course, I do not claim that there is a perfect correspondence between all the 
arguments one had previously encountered, and the arguments one provided during the 
survey. But it is not unreasonable to assume that those who were able to cite both pro and 
con arguments in some details are more likely to have taken uncongenial arguments 
seriously, than those who only cited arguments confirming their opinions (see Cappella et 
al. 2002 for validity tests of this measure). 
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eligibility requirements for Medicare; and the percentage of Americans without health 
insurance. I created an additive index of political information by counting the number of 
correct responses to all 12 items (M = 7.20, SD = 2.47, α = .72).16 
 Party identification. Conventional survey questions (e.g., ANES) were used to 
measure partisanship. Respondents were categorized into five (partisan) groups: Strong 
Republicans (16.1%), Moderate Republicans (16.5%), Independents (34.5%), Moderate 
Democrats (16.4%), and strong Democrats (16.5%).17  
 Control variables. Some of the statistical models to be reported below include a 
range of covariates. They include age (Mean = 44.7), years of education (Mean = 14.2), 
gender (Male = 46.6%), income (Median = $50,000), Black (8.4%), marital status 
(Married = 64%), political interest, political participation, political discussion, attention 
to news about healthcare issues, access to health insurance (insured = 87%), one’s own 
health status (36.0% have a serious disease), and family health status (42.5% have a 
family member with a serious disease). See Appendix A for more detailed information 
about the measurement of the control variables. The appendices also provide survey 
question wordings of the independent, dependent and control variables, and their 
descriptive statistics. Unless noted otherwise, all variables are recoded to vary between 0 
and 1. 
 
 
                                                 
16 The results reported below are robust to using general political knowledge items only 
as well as using healthcare issue knowledge items only. 
17 Those who indicated “something else” (N = 170) were categorized as independents. 
 29 
2.4    Distinguishing Information and Consideration 
 
 A limitation in the classic notions of political knowledge and informed opinion, I 
have argued, is that it ignores the possibility of biased sampling of incoming political 
information. In this section, I examine this possibility empirically, using the distinction I 
drew between two dimensions of political knowledge. If the partisan “perceptual screen” 
affects the sampling of received information, citizens will fail to receive both sides of an 
argument equally. And to the extent that some citizens are “better informed,” their 
awareness of opposing arguments is likely to be slanted. If there is little partisan bias in 
information selection, “well informed” partisans (according to the classic definition) 
would have considered similar number of pro and con arguments, in which case 
information and consideration would be essentially the same thing. In Figure 1 (above) I 
presented two hypothetical scenarios, where such biased learning is completely absent 
(left panel) or extremely strong (right panel).  
In Figure 2, I match the actual data against the two hypothetical possibilities 
outlined in Figure 1 (see Appendix A for specific numbers including number of 
observations and standard errors).18 The solid lines plot the mean values of pro and con 
arguments provided by each partisan group, with the four markers in each group  
 
 
                                                 
18 As a general principle, I start from simple (transparent) specifications, and then move 
onto more complicated models, checking the robustness of findings. In these “simple” 
models, I treat the key independent variables (e.g., PID and political information) as 
categorical, and compare group means. 
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Figure 2: Observed Relationship Between Information and Consideration 
 
Note. N = 2,193. The mean values of pro and con arguments are plotted by PID and 
political information. 
 
 
representing levels of political information.19 As can be seen, partisans tend to diverge 
from the diagonal “benchmark” of balanced consideration, in the direction of the position 
most closely associated with their partisan identity. People were more aware of the 
arguments for their own side, and this pattern was largely driven by “knowledgeable” 
citizens. Well-informed strong Republicans were especially likely to have ignored pro-
healthcare reform arguments, as they mention just about the same number of arguments 
                                                 
19 I use a quartile split to divide the respondents into four levels of political information, 
with the following cutoffs:  42% or less, 50%, 67%, 83% correct answers, which roughly 
correspond to the quartiles.  
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for universal healthcare as their uninformed counterparts (1.86 vs 1.72), although they 
were able to articulate far more con arguments than less informed ones. Similar, albeit 
less pronounced, patterns can be found for moderate Republicans and strong Democrats. 
Independents and moderate Democrats, on the other hand, appear to exhibit fairly well 
balanced considerations on average. 
Now, I provide a more formal examination of the tendencies highlighted in Figure 
2: (1) partisan gaps in the awareness of pro and con arguments, and (2) the pattern where 
partisan gaps are widest among the well informed. To do so, I fit a set of regression 
models where the number of pros and cons are the dependent variable.20 First, consider 
the following regression model: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗 + 𝛾1𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗×𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑗  (2.2) 
 
where the j subscript indexes arguments (pro or con),  the i subscript indexes each 
participant, 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗 is the number of arguments, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗 is a within-individual factor dummy 
variable indicating argument position (pro =1; con=0), 𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖 is a vector of dummy 
variables for partisan identities where strong Republicans serve as the reference category, 
𝛿𝑖 is individual-specific random effects and 𝑖,𝑗 is the stochastic error term.
21 𝛼 is the 
                                                 
20 In these regression models, there are two observations of the dependent variable (pros 
and cons) for each respondent. 
21 Four dummy variables for PID were included in the model, with the base category 
representing strong Republicans. I fit a Maximum Likelihood model to account for the 
individual random effects.  
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average number of cons articulated by strong Republicans (the reference category), 𝛽1 is 
the difference between the number of pros and cons (for strong Republicans), 𝛾1 is the 
vectors of parameters for the PID dummies summarizing partisan differences in the 
number of cons, and 𝛾2 is the interaction between PID and argument position indicating 
the partisan differences in the gap between the number of pros and cons. If there is a 
partisan bias in consideration of pro and con arguments, the difference between pros and 
cons (i.e., the coefficient on 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗) will vary across partisan groups. This can be 
demonstrated by fitting Equation 2.2 where the value of the coefficient on argument 
position varies across PID, and comparing it against a reduced model restricting the 
interactions (𝛾2 vector) to be zero. A likelihood-ratio test suggests that the model 
including the interaction terms fits significantly better than the restrictive one (Chi2 (4) = 
91.61, p < 0.001), providing strong evidence that the distributions of pros and cons that 
underlie people’s opinion substantially differ by PID. 
 
Table 2: Gap between Pros and Cons by PID 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Strong Rep  Mod. Rep Independent. Mod. Dem Strong Dem 
-1.077ab  -0.13b 0.33a 0.53a 0.77 ab 
(0.15)  (0.15) (0.10) (0.15) (0.15) 
Note. Entries are calculated by estimating Equation 2.2. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  N = 4,340.  a P < 0.1 where 𝐻0: 𝛽 = 0. 
b P < 0.1 where 𝐻0: 𝛽 = 0.33. 
 
 
Table 2 reports the estimates of 𝛽1 + 𝛾2  (i.e., average gap between pros and cons 
for each partisan group), which ranges from -1.08 to 0.77 in the expected direction (see 
Appendix A for a full report on the estimates of Equation 2.2). How does each partisan 
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group measure up in terms of balanced awareness? One can think of two benchmarks 
here; assuming that the information flows about the issue in public discourse were evenly 
balanced, one may define unbiasedness as 𝑃𝑟𝑜 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛 = 0. By this standard, every group 
appears to be biased beyond chance, except for moderate Republicans. But assuming that 
Independents lack a partisan slant, the fact that they also named more pro arguments may 
indicate the range of arguments brought to the citizenry overall is slightly slanted in favor 
of universal healthcare.  If this were the case, Independents could serve as a benchmark in 
that they lack partisan bias. By this standard (𝑃𝑟𝑜 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛 = 0.33), all but moderate 
Democrats significantly deviate from the benchmark. In either case, strong partisans 
exhibit slanted distributions of considered reasons. 
Next, to examine the correspondence between information and consideration I 
estimate a regression that extends Equation 2.2 by including political information, and its 
interactions with PID and argument position, which takes the form: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖×𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖×𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖
+ 𝛾3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗×𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾4𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖×𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗×𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑗  (2.3) 
  
where 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖 is the political information of respondent i, 𝛼 is now the predicted number of 
cons mentioned by the least informed strong Republicans (who served as the reference 
category), 𝛼 + 𝛽2 is the predicted number of pros for strong Republicans with the lowest 
political information score;  𝛼 + 𝛽1 is the fitted value of cons for “fully informed” 
(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖 = 1) strong Republicans, and 𝛼 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 is their predicted number of pros, 
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𝛽1 is the difference between least informed and most informed strong Republicans in the 
number of con arguments, and 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 is the difference in number of pros. The 
difference (𝛽1 + 𝛽3 − 𝛽1 = 𝛽3) is the asymmetry in the association between information 
and consideration of pros versus the association between information and consideration 
of cons. It captures the extent to which the slope representing strong Republicans in 
Figure 2 diverges from the diagonal benchmark, i.e., the extent to which information and 
consideration do not correspond. Alternatively, one can interpret 𝛽3 as the extent to 
which the pro versus con difference is strongly pronounced for well-informed strong 
Republicans (𝛽2 + 𝛽3), compared to the less informed (𝛽2).  
𝛾4 is the vector of coefficients on the triple interaction terms representing the 
extent to which the asymmetric correlations differ by PID.  If the relationship between 
information and the range of considered reasons is unaffected by PID, a model that 
restricts the triple interactions to zero should perform as well as a flexible model that 
allows 𝛾4 to be non-zero. A likelihood-ratio test easily rejects this null hypothesis in favor 
of the possibility that partisanship influences the differential correlations between 
information and pro and con arguments (Chi2 (4) = 23.89, P < 0.001).       
The estimates of Equation 2.3 are summarized in Table 3, which shows the 
predicted difference in the number of pros between the least and most informed 
respondents in each partisan group (𝛽1 + 𝛽3 + 𝛾2 + 𝛾4), as well as their predicted 
difference in the number of cons (𝛽1 + 𝛾2). Also reported is 𝛽3 + 𝛾4 = (𝛽1 + 𝛽3 + 𝛾2 +
𝛾4) − (𝛽3 + 𝛾4), indicating the gap in these two correlations (see Appendix A for a full 
report on the estimates of Equation 2.3). As with the previous model, there may be two 
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benchmarks. One may presuppose that “well informed” citizens should do better, 
compared to less well informed ones, in articulating both pros and cons to the same 
extent. In this the case, 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 + 𝛾2 + 𝛾4 should not be significantly different from 𝛽1 +
𝛾2. This “null” hypothesis (𝛽3 + 𝛾4  = 0) is tantamount to assuming that the slopes in 
Figure 2 will parallel with the diagonal. As demonstrated in Table 3, Republicans, 
especially strong ones, clearly fall short of this standard. The relationship between 
information and consideration for strong Democrats appears to be slanted in the opposite 
direction, although to a much lesser degree (𝛽3 + 𝛾4 = 0.99, p = 0.18).  According to an 
alternative standard provided by Independents (𝛽3 + 𝛾4 = −0.44), all but leaning 
Democrats show asymmetric relationship between information and consideration.22  
 
Table 3: Associations between Information and Consideration by PID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Strong Rep Mod. Rep Independent. Mod. Dem Strong Dem 
𝛽1 + 𝛽3 + 𝛾2 + 𝛾4 (Pros) 
0.08 2.13 2.94 3.08 5.56 
 (0.88) (0.61) (0.43) (0.59) (0.70) 
𝛽1 + 𝛾2 (Cons) 
4.22 4.00 3.38 3.48 4.57 
 
(0.88) (0.61) (0.43) (0.59) (0.70) 
𝛽3 + 𝛾4 (Gap) 
-4.15ab -1.87ab -0.44 -0.41 0.99b 
 (0.98) (0.61) (0.48) (0.60) (0.74) 
Note. Entries are calculated by estimating Equation 2.3. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  N = 4,340. a P < 0.1 where 𝐻0: 𝛽3 = 0. 
b P < 0.1 where 𝐻0: 𝛽3 = −0.44.  
 
                                                 
22 The mismatch between information and consideration is particularly severe for 
Republicans. Although I did not hypothesize it, this finding is in fact consistent with 
studies showing that conservatives tend to avoid dissonance-arousing situations (Nam et 
al., 2013), including exposure to counter-attitudinal information more than liberals 
(Garrett and Stroud 2014; Mutz 2006, 33). 
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Taken together, the correspondence between being informed and being 
considerate is far from perfect, and therefore there is little ground for treating these two 
characteristics as the same. Thus even a well-informed public’s decisions may not 
approximate the decisions that a well-considered public would make. I explore this 
possibility in the following sections.  
 
2.5    Informed Opinions versus Considered Opinions 
 
Table 4: Support for Universal Health Insurance by Political Information 
 
Note. N = 2,193. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1. The p values on each level are 
for the mean comparisons against the baseline category (Very Low). The F statistic (with 
3 degrees of freedom) tests the null hypothesis that the mean differences are jointly zero.  
 
 
In this section I compare informed opinions and considered opinions. As 
mentioned above, I use statistical simulation (and an experiment) to estimate them. But 
before presenting the relatively complex models, I first outline how people’s opinions 
differ across different levels of information and consideration using mean comparisons. 
Table 4 compares the average support for universal healthcare of better informed and less 
informed citizens using a quartile spilt. I find a significant (monotonic) negative 
correlation between political information and the view that universal health insurance is a 
Political Information Support 
Very Low  0.64 
(0.01) 
Low 0.63 
(0.01) 
High 0.58* 
(0.01) 
Very High  0.49* 
(0.01) 
F (3) 24.02* 
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good idea. The difference between the most informed and least informed citizens is quite 
sizeable (mean difference = 0.16, p < 0.01), with the former being evenly divided and 
the latter being generally supportive.  
 
Table 5: Support for Universal Health Insurance by Consideration 
Consideration  Support  
Balanced 0.63* 0.70* 0.71* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) 
Rest 0.59 0.59 0.59 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cutoff for Balanced Consideration 3 or more 5 or more 7 or more 
Observations Passing Cutoff 358 105 35 
Note. N = 2,187. Standard errors in parentheses.  *p < 0.1. The p values are for the mean 
differences between Balanced and Rest.  
  
 
Does the same result arise when using consideration as the measure of political 
knowledge? To examine this question, I compare the mean support for universal 
healthcare of those who are fairly “well considered” against the rest of the respondents in 
Table 5.23 I find that those who are well versed in both sides of arguments are more 
supportive of universal healthcare than others, contrary to what was found for “well 
informed” respondents. For example, the respondents who articulated five or more pros 
and five or more cons were substantially more likely to approve the universal health 
insurance policy than the rest (mean difference = 0.11, p < 0.01). Taken together, the 
                                                 
23 Given the uncertainty regarding how many arguments one should articulate to qualify 
as exhibiting high levels of consideration, I use various cutoffs: from three pro and three 
con arguments to seven pros and seven cons. Unsurprisingly, the number of respondents 
categorized to have balanced consideration decreases rapidly as the definition of balanced 
consideration becomes more restrictive (from about 16.3% to 1.6%). 
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mean comparisons reported in Tables 4 and 5 provide preliminary evidence that the 
opinions held by “knowledgeable” citizens differ depending on how one defines and 
measures political knowledge. 
 To be sure, the group means in Tables 4 and 5 are only crude measures of 
“informed” and “considered” opinions.24 I next follow the imputation methods developed 
by Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) and Bartels (1996) to generate estimates of the 
counterfactual collective opinions held by the “fully informed” public, and the “fully 
considered” counterpart, while accounting for the most likely confounders and 
heterogeneity in the effects of information and consideration (for similar approaches to 
simulating other counterfactuals, see Kuklinski et al. 2000; Zhang 2010). First, I estimate 
the effects of political information based on a regression model that takes the following 
form: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖 + 𝑖.                (2.4) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖 is support for a universal health insurance for individual i, 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖  is political 
information, 𝛽0 is the average support among those who are lowest in political 
information, and 𝛽1 is the effect of information.
25 Given that people with different 
political values or self-interests will (rationally) use different evaluative criteria, I allow 
these parameters to vary across individual differences by adding a set of moderators to 
Equation 2.4. To ensure that the results are not sensitive to the choice of individual 
                                                 
24 They do not account for likely confounding factors such as PID, and implicitly assume 
that people will be equally affected by political information and considered arguments. 
25 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖 is now a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1. 
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factors, I try alternative specifications. In a more restrictive (but simple) variation of 
Equation 2.4, I include only party identification and its interaction with political 
information. A second specification includes demographic characteristics that are likely 
to affect the evaluative criteria, in addition to party identification.26 Based on the 
estimated parameters, I simulate an “informed” public opinion by setting 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖 to be the 
highest possible value (100% correct) for everyone and calculating the average of 
imputed 𝑌𝑖. Accordingly, the differences between the counterfactual and the observed 
opinions constitute the anticipated opinion change upon each individual becoming “fully 
informed.” And the mean of these differences is taken to be the “information effect.” 
For considered opinions, I begin by measuring the effects of considering 
arguments for a universal healthcare system, and the effects of considering arguments 
against by fitting (an extended version of) the regression model: 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑝𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐(𝑛𝑖 − 𝑘𝑖) + 𝑖.                (2.5) 
 
where  𝛽𝑝 and 𝛽𝑐 are the effects of pro and con considerations, and 𝑘𝑖 and 𝑛𝑖 − 𝑘𝑖 are 
again, the numbers of pros and cons underlying individual i’s opinion.27 As with 
                                                 
26 The demographic variables include a variety of stable characteristics pertinent to 
healthcare policy preferences (see Appendix A, for the full list). They are similar to those 
used in previous research (e.g., Althaus 1998), but also include several variables tapping 
personal health status, and healthcare conditions (e.g., whether insured or not). In the 
regression analysis, these variables and their interaction with political information are 
added to Equation 2.4. 
27 One can think of Equation 2.5 as a simplified version of Equation 2.1, which cannot be 
estimated as it is. The simplification is that for individual i, all pro arguments are equally 
effective, as are all con arguments. 
 40 
Equation 2.4, I allow these effects to vary across individual differences using two 
different specifications; one including PID only and the other adding demographic 
factors.28 The key difference from “informed” opinion is that this time I set both 𝑘𝑖 and 
𝑛𝑖 − 𝑘𝑖 to be equally high numbers for everyone, thereby forcing a balance in pros and 
cons—a feature that is absent in the estimate of “informed” opinions.29 
The results of these various models are presented in Figure 3.30 The circles and 
triangles in the left half of the figure compare the imputed estimates of information 
effects against consideration effects (with and without demographic moderators). Each 
marker represents the point estimate of the difference between imputed informed or 
considered public opinion and the baseline of actual public opinion. The bars report the  
                                                 
28 I also examined models that included interactions between pros and cons, allowing for 
the possibility that the effect of one side of arguments depends on awareness of the other 
side. The results were robust to this specification choice (See Appendix A). I report the 
results from the simpler specification without the interaction term here. 
29 Pro and con arguments had extremely skewed distributions; while the maximum values 
were 42 and 48 respectively, for the most part respondents articulated five or less 
arguments for each side (87.5% fall in this range for pros and 87.6% for cons). In fact, 
only one respondent listed more than 15 pros and 15 cons (see also Figure A1 in 
Appendix A). Given the sparseness of observations near the actual maximums, “fully 
considered opinions” fixed at these values will be mere extrapolations. Consistent with 
the mean comparison analyses (reported in Table 5), I employ more reasonable 
definitions of “full consideration”—5 pros and 5 cons, and set the maximum of number 
of arguments to be 5, by collapsing values greater than 6 into the maximum category. 
Admittedly this is an arbitrary choice in that there is no theoretical ground to say 
consideration of 5 reasons is enough, and 4 is not. Yet, the findings are generally robust 
to alterative specifications using different cutoffs—3 or 7 arguments on both sides—and 
using percentile values, which does not require (arbitrary) selection of cutoffs (See 
Appendix A).  
30 The confidence intervals and standard errors are calculated using bootstrapping. Each 
set of analyses—i.e., regression and simulation—are replicated on 2000 bootstrap 
samples drawn from the original sample with replacement. Thus the standard error and 
confidence interval for fully informed preference are the standard deviation, and 5th and 
95th quintiles of its values from the 2000 samples. 
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Figure 3: Comparing Information Effects versus Consideration Effects 
Note. The dependent variable is support for universal health insurance. Information 
Effects, denoted by the circle markers, represent the simulated estimates of public 
opinion change that is anticipated when the public is fully informed. Imputed 
Consideration Effects, denoted by the triangular markers, represent the simulated 
estimates of public opinion change anticipated to occur when the public considers a “full” 
range of competing arguments. Deliberation effects, denoted by the square markers, 
represent the estimated effect of actual deliberation on opinion change. Vertical lines 
represent 95% confidence intervals. See Appendix A for more information. 
 
 
95% confidence intervals. As shown in the figure, imputed opinions significantly differ 
from actual public opinion. More importantly, considered and informed public opinions 
differ from actual opinion in the opposite direction. The estimated values suggest that 
while informed public opinion is less favorable to a nationalized health insurance 
program than actual collective opinion by 4.4 to 7.1 percentage points (both statistically 
significant at p < .05), considered public opinion is more favorable. The size of the 
“consideration effect” reported here varies somewhat—from 2.9 to 4.9 percentage 
points—but these estimates are consistently positive, and the lower bounds of the 95% 
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confidence intervals remain above zero with and without additional moderators in the 
model. 
In sum, this analysis suggests that the consideration effect on collective opinions 
significantly diverges from the information effect, not only in magnitude, but also in 
direction. This discrepancy seems to imply that the estimates of “fully informed” public 
opinion (Althaus 1998; Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) may reflect partisan 
bias in awareness by leaving open the possibility that well informed citizens’ political 
knowledge is generally imbalanced. 
It is important note that the statistical imputation approach still requires some 
strong modeling assumptions, particularly that there is no unobserved confounder. I now 
turn to a randomized experiment on deliberation as a means to measure the causal effect 
of consideration. If imputation and experimentation are both valid tools for identifying 
more considered opinions, I should find that these estimates correspond to one another. I 
fit the following regression model: 
 
∆𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑖 + 𝑖 (2.6) 
 
where ∆𝑌𝑖is change respondent i's support for universal healthcare system before and 
after deliberations, 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑖 indicates deliberation, and 𝛽1 is the causal effect of interest. As 
mentioned above I use three different specification approaches—(1) ITT, (2) ATET, and 
(3) ATE. The difference among the three is how deliberation is operationalized—(1) 
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assignment, (2) assignment as the instrument for attendance, and (3) attendance.31  I fit 
each of the specifications with and without (pre-treatment) covariates, yielding a total of 
6 estimates of deliberation effects (see Appendix A for full reports of these models 
including the list of covariates). The rectangular markers in the right half of Figure 3 
report 𝛽1 in Equation 2.6, across these specifications. 
I first present the result of regressing opinion change on group assignment status 
(without controls), which shows a treatment effect that is consistent with the imputed 
estimates of consideration effect (𝛽1 = 0.031, p = 0.056).
 32 The next model, shown in the 
second rectangle, adds the lengthy list of control variables, but still produces a 
remarkably similar figure (𝛽1=.030; p = 0.074). These two estimates capture the 
“intention-to-treat” effect, which represents the impact of being assigned to a treatment 
group, while ignoring the rate at which those in the treatment group actually receive it. To 
calculate the ATET, I turn to 2SLS regression (the third and fourth triangles in Figure 
3).33 I find that actual treatment (i.e., deliberative participation) increases support for 
universal healthcare system by 7.8 to 8.2 percentage points for those would receive 
treatment when assigned. Finally, comparing individuals on (endogenous) deliberation 
attendance, I find the effect of deliberating about healthcare corresponds to 3.6 
percentage points greater support for universal healthcare system, compared to non-
                                                 
31 Attendance is coded as the following; 0 = none; 0.5= once; 1 = twice. 
32 All test statistics are calculated using robust cluster standard error that accounts for 
within-discussion-group correlations. I rescale the number of deliberations participated in 
to range between 0 (none) and 1 (twice). See Appendix A for more information on the 
models. 
33 ATET is identical to the ITT effect divided by the average rates of deliberative 
participation among the treatment group. 
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deliberators (p = 0.067). And holding fixed individual factors increases the size of the 
point estimate (𝛽1=.046; p = 0.028), implying that omission of some potential 
confounders, if anything, may have led to the underestimation of the deliberation effect.34 
Taken as a whole, Figure 3 makes a very straightforward point: across various 
specifications, deliberation moves public opinion in the direction predicted by my 
simulation of “considered opinion,” which is at odds with “informed opinion.” 
 
2.6    Summary 
 
 To summarize, this chapter underscores the discrepancy between two dimensions 
of political knowledge—information and consideration—by providing the following 
evidence. First, the range of considered argument is generally slanted in the direction of 
partisan identities, and this tendency is far stronger among those who possess high levels 
of factual information. Second, the statistical simulations of considered and informed 
preferences indicate that they are not the same thing, significantly diverging on 
preferences for government-sponsored health insurance. Third, on average, deliberative 
intervention—an experimental method for producing considered opinions—pushed 
public opinion in the same direction predicted by the imputation method.   
 It is important to note that whether these estimates of considered opinions are 
normatively “better” than the baseline is still an open question. One may argue that 
                                                 
34 Note that the latest deliberation took place about two months before the measurement 
of the post-test outcome variable (Table 1). Considering that communication effects in 
general tend to disappear rather rapidly (e.g., Gerber et al. 2011), this result is impressive. 
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competent decision making requires more than the reception of a broad range of 
messages. In particular, the Bayesian learning model dictates how citizens should revise 
their opinions upon receiving a stream of information: the most certain evidence should 
carry the greatest weight in opinion formation and revision. Importantly, the analyses 
thus far have ignored the question of whether the quality of argument matters as citizens 
form their policy opinions. Neither the certainty of arguments people had considered 
prior to the surveys nor the certainty of the messages they received during deliberation 
was measured. In the following chapter, I examine how people use received policy 
information more directly by testing the effect of evidence strength.  
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Chapter 3    The Force of the Better Evidence 
 
In terms of multi-step models of attitude change (McGuire 1969; Zaller 1992), 
Chapter 2 focused (mostly) on the “reception” stage. It has been assumed that facilitating 
more considered public opinions is largely a matter of solving the problems of ignorance 
and partisan selective reception. But arguably the most damaging blow to citizen 
competence comes from the notion that it does not even matter whether people have 
substantive information about policy issues because they lack the ability to use 
information rationally anyway. While it is the central assumption of deliberative 
democracy that citizens are capable of forming meaningful opinions led by “the force of 
the better argument” in the marketplace of ideas (Habermas 1984; Fishkin 1995; Mercier 
and Landemore 2012), there has been little empirical evidence that directly supports it—
and plenty that calls it into question (for reviews of such evidence see Delli Carpini et al 
2004; Mendelsberg 2002; Mutz 2008).  
From a theoretical standpoint, there are two important reasons to think that it 
does not matter whether citizens have detailed facts about the political issues of the day, 
and the prospects of deliberative democracy are hopelessly untenable.  
 
1. The Uncritical Public Hypothesis: People do not reason for themselves. They 
defer readily to elite opinions (usually their party leaders’ positions), so much so 
that they ignore substantive information about the merits of the policies at hand 
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(Broockman and Butler 2017; Cohen 2003; Lenz 2012; Rahn 1993; Zaller 1992; 
see Bullock 2011 for a review).  
 
2. The Motivated Public Hypothesis: People are motivated to defend their partisan 
viewpoints. They vigorously discount uncongenial information when confronted, 
even to the point of bolstering prior attitudes (Kunda 1990; Lord et al. 1979; 
Taber and Lodge 2006; Nyhan and Reifler 2010). 
 
But what empirical observation constitutes the evidence against the people can 
pick and choose good argument in the marketplace of ideas? For example, if people 
change their minds after hearing an argument, are they being “manipulated” or 
“educated” (Mansbridge 2003)? If they don’t change their minds, are they exhibiting 
healthy skepticism or irrationality? Teasing out these normative interpretations requires 
defining ex ante the qualitative aspects of strong versus weak arguments that should (or 
should not) make them persuasive—an approach that few studies on political persuasion 
have taken. As such, I argue in the following section that prior evidence remains more 
ambiguous about how critically and rationally citizens respond to new information 
bearing on political issues than is often supposed. In this chapter, I fill this vacuum in the 
literature by presenting three experiments examining whether people take account of 
evidence strength, which permit more straightforward normative interpretation than 
existing studies that draw on the general (and underspecified) concept of argument 
strength.  
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Across the experiments drawing on highly contentious issues in American 
politics—the Affordable Care Act, and the economic performance of the two major 
parties— I find that people update their beliefs and attitudes in light of presented 
arguments. According to the results, people do not mindlessly accept whatever arguments 
they encounter, nor do they categorically reject uncongenial arguments. Instead, people 
account for the (un)certainty of evidence as they form their posterior opinions, even when 
it disconfirms their prior opinions. The patterns of belief and attitude changes imply that 
people sensibly evaluate the diagnostic values of presented evidence in more or less the 
same way across prior attitudes, partisan identity, and other individual traits. These 
findings make a straightforward case for a Bayesian model of persuasion (specified 
below), under which people revise their beliefs by calculating the probative values of new 
information. 
 
3.1    The Uncritical Public Hypothesis  
 
Zaller’s (1992; 1996) RAS model provides a good starting point for the first 
claim. His model aims to explain the nature and origins of mass opinion as a function of 
elite discourse, and ideology while presuming no critical decision making on the part of 
citizens. The patterns in public opinion depend on the two elite discourse variables—
relative balance between competing sides, and overall intensity of issue coverage—but 
not on how citizens critically evaluate these messages. While he notes that better 
informed citizens are more likely to resist incoming messages, even this is far from the 
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kind of critical reasoning that characterizes the democratic ideal in that these individuals 
are not assumed to scrutinize the content of messages in doing so. As Zaller (1992, 45) 
puts it, his “postulate makes no allowance for citizens to think, reason, or deliberate about 
politics: If citizens are well informed, they react mechanically to political ideas on the 
basis of external cues about their partisan implications, and if they are too poorly 
informed to be aware of these cues, they tend to uncritically accept whatever ideas they 
encounter.”  
It is important to note that Zaller (1992, 3) does not provide a direct test of this 
mechanical portrait of the populace. It is, rather, a simplifying assumption necessary for 
“a unified theory of its major empirical regularities,” which after all proved useful. In his 
famous analyses on Americans’ reactions to the Vietnam war, Zaller (1992; 1996) was 
able to explain complicated shifts in mass opinion even though (or because) his model 
did not take into account citizens’ ability to think for themselves. For instance, even in 
the face of an extremely problematic situation in Vietnam in 1970, conservatives—
especially the informed ones—maintained their pro-war position, which, according to 
Zaller (1996, 57-58), indicates that “independent thought among highly aware 
conservatives—or, for that matter highly aware liberals—is entirely absent” (see also 
Lenz 2012). 
It is, however, difficult to know based on observational research (e.g., Lenz 
2012; Zaller 1992) if citizens rely on party cues because they know little more than that, 
or they instead do not reason using the substantive policy information they possess (see 
Bullock 2011, 510-511). In fact, recent experimental studies that provide some detailed 
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facts about various political issues have documented information-based persuasion (e.g., 
Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014; Bullock 2011; Guess and Coppock 2015; Mérola and 
Hitt 2016; but see also Broockman and Butler 2017). In particular, a series of 
experiments by Chong, Druckman and their colleagues report that the strength of 
arguments/frames drives policy opinions (e.g., Chong and Druckman 2007; 2010; 
Druckman et al. 2013), even when participants are provided with party cues (Druckman 
et al. 2013).35 In light of these findings, it may be tempting to draw the sanguine 
conclusion that citizens are able to make competent decisions guided by the actual merits 
of the arguments after all. 
There is a major caveat though: the absence of a well-articulated definition of the 
elements of strong arguments (see Chong and Druckman 2007, 652; Druckman et al., 
2013, 75). This is one of the longstanding difficulties in persuasion studies that has 
hampered the systematic understanding of the relationship between specific message 
variations and persuasion as well as the role of argument quality in persuasion in general 
(Areni and Lutz 1988; O’keefe and Jackson 1995). As unsatisfactory as it might be, 
argument quality has been defined in terms of perceived effectiveness, and 
operationalized based on pretests identifying strong versus weak arguments (e.g., Chong 
and Druckman 2007). The problem with this approach is that to derive a normative 
implication from such a finding is to make the assumption that those who pretest the 
arguments can (and do) evaluate them based on some normatively desirable standards 
                                                 
35 But the effect of argument strength disappears when participants are told that 
Democratic and Republican politicians are polarized on the issue at hand (Druckman et 
al. 2013). 
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(e.g., evidentiary certainty), which is the very thing one should to test in order to assess 
the quality of political reasoning.  
This issue is well understood and articulated by Chong and Druckman (2007, 
652), who note: “strong frames that emerge from debate will reflect a political process in 
which the persuasiveness of a claim depends on more than its validity or relation to 
evidence. The elements of an argument that make it plausible or compelling seem to 
reside as much in its source and the cultural values and symbols as in its causal logic.” To 
the extent that these extraneous factors are not held constant in operationalization, it 
opens up the possibility that the observed effect of argument strength is in fact 
confounded with, for example, the effects of ideological differences across arguments. 
Suppose, for example, that in an experiment, a “strong” argument that the ACA 
will reduce the number of uninsured Americans was more persuasive than a “weak” 
argument that the free market can handle various problems. A normatively pleasing 
explanation may be that pre-testers successfully identified a better argument, which then 
generated opinion change in the experiment. An alternative interpretation, however, is 
that there is nothing inherently more valid about the pro-ACA argument, but that both 
pre-testers and experiment participants favored it anyway, simply because it was more 
consistent with their prior attitudes and values—a phenomenon called “biased 
assimilation” (Lord et al., 1979), “prior attitude effect,” or “congruency bias” (Taber and 
Lodge 2006) in the motivated reasoning literature.  
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3.2    The Motivated Public Hypothesis 
 
In RAS, people rely on partisan cues simply because they are unable to think 
critically (Zaller, 1992). According to the motivated reasoning theory, on the other hand, 
they hold onto partisan viewpoints because they have motivations to do so. The 
theoretical underpinnings of motivated reasoning are provided by Kunda (1990), who 
notes that two general classes of motivations guide how people reason: (1) accuracy 
goals, which lead people to consider a broad range of alternatives and carefully process 
relevant information; and (2) directional goals, which is activated when people desire to 
reach certain conclusions or defend their prior attitudes, usually leading to 
disconfirmation of uncongenial information. While the reasoning strategies under the 
accuracy motivations may be in much agreement with the democratic ideal (see 
Druckman 2012), the defensive partisan motivations are assumed to be the general 
default when it comes to political reasoning (Taber and Lodge 2006; 2012). 
Classic evidence for the motivated reasoning hypothesis is found in the 
experiment by Lord and his associates (1979), which documents that proponents of the 
death penalty thought the studies showing pro-deterrent information were more 
“convincing” and “well-done,” whereas opponents favored the studies demonstrating the 
opposite, even though the quality of methodology was essentially the same (similar 
findings are reported by Corner et al 2012; Lodge and Taber 2012; Miller et al. 1993; 
Munro and Ditto 1997; Taber and Lodge 2006; Taber et al., 2009). And “biased 
 53 
assimilation” of evidence is likely to lead to attitude polarization.36 “Such motivated 
reasoning,” Taber et al. (2009, 138) argue, “is hard to square with normative standards 
for belief updating, which require some independence of new evidence from priors.” 
Unlike the Lord et al. (1979) study, the arguments used by Taber, Lodge and 
colleagues are rhetorical points (recurrent pro and con frames in controversies on 
affirmative action and gun control), rather than “hard” evidence regarding a particular 
aspect of an issue. Albeit advantageous in external validity, this approach leaves open the 
possibility that their findings simply reflect value differences instead of motivated biases 
or irrationality. Indeed, for the findings of “prior attitude effect” or “polarization” to be 
considered evidence of a bias or irrationality of any kind, one should rule out this 
alternative explanation. As an example, suppose that Democrats care about reducing 
disparities between rich and poor, and Republicans care about reducing the role of 
government, and they are exposed to a pro-ACA argument that it can help those who 
couldn’t afford a decent healthcare, and a con argument that the federal government will 
impose more regulations under the ACA. It is not inconsistent with the democratic (or 
Bayesian) standards when Democrats find the pro argument more convincing, whereas 
Republicans favor the con. Nor is it problematic in any sense that they polarize after 
receiving the two arguments. Their “fully informed” preferences of a public policy (per 
Equation 2.1) can very well be divergent to the extent that Democrats and Republicans 
use different evaluative criteria. So if they were in (some) agreement due to insufficient 
                                                 
36 Another component of motivated reasoning examined in Taber and Lodge (2006) is selective 
exposure. This is not my focus here because I aim to examine how people use information after 
exposure, not whether they receive it to begin with. 
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knowledge, it is expected that partisans who process the pro and con arguments in an 
unbiased fashion move in the opposite directions. 
Therefore, to the extent that values/frames are not held constant in research 
design, the benchmark requiring evaluation and assimilation of new arguments to be 
independent of priors are unduly restrictive. To uphold this requirement is to suggest 
either that people with different prior attitudes and values should use the same evaluative 
criteria, or that there are no value differences in the populace, both of which seem 
untenable on normative as well as empirical grounds. In this regard, some of the most 
widely cited evidence from the literature on motivated reasoning (e.g., Edwards and 
Smith 1996; Taber and Lodge 2006; Taber et al., 2009) is not really a strong indictment 
of the citizenry. It may as well be a testament to value diversity in the American public.  
What about evidence that seems to rule out the possibility that apparent 
“congruency biases” in argument assimilation simply reflect value differences? Most 
notably, in the experiment by Lord et al. (1979), both sides of evidence presented to 
participants address the same subtopic—deterrence effect—ensuring that the differential 
evaluations of congenial versus uncongenial information is not driven by differences in 
moral principles held by those who initially favor and oppose death penalty (for similar 
results, see Houston and Fazio 1989; Munro and Ditto 1997; Schuette and Fazio 1995; 
for a review of evidence from non-political issues see Kunda 1990). According to the 
motivated reasoning literature, this evidence shows that “judgments about the validity, 
reliability, relevance, and sometimes even the meaning proffered by evidence are biased” 
(Lord et al. 1979, 2099). 
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But while the observed correlation between priors and evaluation of incoming 
information would be a necessary condition for establishing people’s tendency to 
selectively denigrate the diagnostic value of uncongenial information, it is not a sufficient 
one. This is because people’s answers to the survey items probing the perceived 
quality/strength of information (or arguments) can be causally posterior to their updated 
conclusions. As an example consider a case of two unbiased Bayesians starting from 
different priors. Gina thought there was an 80% chance that the ACA will successfully 
“bend the cost curve.” Ian thought there was only a 10% chance. Assume that they both 
received and understood the same piece of pro-ACA evidence, and also interpreted the 
evidence in the same way; both thought the likelihood of observing that particular data 
when the ACA actually controls cost is 2.25 times greater than when the opposite is true. 
Following Bayes’ rule strictly, both revised their beliefs upward; Gina now thinks there is 
a 90% chance, and Ian says 20%. However, when asked whether they found the evidence 
“convincing,” they give conflicting responses, despite the fact that they are in full 
agreement about the probative values of the evidence per se, because Ian, after all, was 
not “convinced” (Gerber and Green 1999, 197-199). 
Without making the implausible assumption that their responses to evidence 
evaluation questionnaires—typically termed “convincing,” “persuasive,” “strong” and so 
on—are strictly independent of the posteriors, the only condition under which Gina and 
Hyoja will give the same answers to the survey items would be when they base their 
conclusions entirely on the evidence and completely discard their prior knowledge. 
Unless the evidence is indisputably clear, “openness” of this kind is an obvious violation 
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of Bayes’ Theorem. Arguably, this is even more problematic than biased assimilation, 
because “[w]illingness to interpret new evidence in the light of past knowledge and 
experience is essential for any organism to make sense of, and respond adaptively to its 
environment” (Lord et al. 1979, 2107). This “bias” keeps people from being swayed by 
highly implausible claims (e.g., conspiracy theories)—an exercise that is probably more 
beneficial than harmful in general.  
What is clearly not normative is to judge the plausibility of new information 
based on one’s prior attitude and, as a result, push forward the very attitude that colored 
the perception of new information (Gerber and Green 1999; Lord et al., 1979; Ross 
2012). The evidence for polarization of this kind is mixed, however. While Lord et al. 
(1979) found that participants strengthened their views after reading a set of mixed 
evidence, it is important to note that they did not directly observe opinion change with 
pre- and post-treatment measures, but instead relied on self-reported opinion change. 
Subsequent research tapping actual (instead of self-assessed) opinion changes failed to 
replicate Lord et al.’s (1979) findings on polarization (e.g., Guess and Coppock 2015; 
Miller et al. 1993; Munro and Ditto 1997), although there are important exceptions (e.g., 
Nyhan and Reifler 2010). 37  
 
 
                                                 
37 Let me reiterate that unless values/frames of arguments are held constant, it does not 
necessarily take defensive motivations for people with different political values to 
polarize after receiving a balanced set of pro and con argument (e.g., Taber and Lodge 
2006; Taber et al., 2009). In these studies, polarization per se is a poor indicator of 
irrationality or partisan bias. 
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3.3    A (Restrictive) Bayesian Learning Model  
 
In sum, the normative implications of the extant evidence on political 
information processing are more ambiguous than is often assumed. This of course is not 
to say that we have reason to believe that citizens meet any normative standard, but rather 
that it is surprisingly difficult to draw any normative conclusion, the standard itself is a 
moving target. In following section, I specify a restrictive Bayesian model that will be 
used as a benchmark against which to judge the results of the experiments presented 
below. 
 Suppose Gina, our Bayesian voter, receives an argument with some evidence 
that the ACA will slow down cost growth. The model states:  
 
𝑃(𝐻|𝐸) =
𝑃(𝐸|𝐻) ∙ 𝑃(𝐻)
𝑃(𝐸)
        (3.1) 
  
where H is a hypothesis about the Affordable Care Act (e.g., that the net benefit of the 
law is greater than zero); E is evidence relevant to the hypothesis; 𝑃(𝐻) is Gina’s prior 
probability that H is true, before observing E;  𝑃(𝐻|𝐸) is her posterior probability, 
revised in light of E; and 
𝑃(𝐸|𝐻)
𝑃(𝐸)
 is the likelihood function, representing her interpretation 
of how the evidence bears on the hypothesis at hand. This term can be rewritten as:  
 
𝑃(𝐸|𝐻)
𝑃(𝐸|𝐻) ∙ 𝑃(𝐻) + 𝑃(𝐸|~𝐻) ∙ 𝑃(~𝐻)
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where 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻) is her belief about the likelihood of observing E when H was true, and 
𝑃(𝐸|~𝐻) is the likelihood of observing E when the contrary was true.38 The ratio 
between 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻) and 𝑃(𝐸|~𝐻)—the likelihood ratio—dictates in what direction, and 
how much, Gina should update her belief about H after observing E. The likelihood ratio 
of completely uninformative evidence will be 1, in which case, the posterior will be the 
same as the prior. And the larger the difference the between the likelihoods, the more will 
Gina’s posterior tend toward the evidence.  
It is worth emphasizing that Bayes’ Theorem does not tell Gina how to construct 
her likelihood function; it is up to her own judgments, which would reflect not only some 
objective properties of E, but also her subjective evaluations of E. To be sure, if the 
treatment of new evidence is left fully subjective (i.e., there is no constraints on the 
acceptable treatment of new evidence) a Bayesian model becomes tautological because it 
can account for any belief change (Taber et al. 2009). But then again, one should not 
conflate subjectivity per se with bias. Although “[h]ow we determine the boundary line 
between rational skepticism and irrational bias is a critical normative question, but one 
that empirical research may not be able to address,” the fact remains that one somehow 
should draw the line “to resolve the controversy over the rationality of motivated 
reasoning” (Taber and Lodge 2006, 768). In order to make a Bayesian model falsifiable, 
it is necessary to put constraints on likelihood functions based on the properties of E. 
                                                 
38 My discussion here focuses on a dichotomous parameter—the net effect of the ACA is 
either positive (H) or negative (~H)—, this Bayesian framework can be extended to a 
continuous parameter—the value of the net effect—using probability density functions. 
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In a recent study, Guess and Coppock (2015) address this dilemma by imposing 
the restriction that the difference between the likelihoods, 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻) − 𝑃(𝐸|~𝐻), is 
“correctly” signed, which does not allow people to have an extreme likelihood function 
that would lead one to believe, for instance, that evidence of strong deterrent effects is 
good news for the anti-death penalty position. I build on their research by introducing an 
additional restriction that individuals’ likelihood functions are constrained not just by the 
direction but also the strength of evidence. That is, Gina grasps the differences in the 
diagnostic values of an event that is far more likely to occur when H is true than is not 
(strong evidence), and an event that is slightly more likely to occur when H is true than is 
not (weak evidence). More formally, it means Gina’s subjective likelihood ratios are 
lined up such that 
𝑃(𝐸𝑆𝑃|𝐻)
𝑃(𝐸𝑆𝑃|~𝐻)
>
𝑃(𝐸𝑊𝑃|𝐻)
𝑃(𝐸𝑊𝑃|~𝐻)
, where 𝐸𝑆𝑃 and 𝐸𝑊𝑃 are strong and weak pro 
evidence for H. Likewise, 
𝑃(𝐸𝑆𝑐|~𝐻)
𝑃(𝐸𝑆𝑐|𝐻)
>
𝑃(𝐸𝑊𝑐|~𝐻)
𝑃(𝐸𝑊𝑐|𝐻)
 where 𝐸𝑆𝐶  and 𝐸𝑊𝐶 are strong and weak 
con evidence against H. 
Imposing this restriction requires defining the objective elements of evidence that 
would compel Gina toward the position it supports—i.e., what makes a piece of strong 
evidence strong. I define these elements as the commonly held standards of statistical, 
external, and construct validity, upon which social scientists readily draw to evaluate the 
quality of research findings (e.g., Shadish et al. 2002). Accordingly, in the experiments 
presented below, “strong” evidence describes, for instance, more sizeable effects of the 
ACA on health care costs, based on more externally valid, and more relevant, data.  
No one thinks that the average citizen is as skilled in making such assessments of 
evidence as trained researchers (Niesbett and Ross 1980). But I would argue that people 
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routinely calculate the probative values of various kinds of information they encounter, 
guided by common sense and logic, which allow them to notice the difference between 
strong versus weak evidence. The theoretical expectation of the (restrictive) Bayesian 
model specified here is that the following equation holds, regardless of prior attitudes:  
 
𝑃(𝐻|𝐸𝑆𝐶) < 𝑃(𝐻|𝐸𝑊𝐶) < 𝑃(𝐻) < 𝑃(𝐻|𝐸𝑊𝑃) < 𝑃(𝐻|𝐸𝑆𝑃). 
 
If, alternatively, people accept whatever arguments they encounter, without 
accounting for the uncertainty of the evidence, one will find 𝑃(𝐻|𝐸𝑆𝐶) = 𝑃(𝐻|𝐸𝑊𝐶) <
𝑃(𝐻) < 𝑃(𝐻|𝐸𝑊𝑃) = 𝑃(𝐻|𝐸𝑆𝑃). If this holds true, political persuasion is possible, but 
even to the point where politicians can get away with claiming whatever they want 
citizens to believe. If people categorically reject counterevidence to defend their priors, 
one will find P(𝐻|𝐸𝑆𝐶) = 𝑃(𝐻|𝐸𝑊𝐶) = 𝑃(𝐻) for proponents (or Democrats), and 
P(𝐻) = 𝑃(𝐻|𝐸𝑊𝑃) = 𝑃(𝐻|𝐸𝑆𝑃) for opponents (or Republicans). If people backlash 
against counterevidence, which is the most extreme form of motivated reasoning, one 
will find P(𝐻|𝐸𝑆𝐶) > 𝑃(𝐻) and P(𝐻|𝐸𝑤𝐶) > 𝑃(𝐻) for supporters (or Democrats), and 
P(𝐻|𝐸𝑆𝑃) < 𝑃(𝐻) and P(𝐻|𝐸𝑊𝑃) < 𝑃(𝐻)  for opponents (or Republicans). If this holds 
true, political persuasion would not be generally possible. 
In what follows, I present three experiments that test these competing hypotheses. 
To the extent that motivated reasoning overwhelms evidence-based opinion revision, “hot 
button” issues should provide the hardest context under which to detect the effect of 
evidence (Taber and Lodge 2006, 757). With that in mind, the experiments draw on two 
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of arguably the most contentious issues in American politics today—the Affordable Care 
Act (Experiments 1 and 2), and the economic performance of the two major parties 
(Experiment 3). The experiments examine how participants’ posterior beliefs and 
attitudes vary in response to arguments coupled with varying degrees of evidence 
certainty.  
  
3.4    Experiment 1: A Pilot Test 
 
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to pilot-test the materials—theoretical 
explanations and factual evidence—that would then be used to construct the arguments 
for Experiment 2. The dependent variable was people’s guesses about the ACA’s impact 
on health care costs, conditional on a range of evidence that varies in position (good or 
bad news for the ACA) and strength. These characteristics of presented evidence 
constitute the key independent variables of Experiment 1. It thus represents a preliminary 
test of how people would interpret the diagnostic values of various pieces of information, 
and update their beliefs. The data were gathered from 246 participants recruited via 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in March 2016. Each participant was paid $0.75. 
 
Research Design 
As noted earlier, it is important to hold “frames” constant to compare people’s 
responses to political arguments against a normative standard. Among several economic 
and social dimensions of the health care debate, I chose health care costs as the focus of 
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the Experiment 1 (and Experiment 2) because prior research shows it to be the most 
prevalent frame in public discourse about this topic, and used in arguments made by both 
sides (Druckman et al. 2012, 434). It also seemed plausible that both supporters and 
opponents of the law would consider it an important evaluative criterion, unlike some of 
the other considerations about the ACA (e.g., the government’s involvement in health 
decisions).39 Throughout Experiments 1 and 2, “pro evidence” refers to the ones that 
suggest the ACA is successfully “bending the cost curve”, and “con evidence” refers to 
the ones that suggest the law makes health care even more expensive.  
To maximize the realism of experimental stimuli, I draw on actual facts published 
in research articles and reports (a full list of evidence and sources is offered in Appendix 
B). I selected four “pairs” of pro evidence, and four “pairs” of con evidence, each pair 
consisting of a strong version and a weak version. The strong versions are “quasi-
experimental” findings that describe (a) noticeable differences (b) at the national level (c) 
in relevant statistical data. I created their weaker counterparts by manipulating some of 
these dimensions—(a) smaller differences and/or (b) local level evidence, and/or (c) 
arguably irrelevant statistics—as permitted by the information that I was able to find. I 
also included six pieces of evidence—two strong and four weak (as judged by the same 
criteria). In total, 22 pieces of evidence that vary in direction (11 pros and 11 cons) and 
certainty (10 strong and 12 weak) were pre-tested. While I did not attempt to predict the 
rank order of the likelihood ratios among all 22 pieces of information, I did expect that 
                                                 
39 This decision makes it easier to rule out value differences as a convincing explanation 
for a partisan difference in treatment effects. But the tradeoff is that the lack of variation 
in importance of the sub topic makes it difficult to detect its moderating effects.  
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evidence classified as strong ex ante would have higher likelihood ratios on average, in 
people’s judgments. Testing this expectation was the point of Experiment 1.  
The experiment was conducted as follows. After answering pre-treatment 
questionnaires, participants read a message summarizing “health economists’ theory” 
about the ACA’s impact on health care costs. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of two conditions. Half of the participants were told the ACA would slow down growth 
in health care costs because Obamacare would solve the “adverse selection problem” 
where those buying insurance were sicker than average (the pro condition). The other half 
were told the ACA would accelerate cost growth because community rating would create 
the adverse selection problem, where medical costs for healthy people would rise, leading 
some of them to exit the insurance market (the con condition). Texts of the messages are 
provided in Appendix B. 
The dependent variable in this experiment is the conditional probability that the 
ACA restrains (or drives up) health care costs, in light of each piece of evidence drawn 
from the pool of information described above. Participants assigned a conditional 
probability on a scale varying from “extremely low (5% chance)” to “extremely high 
(95% chance),” given that a hypothetical new study found that “during the first two 
quarters after the reform, premiums in the individual health insurance market increased 
by 24.4% over what they would have been without Obamacare across all states.” This 
task was repeated for the 22 facts in random order, making for a 2 (between-subject) by 
22 (within-subject) factorial design. 
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Results 
The mean difference between the two experimental groups represents the 
conditional probability that the ACA controls cost growth given each piece of evidence 
(scaled to vary between 0.05 to 0.95) minus the conditional probability the ACA drives 
up costs given the same evidence. If a piece of information makes every respondent 
believe that Obamacare will definitely bend the cost curve, the group difference given 
this evidence would be 0.95-0.05=0.9. The main interest here is how this statistic varies 
across the 22 pieces of evidence.  
 
Figure 4: Conditional Probabilities Given Evidence 
 
Note: OLS estimates. Horizontal lines are 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are 
clustered at the respondent level. “S” indicates “Strong.” “W” indicates “Weak.” “P” 
indicates “Pro.” “C” indicates “Con.” Lower case letters in parentheses pair a piece of 
strong evidence with its weaker version. For example, SP(a) and WP(a) are a pair. 
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Figure 4 reports the main results from regression models where conditional 
probabilities were regressed on (1) experimental condition, (2) dummy variables 
indicating each piece of evidence, and (3) the interactions between condition and the 
dummies.40 To closely examine whether people interpret evidence differently across their 
prior attitudes, I also present the model that draws on only opponents of the law (87 
respondents) as well as the model drawing on only supporters (100 respondents). The 
estimates are ordered on the vertical axis so that the evidence that drives conditional 
probabilities to the pro-ACA direction the most is located on the top.  
Several patterns stand out at a glance. First, the facts predetermined to be strong 
pro evidence appear in the first five rows, and those predetermined to be strong con are 
located at the bottom. This means that participants do take account of evidence strength, 
and their interpretations are lined up as intended. Second, none of the evidence is 
powerful enough to eliminate the gap between opponents and supporters. This indicates 
people would reach different conclusions based on the same evidence. But more 
importantly, there is a direct correspondence between how proponents’ conditional 
probabilities vary across evidence, and how opponents’ vary. This means people starting 
                                                 
40 Across all experiments, I embedded a screener question right before the treatments take 
place (Berinsky et al. 2014). In Experiment 1 participants were instructed to “ignore the 
question and select the Drudge Report and none of the above as your two answers," 
before being asked to identify the news website they visit. 71.5% of participants correctly 
marked the two options, whereas 15.5% marked only one of them—mostly failing to 
notify the “none of the above” part of the instruction. I dropped the remaining 13%, who 
would most likely add noise, and underweighted those who marked only one option 
correctly by 0.5. The same approach was taken for Experiments 2 and 3 as well. The 
results remain almost identical when low-attention participants are kept in the analyses 
and given the same weight as high-attention participants. Also note that non U.S. citizens 
were also excluded from all analyses.  
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from different priors are in good agreement with one another about the diagnostic values 
(i.e., the likelihood ratios) of each piece of information. There is no clear indication that 
they undervalue counterevidence. Overall, the results suggest that people match very 
nicely to the restrictive Bayesian standards specified above.  
 
Table 6: Conditional Probabilities Pooled by the Type of Given Evidence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Subset All Opponent Supporter All Opponent Supporter 
Strong Con -0.316 -0.563 -0.124 -0.327 -0.580 -0.127 
 (0.028) (0.034) (0.038) (0.029) (0.034) (0.039) 
Weak Con -0.153 -0.404 0.058 -0.141 -0.396 0.081 
 (0.027) (0.035) (0.033) (0.027) (0.037) (0.033) 
Weak Pro -0.047 -0.275 0.148 -0.024 -0.255 0.171 
 (0.025) (0.033) (0.032) (0.026) (0.036) (0.033) 
Strong Pro 0.117 -0.103 0.313 0.139 -0.078 0.328 
 (0.029) (0.042) (0.038) (0.030) (0.045) (0.038) 
F (3) 83.36* 50.42* 39.20* 81.96* 46.44* 38.38* 
N (Evidence) 22 22 22 16 16 16 
N (Respondent) 214 87 100 214 87 100 
* p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Entries are 
marginal group differences, or the between the probability that the ACA controls cost 
growth minus the probability that the ACA accelerates cost growth, by type of given 
evidence. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.  
 
 
In Table 6, I pool the results in Figure 4 by the four evidence types, and provide 
F-statistics that test the null hypothesis that the differences in conditional probabilities do 
not vary across the kind of given evidence.41 Column 1 draws on all participants, and 
                                                 
41 The estimates are based on OLS modes that regress the dependent variable on (1) 
experimental condition, (2) three dummy variables indicating evidence type, and (3) the 
interactions between condition and the dummies. The F-statistics test if the three 
interaction terms are jointly zero—i.e., the group difference is constant across evidence 
types. 
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Columns 2 and 3 subset the data by prior attitudes toward the ACA. As indicated by the 
large F-values, the null hypothesis is easily rejected regardless of prior attitudes. Again, 
while supporters and opponents never agree about the conditional probabilities, the 
magnitudes of the within-subject differences across different types of evidence are very 
similar (-0.103 + 0.563 = 0.460 for opponents; 0.313 + 0.124 = 0.447 for proponents).   
I repeat similar analyses in Columns 4 to 6, but this time using the 8 pairs of 
evidence that have a stronger/weaker counterpart (the ones with a lower case letter in 
Figure 4). The results are virtually identical to the previous specification. To maximize 
the comparability between the strong and weak arguments, only these 8 “pairs” of 
evidence were used in Experiment 2. 
   
3.5    Experiment 2: The Affordable Care Act 
 
There are two important caveats to Experiment 1. First, participants did not 
actually update their beliefs, unlike a typical experiment that tests the effects of a political 
argument. Instead, they just indicated how they would assess the likelihood of the health 
economists’ prediction being correct, “if and when” a hypothetical study presents a piece 
of information as its finding. They might respond differently when the facts are presented 
as actual findings from real data. In addition, there is an important distinction to make 
between a belief about a specific consideration (cost) about the ACA, and overall 
attitudes toward the law. As conventionally defined, the latter would be the weighted 
average of multiple beliefs (Fishbein 1963). Even if strong counterevidence can change 
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people’s beliefs, it may ultimately fail to change attitudes, if people search their 
memories to muster up reasons to draw the desired conclusion based on other beliefs 
about the law (see Kunda 1990, 483). Experiment 2 addresses these concerns by having 
participants read an argument coupled with the strong or weak evidence identified in 
Experiment 1, and answer questions measuring beliefs and attitudes. The key dependent 
variables are beliefs about the impacts of the ACA’s on health cost increases as well as 
overall attitudes toward the law. The independent variable is exposure to one of four 
arguments that differ in terms of position (pro versus con), and evidence strength.  
 
Research Design 
Experiment 2 was conducted in four waves. In the first wave, pre-treatment 
covariates were measured, including the baseline values of the dependent variables, and 
prior knowledge about the ACA.42 Survey responses were gathered from 2,029 
participants recruited via Mechanical Turk in May 2016. Each participant was paid $0.35. 
Following a week of “washout period,” 1,800 of the initial respondents were invited to 
participate in the main experiment. Those who failed a screener question and non-U.S. 
citizens were not invited. Among the invited respondents, 1,514 completed the second 
wave. Initially, participants were paid $0.75 for Wave 2, though I increased the payment 
amount to $1 and then to $1.5 to maximize the completion rate.  
                                                 
42 Some covariates were measured in the second wave. This decision was made based on 
(1) whether answering the questions would plausibly affect how participants respond to 
to the treatments, or (2) whether the treatments would plausibly affect the answers to the 
questions.  
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Participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions: strong con, weak 
con, weak pro, strong pro, and placebo. Those assigned to one of the first four conditions 
received an argument about the ACA’s impact on health costs, constructed from the 
materials pre-tested in Experiment 1 (see Appendix C for the full texts of these 
arguments). In these cases, the arguments began by stating “health experts have been 
keeping close taps on how the law is changing America’s health care system.” In the con 
conditions, the arguments went on to say “[D]espite some successes, Obamacare [the 
ACA] is failing to address one of the most serious problems of America’s health care 
system: the rising costs,” and then presented the health economists’ theoretical 
explanation that was used in Experiment 1 as well. In the pro conditions, the messages 
said “the ACA is successfully addressing the rising costs,” and then provided an 
explanation. In all four cases, participants were told “now, there is mounting evidence 
that that the health economists were right,” followed by four pieces of evidence pretested 
in Experiment 1. In the strong pro condition, for example, participants were provided 
with the following facts: 
 
1. Confirming health economists’ key assumption about expanding the insurance 
pool, an analysis by the Department of Health and Human Services indicates 
that the uninsured rate for non-elderly adults has decreased by 43%, over the 
two years after the reform. 
 
2.  According to a report by the Kaiser Family Foundation, the overall premium 
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for employer-sponsored health insurance rose by 3.8% each year since the 
reform. By contrast, during the Bush years, premiums increased on average by 
8.8 % each year. 
 
3.  According to the latest data released by the Centers for Medicaid and 
Medicare Services, the annual growth in national out-of-pocket spending was 
1.3% in 2014. Again this is lower than the annual growth rates under Bush 
(5.6% on average). 
 
4. Earlier this year, Kaiser Family Foundation released an analysis showing 
premiums in the Obamacare Marketplaces decreased by 0.7% nationwide, after 
accounting for tax credits. In comparison, the national individual health 
insurance premium had increased by 10 to 12% per year before the reform, 
according to an analysis by an MIT economist. 
 
The arguments then concluded by emphasizing the importance of the “positive 
[warning] signs.” Across these four conditions, the wordings were kept as close as 
possible.43 In the placebo condition, participants read a message about the debt crisis in 
Greece.44 The five messages were similar in length (between 416 to 462 words).  
                                                 
43 In each of the four treatment conditions, the law was referred to as “the Affordable 
Care Act” (and then as “the ACA”) for half of participants, and as “Obamacare” for the 
other half, by random assignments. I found no evidence that this wording choice altered 
the treatment effects, so I pool them. 
44 In Experiment 3, I added a control condition where participants did not read any 
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The second wave of Experiment 2 was conducted as follows. First, participants 
answered general political knowledge questions,45 followed by a screener question.46. The 
next step was the core part of this experiment. Participants were provided with one of the 
five arguments to which they were randomly assigned, and asked to read the arguments 
carefully.47 Then participants evaluated the strength of the argument and answered the 
post-treatment measures of attitudes and belief about the law. Subsequently, participants 
answered questions for potential moderators—e.g., need for cognition, demographic 
characteristics, etc. Finally, they were asked to recall the contents of the argument.48  
                                                 
message to address the (unlikely) concern that the placebo had impacts on participants’ 
attitudes on American political issues. I found no evidence for this possibility. 
45 General political knowledge questions were asked at the beginning as a “warm up” 
exercise. I assumed that they are unlikely to have priming effects. 
46 Similar to Experiment 1, participants were instructed to “ignore the question and select 
the Drudge Report and the NPR website and none of the above as your three answers and 
none of the above as your two answers," before being asked to identify the news website 
they visit. 71.1% of participants correctly marked the two options, whereas 22.2% 
marked only one or two of them—mostly failing to notify the “none of the above” part of 
the instruction. I dropped the remaining 6.7%, who would most likely add noise, and 
underweighted those who marked only one or two options correctly by 0.5. Appendix B 
provides the results that treat low attention respondents in the same was high attention 
respondents. The findings are virtually identical.  
47 Participants were told that there would be recall questions toward the end of the survey. 
The time that each participant spent on the message page was recorded. Its 99%-trimmed 
mean was 143 seconds. The median was 113 seconds. Most participants (93.4 %) spent at 
least 30 seconds reading the presented article. I did not drop those spent less time from 
the analyses below, because doing so may compromise the comparability across 
experimental conditions. 
48 Two recall questions were used. The first one was choosing the factual evidence 
included provided in the message one read. 78.9% of those in the treatment groups gave 
correct answers. The second one was choosing the economic term that the argument used 
to explain the health economists’ theory. 47.5% of the treated respondents correctly 
identified “adverse selection,” 7.8% chose one of the incorrect answers, and the rest said 
they were not sure.  
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Those who took part in the main experiment were invited to take two follow-up 
surveys. Wave 3 was launched about 80 days after Wave 2 (between late July and early 
August) in order to assess the longevity of the treatment effects. Wave 3 was completed 
by 899 participants. In the wake of the widely-covered story of premium increases that 
broke in late October, I re-contacted the participants to examine if (1) they received this 
information, and if (2) they changed their beliefs as a result.49 According to my 
classification, this story provides a piece of “strong con” evidence. The final survey was 
completed by 850 participants.  
 
Measurement 
 
Table 7: Measurement of Beliefs and Attitudes about the ACA 
Belief in cost saving effect (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83; scaled 0-1, with 1 indicating the pro-ACA side) 
1. In terms of health care costs, the reform law is changing the American health care system... (for the better/worse) 
2. The probability that the law slows down growth in health care costs over the next ten years is...(high/low) 
3. The probability that the law accelerates growth in health care costs over the next ten years is... (high/low) 
Attitudes toward ACA (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.96; scaled to 0-1, with 1 indicating the pro-ACA side) 
1. Do you support or oppose the health care reform law passed in 2010? 
2. Would you vote to repeal the health care reform law, if you were in Congress today? 
3. The health care reform law is changing the American health care system... (for the better/worse) 
4. The overall impacts of the health care reform law on the American people will be...(good/bad) 
5. The overall impacts of the health care reform law on you and your family will be... (good/bad) 
 
The key dependent variables are (1) belief in the ACA’s impact on health costs, 
and (2) attitudes toward the ACA. Appendix C reports additional analyses focusing on 
other dependent variables such as the intention to vote Democratic, support for President 
                                                 
49 The story broke on October 24th, 2016, and survey responses were collected between 
October 26th and November 3rd (but mostly in the first three days).  
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Obama, and so on. All dependent variables were coded so that higher values indicate the 
pro-ACA (and the Democratic) side. Table 7 lists the survey items used to measure 
beliefs and attitudes. See Appendix C for survey wordings and more information about 
measurements of other variables. 
 
Results 
The (immediate) treatment effects were estimated using the following regression 
model: 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑊𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑊𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑃𝑖 + 𝑖  (3.2) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖 is the dependent variable, and 𝑆𝐶𝑖, 𝑊𝐶𝑖, 𝑊𝑃𝑖 , 𝑆𝑃𝑖 are dummy variables marking 
the four treatment conditions to which participant i was assigned—e.g., SC indicates the 
strong con condition—, 𝛽0 is the control group mean, and 𝛽1 to 𝛽4 are the treatment 
parameters, and 𝑖 is an error term. To minimize error variance, and thus improve 
statistical precisions, I estimate the model with a set of pre-treatment covariates that are 
thought to be highly predictive of the dependent variables, including their lagged 
values.50 Reported from here on out are all covariate-adjusted estimates. Participants 
exhibiting low attention were underweighted.  
                                                 
50 When estimated without covariates, the point estimates are very similar, though 
standard errors are larger. For the results without pre-treatment covariates and additional 
robustness checks see Appendix C. 
 74 
The expectation under the (restrictive) Bayesian model is 𝛽1 < 𝛽2 < 0 < 𝛽3 < 𝛽4 
across priors. This model will be rejected if either of the skeptics’ hypotheses hold. 
Specifically, one will have strong evidence against the Bayesian model in favor of the 
uncritical public hypothesis when one finds 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 < 0 < 𝛽3 = 𝛽4. One will have 
strong evidence for the motivated reasoning hypothesis if 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 0 for proponents (or 
Democrats), and 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 = 0 for opponents (or Republicans).
51 If there is a backfire 
effect, one will find 𝛽1 > 0 and  𝛽2 > 0 for supporters (or Democrats), and 𝛽3 < 0 and 
𝛽4 < 0 for opponents (or Republicans).  
Table 8 reports Experiment 2’s main results (see Panel A). The first three columns 
demonstrate the treatment effects on belief in the ACA’s cost saving effect. Column 1 for 
all participants, and Columns 2 and 3 for opponents and supporters respectively. The 
results are remarkably consistent with the Bayesian model. The average effect of the 
strong con message is a 13.0 percentage point decrease. The weak con message’s effect is 
-9.2 percentage points. The pro-ACA argument coupled with weak evidence increase 
people’s belief in the ACA’s cost preserving effect by 8.4 percentage points, and the 
strong pro evidence raises the effect to 12.6 percentage points. The estimate of  𝛽2 is 
significantly higher than 𝛽1 (p < 0.01); 𝛽3 is significantly higher than 𝛽2 (p < 0.001); and 
𝛽4 is significantly higher than 𝛽3 (p < 0.01). To put the sizes of these effects in context, 
the gap between the strong con evidence condition and the strong pro evidence condition 
                                                 
51 I subset the data by prior attitudes toward the ACA in the analyses presented below. 
Similar analyses subsetting the data by partisan identity is provided in Appendix C. I 
reach the same general conclusion using this alternative specification. 
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(𝛽4 − 𝛽1 = 0.130 + 0.126 = 0.256) is comparable to the average difference between 
Democrats and Republicans at the baseline (0.256).  
 
Table 8: Treatment Effects on ACA Opinions (Experiment 2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Belief in Cost Saving Effect Attitudes toward ACA 
Subset All Opponent Supporter All Opponent Supporter 
Panel A 
      
Strong Con (𝛽1) -0.130* -0.089* -0.156* -0.082* -0.030* -0.109* 
 (0.014) (0.024) (0.017) (0.011) (0.017) (0.015) 
Weak Con (𝛽2) -0.092* -0.061* -0.105* -0.038* -0.029* -0.041* 
 (0.014) (0.025) (0.016) (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) 
Weak Pro (𝛽3) 0.084* 0.088* 0.082* 0.035* 0.072* 0.013 
 (0.014) (0.024) (0.016) (0.010) (0.018) (0.012) 
Strong Pro (𝛽4) 0.126* 0.137* 0.119* 0.060* 0.101* 0.032* 
 (0.014) (0.025) (0.017) (0.011) (0.019) (0.012) 
AIC -1077 -301 -786 -1711 -586 -1119 
Panel B 
      
Linear Slope 0.275* 0.242* 0.295* 0.143* 0.147* 0.135* 
  (0.013) (0.023) (0.015) (0.011) (0.018) (0.013) 
AIC -1073 -304 -783 -1715 -584 -1111 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1412 563 829 1412 563 829 
* p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Covariates include the lagged values of the dependent variables, party ID, evaluations of 
Obama (overall and healthcare), and vote choice. Low attention participants are 
underweighted. The coefficients on the intercepts and the covariates are not shown. See 
Appendix C.3 for the full reports. 
 
 
In columns 2 and 3, I demonstrate that the treatment effects are fairly consistent 
across prior attitudes. While the overall differences across experimental conditions are 
somewhat larger for proponents, this heterogeneity is small considering the overall effect 
sizes. Presumably, it reflects a floor effect for opponents, whose baseline belief in ACA’s 
cost saving effect is lower (0.309) than proponents’ belief is high (0.584), as measured by 
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the control group’s means. Another noticeable difference is that con arguments produce 
larger changes for proponents, and pro arguments produce larger changes for opponents, 
again probably reflecting ceiling and floor effects. Importantly, to the extent there is 
difference in the treatment effects, it is in the opposite direction of what should have 
happened had people been motivated to eschew counterevidence. Indeed, the 
heterogeneous treatment effects reduce the pre-existing belief gap.52 
In Columns 4 to 6, I show that the treatments shifted people’s attitudes toward the 
ACA (scaled 0-1, with 1 indicating most favorable attitudes) in a manner consistent with 
the Bayesian model. In particular, the strong pro argument increases support for the law 
by 6.0 percentage points on average, doing so by 10.1 points for opponents and by 3.0 
percentage points for proponents. This means that the argument decreases the pre-
existing difference by 7.1 percentage points. The strong con argument also undercuts 
support for the law by 8.0 percentage points on average, and by 10.9 points for 
supporters. The effects on this dependent variable are not as large as the effects on belief 
about costs. Conceiving an attitude as the summary of various beliefs (Fishbein 1963; see 
also Zaller 1992), this is not surprising; health costs would be one of many things people 
consider as they form their opinion about the law.  
 
 
                                                 
52 In Appendix C, I show that even those who exhibited strong attitudes toward the ACA 
at the baseline survey are influenced in a similar way. They, too, adjusted their beliefs and 
attitudes in response to counter arguments. I also show in the appendix that the treatment 
effects are similar for those who supported different presidential candidates in the 2016 
election cycle (e.g., Clinton versus Trump). 
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Figure 5: Adjusted Means across Experimental Conditions 
 
Note: OLS estimates based on Table 8. Vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals. 
Estimates are adjusted for pretreatment covariates including the lagged values of the 
dependent variables, party ID, evaluations of Obama (overall and healthcare), and vote 
choice. Low attention participants are underweighted. Unadjusted means are similar, 
though confidence intervals wider.  
 
 
Figure 5 summarizes the results by presenting the adjusted group means across 
the experimental conditions. As can be seen at a glance, the treatments shifted people’s 
beliefs and attitudes in a more or less linear fashion. This means that a single coefficient 
of the “linear slope” may summarize the results more efficiently with greater statistical 
power, though doing so involves restricting a change from each condition to the next 
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(e.g., strong con from weak con) to be the same across the spectrum. Panel B of Table 8 
provides the estimates of these “slopes.”53 The overall treatment effects are estimated to 
be between 24.2 to 29.5 percentage points on belief changes, and between 13.5 to 14.7 
points on attitude changes. 
By and large, the patterns shown above are consistent with what would happen 
when people have similar ideas about the certainty of evidence—i.e., the likelihoods of 
observing the “data” under the competing hypotheses about the ACA’s effects on health 
care costs—regardless of their priors. This apparently goes against the general findings of 
the motivated reasoning literature that people’s interpretation of new information is 
colored by their prior attitudes. As I have argued, the previous findings of “biased 
assimilation”—i.e., correlations between prior attitudes and argument evaluations—can 
reflect the remaining disagreements between people starting from different priors, instead 
of their tendency to discount counterevidence—i.e., biased likelihood functions. The fact 
that people unfavorably evaluated arguments that challenged their prior attitudes in 
ostensible perceived argument strength measures does not necessarily mean that people 
refuse to recognize the “force” of counterevidence. 
To make this point more precise, I calculated the likelihood ratios that correspond 
to the average belief changes summarized in the left panel of Figure 5—i.e., “the force of 
an argument, namely its general capacity of changing degrees of beliefs” (Hahn and 
Oaksford 2007, 710). The likelihood ratio of a pro argument is: 𝐿𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑜 =
𝑃 (𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑜|𝐻)
𝑃 (𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑜|~𝐻)
=
                                                 
53 Experimental conditions were coded as a continuous variable running from 0 (strong 
con) to 0.25 (weak con), 0.5 (placebo), 0.75 (weak pro), and to 1 (strong pro). 
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𝑃 (𝐻|𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑜)
𝑃 (~𝐻|𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑜)
∙
𝑃 (~𝐻)
𝑃 (𝐻)
, where H is the hypothesis that the ACA slows down cost growth, and 
~H is the contrary hypothesis. The likelihood ratio of a con argument is: 𝐿𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑛 =
𝑃 (𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛|~𝐻)
𝑃 (𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛|𝐻)
=
𝑃 (~𝐻|𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛)
𝑃 (𝐻|𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛)
∙
𝑃 (𝐻)
𝑃 (~𝐻)
. Defining the average respondent’s prior as the control 
group’s mean belief in H and her posterior given each argument as the treatment groups’ 
mean beliefs in H, the estimated value of the average respondent’s prior belief in H 
would be 𝛽0̂ = 0.47 and posterior belief given the strong pro argument would be 
𝛽0 + 𝛽4̂ = 0.60.
54 The corresponding likelihood ratio is  𝐿𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑜 =
0.60
(1−0.60)
∙
(1−0.47)
0.47
≈
1.66; that is, a change from 0.47 and 0.60 is what would happen if one interprets that the 
events described in the strong pro argument are 1.66 times more likely if H was true, than 
if it was false (under Bayes’ theorem). This framework was used to calculate the 
likelihood ratios of the four types of argument, as judged in the eyes of the average 
opponent and supporter of the law. Figure 6 provides the point estimates and 95% 
confidence intervals, obtained via bootstrapping.  
The figure shows that the likelihood ratios—i.e., “the force of an argument” (see 
Hahn and Oaksford 2007, 710)—differ significantly by argument type, but little by prior 
attitudes. The results suggest that people assigned higher diagnostic values to the 
arguments with stronger evidence (1.66 to 1.88) than weaker evidence (1.40 to 1.50). The 
figure also suggests that the likelihood ratios assigned by the average opponent and 
supporter are more or less the same across the four types of argument (all p >.10).55 If 
                                                 
54 I take these values as probability statements. That is, a respondent who scored 0.60 in 
the belief scale is taken to have given a 60% chance that the ACA controls costs. 
55 P-values are calculated via bootstrapping. 
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anything, the likelihood ratios associated with uncongenial arguments are higher than 
congenial arguments.  
 
Figure 6: Likelihood Ratios Corresponding to the Average Treatment Effects 
 
Note. The estimates are calculated based on the group means shown in the left panel of 
Figure 5. Vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals.  
 
 
In contrast, people’s stated evaluations of arguments are correlated positively and 
substantially with prior attitudes for both proponents and opponents, as shown in Figure 
7.56 The discrepancy between Figures 6 and 7 underscores the need to differentiate 
between people’s responses to the conventional measures of perceived argument strength 
                                                 
56 See Appendix C for more information about the measurement of perceived argument 
strength, as well as the regression models, from which the figure is drawn. 
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and their actual interpretation of how probative the given evidence is—i.e., likelihood 
functions. As long as people have similar likelihood functions, no matter how they 
ostensibly evaluate the arguments, Bayes’ theorem predicts people’s beliefs will 
eventually converge to the available evidence as the clarity and amount of (received) 
information increases (see Tetlock 2005, 310 for an example of a formal demonstration 
of the latter point). 
 
Figure 7: Perceived Argument Strength by Argument Type and Prior Attitudes 
 
Note: Based on regression estimates reported in Appendix C. Dots are marginal means, 
adjusted for pretreatment covariates including lagged values of the dependent variables, 
party ID, evaluations of Obama (overall and healthcare), and vote choice. Vertical lines 
are 95% confidence intervals.   
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I have looked closely at the potential difference in treatment effects by prior 
attitudes (and by party ID in Appendix C). Now I examine treatment effect heterogeneity 
by other respondent characteristics. These factors include several direct and indirect 
indicators of the importance of health care (costs), political knowledge, need for 
cognition, and demographics. This exercise serves two purposes. From an empirical 
standpoint, it allows me to examine the generalizability of the findings of the current 
experiment that draws on a convenience sample from Mechanical Turk. Compared to the 
general U.S population, MTurk respondents are known to be more Democratic and 
liberal, more politically informed, high on need for cognition, less wealthy, younger, 
more educated and so on (Berinsky et al. 2012). In the presence of substantial treatment 
effect heterogeneity along these factors, one should be wary of the possibility that the 
impacts of the arguments are overstated (or understated for that matter) here, due to the 
peculiar sample attributes.  
Exploring moderating effects can also have theoretical implications, because the 
hypotheses discussed above can be extended to specify the boundary conditions under 
which new information does (and does not) make an impact. For example, issues deemed 
personally important can trigger defensive reactions, thereby attenuating the treatment 
effects, according to the motivated reasoning hypothesis (see Leeper 2014). In contrast, 
under the Bayesian framework, incoming information will be weighted more heavily 
when it is personally relevant than when it is not, even if it is not consistent with one’s 
prior beliefs.57 Since I have been examining the effects of four types of arguments on two 
                                                 
57 This is because people are expected to construct less discriminant likelihood functions 
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outcome variables, introducing 14 moderating variables means that there are 4×2×14 =
112 interaction terms to estimate and interpret. To reduce the complexity, I focus on the 
differences in the “linear slopes” instead. I estimate 28 regression models that allow the 
slopes to vary by each individual trait, by interacting it with experimental conditions 
(operationalized as a continuous variable), and pre-treat covariates. Table 9 summarizes 
the results.  
As shown in Column 1, the treatment effects on the belief in ACA’s effect on cost 
growth are highly consistent across a variety of individual factors. Some “significant” 
differences do appear, but they are fairly small in substantive terms, and mostly fail to 
survive the Holm correction for multiple (14) comparisons. Given this consistency, it 
appears highly implausible that the treatment effects on beliefs would completely 
disappear or even flip signs when examined with a different sample that is more 
representative of the U.S. population. 
Even if an argument creates similar changes in the beliefs about an objective 
attribute of a policy—whether it raises health care costs—its impact on overall attitudes 
can vary across individual differences in evaluative criteria. In the second column, I 
report more noticeable interaction effects on attitudes toward the ACA. Six out of the 14 
variables moderate the treatment effects at the p < 0.1 level, three of which remain 
statistically significant even after correcting for multiple comparisons. Interestingly, I  
                                                 
(i.e., likelihood ratio close to 1) when the presented information is not relevant to their 
concerns. For example, someone who does not care at all health care costs but cares 
deeply about something else (e.g., the size of the federal government) is less likely to be 
influenced by the arguments, even if the evidence is strong, compared to someone for 
whom the rising costs are of greater concern.  
 84 
Table 9: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by 14 Individual Traits (Experiment 2) 
  (1) (2)  
 Moderating Variables Beliefs Attitudes N 
1 ACA Opponent 0.242* (0.023) 0.147* (0.018) 563 
 ACA Supporter 0.295* (0.015) 0.135* (0.014) 892 
     Difference in Treatment Effect 0.053* (0.028) -0.012 (0.023)  
2 Republican 0.216* (0.025) 0.121* (0.020) 396 
 Democrat 0.300* (0.016) 0.148* (0.014) 842 
     Difference in Treatment Effect 0.084** (0.030) 0.027 (0.025)  
3 Cost Importance < 1 0.280* (0.013) 0.136* (0.012) 1120 
 Cost Importance = 1 (Highest) 0.273* (0.036) 0.176* (0.027) 292 
     Difference in Treatment Effect -0.007 (0.038) 0.040 (0.030)  
4 Healthcare Importance Low-mid 0.275* (0.018) 0.136* (0.015) 769 
 Healthcare Importance High 0.279* (0.019) 0.156* (0.017) 643 
     Difference in Treatment Effect 0.004 (0.026) 0.020 (0.022)  
5 No Problems with Medical Bills 0.273* (0.017) 0.116* (0.015) 795 
 Had Problems with Medical Bills 0.272* (0.020) 0.177* (0.016) 617 
     Difference in Treatment Effect -0.001 (0.026) 0.061** (0.022)  
6 Insured 0.289* (0.014) 0.143* (0.012) 1187 
 Uninsured 0.180* (0.037) 0.149* (0.033) 207 
     Difference in Treatment Effect -0.109* (0.040) 0.007 (0.035)  
7 Middle or Upper Class 0.267* (0.017) 0.117* (0.014) 886 
 Working or Poor Class 0.291* (0.020) 0.182* (0.017) 621 
     Difference in Treatment Effect 0.024 (0.026) 0.065** (0.022)  
8 Income ≥ $50,000 0.302* (0.018) 0.119* (0.015) 694 
 Income < $50,000 0.254* (0.018) 0.169* (0.016) 718 
     Difference in Treatment Effect -0.048* (0.026) 0.050* (0.022)  
9 High Political Knowledge 0.274* (0.019) 0.105* (0.015) 664 
 Low Political Knowledge 0.275* (0.018) 0.175* (0.016) 748 
     Difference in Treatment Effect 0.002 (0.026) 0.070** (0.022)  
10 High Need for Cognition 0.280* (0.019) 0.121* (0.015) 682 
 Low Need for Cognition 0.265* (0.017) 0.163* (0.016) 730 
     Difference in Treatment Effect -0.015 (0.026) 0.042* (0.022)  
11 4 Year College or higher 0.293* (0.017) 0.120* (0.014) 751 
 2 Year College or lower 0.255* (0.020) 0.166* (0.017) 661 
     Difference in Treatment Effect -0.038 (0.026) 0.046* (0.022)  
12 Age ≥ 35 0.267* (0.019) 0.133* (0.016) 604 
 Age < 35 0.279* (0.018) 0.148* (0.015) 808 
     Difference in Treatment Effect 0.012 (0.026) 0.015 (0.022)  
13 Male 0.278* (0.018) 0.135* (0.015) 696 
 Female 0.274* (0.019) 0.153* (0.015) 716 
     Difference in Treatment Effect -0.005 (0.026) 0.018 (0.022)  
14 White 0.271* (0.015) 0.141* (0.013) 1066 
 Non-White 0.287* (0.025) 0.153* (0.022) 346 
     Difference in Treatment Effect 0.016 (0.029) 0.013 (0.026)  
 Covariates Yes Yes  
 Moderator ×Covariates Yes Yes  
* p < 0.1 (No correction). ** p <0.1 (Holm corrections for 14 comparisons; reported for 
the interaction terms only). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. The 
set of covariates is the same as Table 8. 
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find that the effects are more pronounced for those who have had problems with medical 
bills (by 6.1 percentage points), and those who identify themselves as the working/poor 
class (by 6.5 points)—for whom, presumably, the rising costs would be of greater 
importance. Personal relevance appears to lead people to give more relative weights to 
incoming information than prior—a finding that is compatible with the Bayesian model, 
but not with the motivated reasoning theory.58  Nevertheless, even these differences are 
not big enough to make the treatment effects disappear for certain individuals. Across all 
subsets of the sample, the treatment effects on attitudes are in the double digits, again 
demonstrating a great deal of treatment effect homogeneity. 
 
Longevity of Treatment Effects 
Having documented immediate treatment effects, I now examine whether they 
persist for an extended period of time. Figure 8 reports the overall treatment effects (i.e., 
linear slopes) as measured about 80 days Wave 3), and 160 days after the main 
experiment (Wave 4). The effects did remain observable even a couple of months later, 
but decayed in the long run. On average, the overall effects on beliefs about health costs 
had diminished to about one-fourth of the original estimates (0.064/0.275) by the third 
wave (though remaining statistically significant at p < 0.001), and to less than one-tenth 
by the final survey (p = 0.301). As for attitudes toward the law, the treatment effects had 
disappeared entirely by Wave 3 and remained so until Wave 4. Perhaps the eventual 
                                                 
58 As is often the case, a strong causal interpretation of the interaction effects is not 
warranted, because they may reflect spurious correlations. 
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decay in the treatment effects is not surprising because, as shown in third panel of the 
figure, most respondents in the treatment groups were (understandably) not able to recall 
whether the message argued that Obamacare will increase/decrease healthcare costs in the 
follow-ups.  
 
Figure 8: Long-Run Effects on ACA Opinions (Experiment 2) 
 
Note: Based on regression estimates reported in Table A21 in Appendix C. Dots are 
overall treatment effects, adjusted for pretreatment covariates including baseline values of 
the dependent variables, party ID, evaluations of Obama (overall and healthcare), and 
vote choice. Vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals.   
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3.6    Observational Replication of the ACA Experiment 
 
The main experiment is designed to measure the effects of new information in a 
closely controlled setting. While it allows for a strong causal inference, it may be 
questionable as to how far the findings can be generalized to how people update their 
political opinions in light of new information in other contexts (see Shadish et al. 2002, 
Chap. 3). First, people may have paid unusually high attention to the messages because 
they were informed that recall questions would follow. Second, the estimates reported 
above may be specific to the particular characteristics of the experimental stimuli; for 
example, the effects might have been smaller, had the messages been less civil and/or 
more partisan. Third, participants may have guessed the purpose of the experiment, and 
tried to give responses that would confirm the hypothesis.  
Wave 4 of the ACA study, which was fielded two days after news broke that 
ACA premiums are increasing by 22% in 2017, provides an excellent opportunity to 
addresses these concerns and strengthen the external validity of this research by shedding 
light on how people respond to new information received in a non-artificial “real world” 
setting. To do so, I asked participants if they heard or seen any news about health 
insurance rates in 2017 over the past few days,59 and compared those who did and did not 
receive the information. Admittedly, this particular analysis is not experimental, and thus 
requires an identifying assumption. To identify the effect of the new information, I 
                                                 
59 56.5% responded yes, and most of them (98.1%) correctly indicated that the news reports 
suggest premiums will increase next year. 
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regressed the dummy variable indicating whether one received the news, the lagged 
dependent variables measured in the prior three waves, as well as other political variables 
highly predictive of ACA beliefs and attitudes (e.g., PID).60 The identifying assumption 
was that those who had the same opinions at prior waves would have had the same 
opinions in the absence of exposure to the premium increase story (Angrist and Pischke 
2009, 244). Consistent with this assumption, the exposed and unexposed groups did not 
differ significantly in their attitudes and beliefs measured in Wave 3, conditional on 
Wave 1 and Wave 2 covariates. Likewise, their Wave 2 opinions were statistically 
indistinguishable, conditional on Wave 1 covariates. 
 
Figure 9: Effects of Exposure to the Coverage of 2017 ACA Premium Increases 
 
Note. Based on regression estimates reported in Table A22 in Appendix C. Dots are the 
effects of exposure to the premium increase story. Vertical lines are 95% confidence 
intervals. “Oppnnts” stands for “Opponents.” “Spprtrs” stands for “Supporters.” All 
estimates are adjusted for pre-treatment covariates including lagged dependent variables. 
 
                                                 
60 Appendix B reports similar findings using a specification that controls only for lagged 
dependent variable at Wave 3. It also reports consistent negative effects when the respondents are 
subset by party ID instead of prior ACA attitudes.  
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As shown in Figure 9, receiving the news appears to have lowered people’s belief 
in ACA’s cost saving effect by 3.6 percentage points, and overall support for the law by 
2.4 points on average. Importantly, the results show that supporters of the law (and 
Democrats) moved in the negative direction upon exposure to the unwelcoming 
information, instead of ignoring it outright or backlashing. Again, this is consistent with 
the findings of the main experiment, and not with the motivated reasoning hypothesis. 
 
3.7    Experiment 3: The Economy  
 
While the Affordable Care Act is obviously one of the most polarized political 
issues of the day, one may point out that the law is only two years old. Few people know 
about the provisions of the law in detail, and fewer still have a comprehensive knowledge 
of the tangible changes that the law has introduced to the American health care system, 
which might have attenuated the effects of motivated bias (Taber and Lodge 2006). 
Experiment 3 replicates the main results of Experiment 2, focusing on another 
contentious, but much older, issue in American politics—which party is strongest at 
improving the nation’s economic performance. 
 
Research Design 
Unlike Experiment 2, all pre-treatment covariates were measured within the same 
wave as the treatment. Twelve hundred (1200) respondents were recruited via 
Mechanical Turk and completed the survey in April 2016. Each participant was paid 
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$1.25. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions: strong income 
evidence, weak income evidence, strong GDP evidence, weak GDP evidence, placebo, 
and control. 
 
Figure 10: Charts in the Strong (Left) vs. Weak (Right) Conditions 
 
Note: Modified replications of Blinder and Watson (2016).  
 
 
The evidence presented to the first experimental group (strong income growth 
evidence) is a slightly modified replication of Bartels’ analysis (2008), which shows that 
incomes grew generally faster under Democratic Presidents than Republican ones, 
especially for the working class.61 To create its weaker counterpart (the second treatment 
                                                 
61 I also acknowledge that parts of the arguments used in the experiment are taken 
directly from Bartels’ (2012) article, published on Salon.com. 
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group), I unfaithfully replicated Bartels’ (2008) findings, searching for a specification 
that makes the partisan performance gaps appear much smaller, though not completely 
absent. I took the same approach for the third and fourth treatment groups (strong and 
weak GDP growth evidence groups), based on a study by Blinder and Watson (2016), 
which shows that GDP grew much faster under Democratic Presidents than Republican 
ones. Each argument contained a chart that summarizes mean differences. Figure 10 
provides the examples from the third (strong GDP evidence) and fourth (weak GDP 
evidence) conditions. Appendix C provides more information about these “replications.” 
Those assigned to one of the first four conditions then received an argument about 
the historic differences in economic performance under Democratic and Republican 
Presidents since the 1950s. The first two focused on income growth, and the other two 
focused on GDP growth. The arguments all claimed that Democratic Presidents 
historically handled the economy better than Republican Presidents.62 All facts presented 
in these conditions are generated based on my calculations, using the official data sources 
cited in the messages; the U.S. Census Bureau in the first two and the National Bureau of 
Economic Research in the other two.  
By analyzing the income data and GDP data firsthand, I was able to calculate the 
p-values, and incorporate that information in manipulating the uncertainty of the 
evidence. For example, those assigned to the strong income evidence condition were told 
“a regression analysis (a standard statistical technique) indicates that there is about a 1 in 
1000 chance that a difference like this would pop up, simply because Democrats got 
                                                 
62 In other words, there was no pro-Republican argument in this experiment. 
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lucky, when there’s nothing inherently better about their policies.” Those in the 
corresponding weak condition were told “there is less than a 3 in 7 chance.” In Bayesian 
terms, these quantities represent the probabilities of observing the data under the null 
hypothesis, or P (E|~H), which comprise the denominators of the likelihood ratios. All of 
the four arguments concluded by suggesting that past performance provides important 
information about the future as well. The placebo group read a message about debt crisis 
in Greece, which also included a chart. The control group did not read any argument. The 
full texts can be found in Appendix C. 
Experiment 3 was conducted as follows. The experiment began with questions 
measuring various pre-treatment covariates, including prior retrospective evaluations of 
the two major parties, followed by a screener question. Then, those assigned to the 
treatment and the placebo conditions were provided with one of the five messages. After 
reading the messages, these participants were asked to evaluate the argument.63 Those in 
the control group skipped these steps. Then all participants answered questions measuring 
the dependent variable—their retrospective and prospective economic evaluations of the 
major parties. Finally, they were asked to recall the contents of the argument.64  
 
                                                 
63 The time that each participant spent on the message page was recorded. Its 99%-
trimmed mean was 145 seconds. The median was 113 seconds. Most participants 
(89.7 %) spent at least 30 seconds reading the presented article. I did not drop those spent 
less time from the analyses below, because doing so might compromise the comparability 
across experimental conditions. 
64 Two recall questions were used. The first one asked respondents to choose the main 
claim of the message. 78.7% of those in the treatment groups gave correct answers. The 
second one involved choosing the chart they saw in the message. 80.8% of the treated 
respondents correctly identified the chart included in each argument.  
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Measurement 
 
Table 10: Measurement of Retrospective and Prospective Economic Evaluations 
Retrospective Beliefs (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88; scaled 0-1, with 1 indicating the pro-Democratic side) 
1. Which party has done a better job of handling the national economy 
2. People like you have been better off under… 
3. Which party has done a better job of handling income inequality 
Prospective Beliefs (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.93; scaled to 0-1, with 1 indicating the pro-Democratic side) 
1. Which party will do a better job of handling the national economy 
2. Expect the national economy to get better, if a Democratic candidate wins 
3. Expect the national economy to get better, if a Republican candidate wins 
4. Between Democratic and Republican economic policies, which will generate faster economic growth 
5. People like you will be better off financially under 
6. Expect the total income of your household will go up or down, if a Democratic candidate wins 
7. Expect the total income of your household will go up or down, if a Republican candidate wins 
8. Between Democratic and Republican economic policies, which will make the your income grow faster 
9. Which party will do a better job of handling income inequality 
10. Expect income distribution to become more equal, or less equal than now, if a Democratic candidate wins 
11. Expect income distribution to become more equal, or less equal than now, if a Republican candidate wins 
12. Between Democratic and Republican economic policies, which will reduce income inequality more 
 
The key dependent variables in Experiment 3 are retrospective and prospective 
evaluations of the economic performance of the two major parties.65 Table 10 lists the 15 
survey items that were used to measure economic evaluations along with reliability 
statistics (for additional information about the measurements, see Appendix D). 
 
Results 
To simplify the analyses and presentation of the findings, I collapse the six 
conditions into three: (1) strong income/GDP evidence, (2) weak income/GDP evidence, 
                                                 
65 See Appendix D for additional analyses examining the “carryover” treatment effects on 
vote choice and so on.  
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and (3) control/placebo.66 As with Experiment 2, I also estimate the “linear slope” of 
treatment effects by operationalizing the experiment conditions as a single continuous 
variable representing a scale of evidence strength (0 = control/placebo, 0.5 = weak; 
1=strong). In short, the treatment effects are estimated using the following regression 
equations: 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝑖  (3.3) and 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐸𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖  (3.4). 
 
Table 11 reports Experiment 3’s main results. Notably, the effects appear to be 
much more modest than the belief changes observed in Experiment 2.67 But the central 
expectations of the restrictive Bayesian model generally hold up. As shown in Columns 1 
and 4, the arguments with strong evidence had significant, though incremental, effects on 
both retrospective (5.5 percentage points) and prospective beliefs (3.4 percentage points) 
                                                 
66 In Appendix D, I report additional analyses estimating the effects of each of the four 
treatment conditions. Appendix D also provides results based on alternative 
operationalization of the dependent variables, by dividing them into three sub-elements: 
sociotropic evaluations; pocketbook evaluations; income inequality evaluations. Although 
it was not my primary concern, I examined whether the GDP arguments had more 
pronounced effects on socio-tropic evaluations; and whether the income arguments on 
evaluations of the handling of income inequality in the appendix. This indeed was the 
case. 
67 There are several possibilities as to why this was the case. The reason may be 
something substantive—people had more certain prior beliefs about the economy; or 
methodological—responses to pre-treatment questionnaires had stronger impacts because 
they were measured within the same wave; or something artificial—the arguments were 
not as well written as Experiment 2. 
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for the participants as a whole. Meanwhile, the effects of weak evidence were about half 
the size of the strong one (3.7 and 1.7 percentage points). The estimates of 𝛽2 are 
significantly higher than 𝛽1 for both retrospective (p = 0.07) and prospective evaluations 
(p = 0.02). Columns 2 and 3 (and Columns 5 and 6) compare the treatment effects for 
Republicans and Democrats. I do not find that Republicans ignored the uncongenial 
arguments—in which case both 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 should have been zero—nor do I find that they 
backlash—in which case both 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 should have taken on negative values. If 
anything, the treatments had larger impacts on Republicans, though the difference 
between strong versus weak arguments were pronounced only for Democrats. 
 
Table 11: Treatment Effects on Economic Evaluations (Experiment 3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Retrospective Beliefs Prospective Beliefs 
Subset All Rep Dem All Rep Dem 
Panel A       
Weak 0.037* 0.070* 0.017 0.017* 0.040* 0.007 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.012) (0.007) (0.014) (0.009) 
Strong 0.055* 0.074* 0.037* 0.034* 0.033* 0.031* 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009) 
AIC -1449 -346 -919 -2065 -569 -1252 
Panel B       
Linear Slope 0.055* 0.077* 0.037* 0.034* 0.035* 0.031* 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009) 
AIC -1450 -344 -921 -2067 -567 -1253 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1100 319 654 1100 319 654 
Note. * p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Covariates include party ID, favorite Presidential candidate (among Clinton, Sanders, 
Trump, Cruz and Kasich), vote choice in 2012, evaluations of Obama (overall, economy 
and inequality), pre-treatment retrospective evaluations of the two parties. The 
coefficients on the intercepts and covariates are not shown. See Appendix D for the full 
reports. 
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Table 12: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by 11 Individual Traits (Experiment 3) 
  (1) (2)  
Model Moderating Variables Retrospective Prospective N 
1 Republican 0.078* (0.018) 0.037* (0.013) 319 
 Democrat 0.038* (0.011) 0.032* (0.009) 654 
     Difference in Treatment Effect -0.040* (0.021) -0.005 (0.016)  
2 Economy Importance Low 0.051* (0.014) 0.031* (0.012) 476 
 Economy Importance High 0.058* (0.012) 0.036* (0.009) 624 
     Difference in Treatment Effect 0.007 (0.019) 0.005 (0.015)  
3 Equality Importance Low 0.057* (0.011) 0.031* (0.009) 646 
 Equality Importance High 0.052* (0.014) 0.039* (0.011) 458 
     Difference in Treatment Effect -0.005 (0.018) 0.008 (0.015)  
4 Middle or Upper Class 0.045* (0.012) 0.024* (0.009) 465 
 Working or Poor Class 0.066* (0.014) 0.047* (0.012) 625 
     Difference in Treatment Effect 0.021 (0.018) 0.023 (0.015)  
5 Income ≥ $50,000 0.045* (0.013) 0.030* (0.009) 562 
 Income < $50,000 0.062* (0.013) 0.037* (0.010) 538 
     Difference in Treatment Effect 0.017 (0.018) 0.007 (0.014)  
6 High Knowledge 0.028* (0.011) 0.023* (0.009) 540 
 Low Knowledge 0.084* (0.014) 0.048* (0.011) 560 
     Difference in Treatment Effect 0.056** (0.018) 0.025* (0.014)  
7 High Need for Cognition 0.039* (0.012) 0.036* (0.010) 540 
 Low Need for Cognition 0.075* (0.014) 0.036* (0.011) 560 
     Difference in Treatment Effect 0.038* (0.018) 0.000 (0.015)  
8 4 Year College or higher 0.037* (0.012) 0.025* (0.009) 517 
 2 Year College or lower 0.075* (0.014) 0.042* (0.011) 583 
     Difference in Treatment Effect 0.038* (0.018) 0.017 (0.014)  
9 Age ≥ 35 0.066* (0.012) 0.050* (0.010) 604 
 Age < 35 0.047* (0.013) 0.026* (0.010) 496 
     Difference in Treatment Effect -0.019 (0.018) -0.024* (0.014)  
10 Male 0.061* (0.013) 0.046* (0.010) 542 
 Female 0.048* (0.013) 0.023* (0.010) 558 
     Difference in Treatment Effect -0.014 (0.018) -0.023 (0.014)  
11 White 0.061* (0.010) 0.033* (0.008) 872 
 Non-White 0.034* (0.018) 0.039* (0.014) 228 
     Difference in Treatment Effect -0.027 (0.021) 0.006 (0.016)  
 Covariates Yes Yes  
 Moderator ×Covariates Yes Yes  
* p < 0.1 (No correction). ** p <0.1 (Holm corrections for 14 comparisons; reported for 
the interaction terms only). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. The 
set of covariates is the same as Table 11. 
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In Table 12, I explore whether the treatment effects interact with individual 
characteristics. The treatment effects are fairly consistent across a variety of individual 
factors. All but one interaction term fails to remain statistically significant, after 
correcting for multiple comparisons. The treatment effects remain statistically significant 
for all subsets of the sample. Overall, the key findings of Experiment 2 are replicated 
fairly well. 
 
Table 13: Long-run Effects on Economic Evaluations (Experiment 3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Retrospective Beliefs Prospective Beliefs 
Subset All Rep Dem All Rep Dem 
Linear Slope 0.028* 0.033 0.023* 0.012 0.022 0.010 
 (0.011) (0.022) (0.014) (0.009) (0.018) (0.012) 
AIC -1079 -265 -669 -1386 -361 -827 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 837 251 492 837 251 492 
Note. * p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 
 
Finally, Table 13 measure the treatment effects 1 or 2 weeks later. The estimated 
effects on retrospective evaluations retained about 50% of immediate effects (p < 0.05), 
whereas the effects on prospective evaluations were diminished to about 35% of the 
original size (p = 0.170). 
 
3.8    Summary 
 
Despite widespread skepticism, it remains elusive as to whether people can 
critically evaluate political information and revise opinions, because the benchmark itself 
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is often a moving target. In this chapter, I present three experiments that strongly support 
a Bayesian model of information processing. Across the experiments, people updated 
their beliefs and attitudes in light of the presented arguments. They did not mindlessly 
accept whatever arguments they encounter, nor did they reject uncongenial arguments 
outright. Instead, people account for the uncertainty of evidence as they form their 
posterior opinions, regardless of the congeniality of the incoming information. To answer 
the title question of this chapter, the quality of evidence matters. 
An encouraging implication of these findings is that people will eventually be 
able to know if a policy is in their interests, if they are exposed to a stream of 
information. On a related note, and contrary to prior research rooted in the motivated 
reasoning hypothesis (e.g., Nyhan and Reifler 2010), it also suggests that people will 
move away from political misbeliefs—defined as those inconsistent with the best 
available evidence—if sufficiently informed with facts where one side produces clearly 
better evidence than the other. A big caveat to this counterfactual prediction, however, is 
that most people do not consume much political information (Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1996), and those who do follow politics more regularly tend to be more aware of 
arguments that confirm their partisan viewpoints, as demonstrated in Chapter 2 (see also 
Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Jerit and Barabas 2012; Taber and Lodge 2006).  
The broad implications of this dissertation should, therefore, reflect and integrate 
the findings of both Chapters 2 and 3—a task set out for the following chapter.  
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Chapter 4    General Discussion 
 
 In American politics, controversies surrounding policy proposals rarely come 
down to a simple black and white choice. Almost every policy option entails trade-offs, 
with legitimate rationales for supporting or opposing them. In this regard, democratic 
decision making necessitates taking potential advantages and disadvantages into 
consideration as one forms his or her opinion. Obviously, those who do not possess any 
knowledge about politics are not likely to make political decisions in such a fashion. 
They may not have any meaningful opinions at all (Converse 1964). A substantial body 
of theory and research has argued that “informed citizens are demonstrably better 
citizens, as judged by the standards of democratic theory and practice underpinning the 
American system” (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 272). Such citizens, it was found, are 
more engaged, better able to translate their interests into opinions, more likely to support 
democratic norms, and more likely to have stable opinions.  
 However, more recent research has counterbalanced this optimism, suggesting 
that politically knowledgeable citizens are more likely to develop systematically biased 
empirical beliefs; to align their opinions with their previously held values (Wells Reedy 
Gastil and Lee 2009); to respond to partisan polarization among elites in ways consistent 
with their own partisanship (Abramowitz 2010; Claassen and Highton 2009); and to 
engage in even more biased information processing and be more likely to polarize as a 
result (Taber and Lodge 2006). All of these tendencies seem to suggest that seemingly 
well informed citizens fall short by the standard of having “considered opinions.” The 
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first half of the current research (Chapter 2) represents a long overdue attempt resolve 
this discrepancy in the literature with a more nuanced conceptualization and measurement 
of political knowledge.  
 But even assuming citizens are provided with diverse information, the question 
remains as to whether they are capable of effectively using it, and thereby making 
competent decisions. Dishearteningly, the bulk of empirical research has called this 
assumption into question (see Achen and Bartels 2016, Chap. 2 for a recent review of this 
literature). To the extent that citizens encounter political messages, they tend to 
mechanically and even blindly rely on contextual cues and adopt elite positions instead of 
thinking critically (Broockman and Butler 2017.; Cohen 2003; Lenz 2012; Rahn 1993; 
Zaller 1992; 1996). And they tend to use a modicum of information they receive to 
rationalize and strengthen their partisan viewpoints (Lodge and Taber 2013; Taber and 
Lodge 2006). 
 But the case against evidence-based reasoning in a (hypothetically) informed 
electorate is not settled. While the examples of political persuasion have been 
documented in many experimental studies (see Druckman et al. 2013; Guess and 
Coppock 2015 for recent examples), few studies manipulate arguments in such a way that 
the observed persuasion can be considered clear evidence for (or against) citizens’ ability 
to critically evaluate the quality of information. In addition, fully rational Bayesians may 
appear to exhibit “biased assimilation”—the empirical bedrock of a second line of 
skepticism (e.g., Taber and Lodge 2013)—under some plausible conditions such as that 
people holding different values use differential evaluative criteria, and/or that their 
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responses to argument evaluation questionnaires are causally posterior to their 
conclusions. The second half of the current research (Chapter 3) represents an attempt to 
measure the extent to which evidence matters, directly pitting Bayesian rationality against 
the skeptics’ hypotheses. 
 
4.1    Main Findings and Their Implications for the Literature 
 
There are several important findings reported in the previous chapters. In Chapter 2, 
I showed that the range of considered argument is generally slanted in the direction of 
partisan identities, and that this tendency is far stronger among those who possess high 
levels of factual information. This raises important issues regarding the civic competence 
of the knowledgeable, and even what one means by concepts such as “informed 
opinions” or “political knowledge.” To be clear, nothing in these findings questions the 
beneficial role of factual information for democratic decision making. It does suggest, 
however, that the ways in which citizens receive and process political information do not 
necessarily lead them to “fully consider” the merits and perils of the choices they make. 
Given the skewed distribution of argument repertoires among the well informed, it is 
not surprising that “informed” and “considered” opinions diverge on the support for a 
universal healthcare program—the second takeaway of this dissertation. Taken together, 
these findings call for a conceptual distinction between “informed” opinion (e.g., Althaus 
1998; Gilens 2001), and “considered” opinion (e.g., Luskin et al. 2002), concepts which 
have been used interchangeably in the literature (e.g., Fishkin 1995; Price and Neijens 
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1998). Citizens could have a large base of information about politics, and still hold ill-
considered opinions. On a related note, they help explain why “informed” citizens exhibit 
arguably undesirable tendencies, such as holding incorrect beliefs aligned with their 
partisan identity (Achen and Bartels 2006; see also Taber and Lodge 2006). My research 
suggests that the limitations in conceptualization and measurement that have failed to 
purge political knowledge of biased awareness may be the reason for some of the 
apparent perils of “sophistication.”  
But no matter how one defines adequate political knowledge, the importance of 
being informed about politics ultimately depends on the assumption that people refine 
their opinion in light of what they have learned. Some find this assumption unrealistic. 
One concern is that people can easily be manipulated, often failing to account for the 
strength of empirical evidence as they form their opinions. Another concern is that they 
can be irrationally defensive about their partisan viewpoints often not budging an inch 
even when faced with strong counterevidence. Neither was the case in the experiments 
reported in Chapter 3. Instead, I found that people update their beliefs and attitudes in 
response not only to the position of the argument, but also the (un)certainty of evidence. 
Pro-ACA arguments shifted people’s mind in the expected direction, and more so when 
the evidence was strong. Perhaps more important, I found no evidence of defensive 
reaction to counter arguments, which is especially impressive considering that the 
experiments drew on highly contentious issues in American politics. The patterns of 
belief and attitude changes shown in the chapter imply that people evaluated the 
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diagnostic values of presented evidence in more or less the same way across prior 
attitudes, partisan identity, and other individual traits.  
These findings contribute to the long-standing controversy about citizens’ critical 
ability to use information and complement recent research demonstrating the effects of 
substantive information and arguments on policy opinions (e.g., Boudreau and 
MacKenzie 2014; Bullock 2011; Chong and Druckman 2010; Druckman et al. 2013; 
Guess and Coppock 2015; Mérola and Hitt 2016), by demonstrating particularly that 
evidentiary (un)certainty puts constraints on belief and attitude updating. This is rare 
evidence that people account for the differential probative values of strong versus weak 
evidence when they update their opinions—even when the evidence challenges prior 
opinions about highly contentious issues.  
My findings are seemingly inconsistent with two important strands of prior research: 
(1) partisan disagreements and misperceptions about factual matters at the macro-level 
(e.g., Bartels 2002; Berinsky 2012a; 2012b; 2015; Flynn et al. 2017; Jerit and Barabas 
2012; Kuklinski et al. 2000; but see Bullock et al. 2015; Prior et al. 2015); (2) and the 
micro-level findings of motivated reasoning whereby people reject uncongenial 
information when confronted, sometimes doubling down on their prior attitudes (e.g., 
Lord et al. 1979; Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Taber and Lodge 2006). I will now attempt to 
reconcile my findings with the large body of evidence documenting partisan bias. 
With respect partisan gaps in factual beliefs and misperceptions, the question is: how 
can such differences persist if partisans indeed interpret information in more or less the 
same way? A plausible explanation may be that people inevitably forget the specific 
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content of the new information over time, and as they do so, fall back on prior opinions 
and party identification. While some previous studies found persuasion effects lasting at 
least for a few weeks (e.g., Guess and Coppock 2015; but see Hill et al. 2013 and Gerber 
et al. 2011 for examples showing more rapid decay), rarely do researchers attempt to 
measure communication effects that last for several months, leaving open the possibility 
that communication effects become minimal in a longer stretch of time. Indeed, the 
treatment effects of new information found in Experiment 2 substantially decayed 
(though partially surviving) 80 days into the post-treatment period, and almost entirely 
disappeared in 160 days. Although hardly surprising, the long-run decay shown in my 
experiments has an important implication: even if new evidence matters momentarily, at 
the end of the day, public opinion would converge toward partisan viewpoints most of the 
time. As such, the force of the better evidence is itself transitory, often failing to upset the 
deeper partisan bedrock. 
Of course, partisans may converge toward the best available evidence if partisans 
continue to receive a stream of similar information doubling down on the same 
conclusion repeatedly. But this scenario seems unlikely, given citizens’ lack of interest in 
political issues and tendency to seek out information that confirms their pre-existing 
attitudes to the extent that they consume political information at all (Bullock 2009)—a 
point I return to below. 
How then can my findings be squared with the motivated reasoning literature (e.g., 
Kunda 1990; Lord et al. 1979; Miller et al. 1993; Taber and Lodge 2006; Nyhan and 
Reifler 2010; Nyhan et al. 2014)? First, it is worth re-emphasizing the point that people’s 
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response to ostensible argument evaluation items can differ across prior attitudes or 
partisan leaning even when they are in full agreement about the diagnostic values of the 
presented information. While such findings (conflicting evaluations about the same 
information among partisans) have been taken to show that the likelihood function of 
evidence is “biased” toward prior attitudes (e.g., Lord et al. 1979), they might also reflect 
the fact that people starting from different priors fail to converge in the end because the 
presented evidence is not clear enough (Gerber and Green 1999). Indeed, I would have 
concluded that the participants in the ACA experiments also engaged in biased 
assimilation, had I relied solely on how their stated evaluations of the arguments were 
dependent on their priors—a misguided conclusion, given the parallel (and sometimes 
convergent) belief updating patterns outlined throughout Chapter 3. This, of course, is not 
to say motivated reasoning never occurs, but to question its predominance as the default 
mode of political reasoning. 
Importantly, there exists a considerably smaller but more convincing body of 
evidence demonstrating “backfire” effects whereby people strengthen their prior opinions 
in face of counterevidence (Nyhan and Reifler 2010; 2015; Nyhan et al. 2014). This is 
more directly at odds the findings reported in Chapter 3 than other studies open to 
alternative explanations (e.g., Lord et al. 1979; Taber and Lodge 2006). But the 
prevalence of such backlash is also in dispute, as more recent studies found little to mixed 
evidence (Bishin et al. 2016; Guess and Coppock 2015; Wood and Porter 2016). Taken as 
a whole, there emerges an intriguing puzzle: under what conditions, does the force of 
evidence trump the power of denial? I examine this question in terms of whether my 
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findings can be generalized to different contexts, different issues, and different features of 
persuasive messages.  
With respect to the context, the online experiments presented in Chapter 3 were 
designed to isolate the effect of a single piece of argument. This “sterilized” setup is 
admittedly less than ideal, as it resembles neither the usual information environments in 
which citizens are situated nor the normative speech situation designed by deliberative 
theorists. Democratic competition leads (or forces) citizens to have access to arguments 
from competing sides (Chong and Druckman 2007), and I have argued that it is critical 
that they do so in a balanced fashion to make considered decisions. One important 
possibility is that the effects of multiple arguments become interactive, rather than 
additive, such that the force of counterevidence arises only in the absence of a challenge, 
and recedes into null in a competitive environment. However, the evidence for this 
possibility is mixed in the previous literature.  
On the one hand, studies on the inoculation theory (McGuire 1961) have found that 
warning people about future persuasive attempts and preemptively discrediting the 
argument helps people resist them (e.g., Pfau et al. 2001), even when the “preemption” 
does not provide specific evidence against the forthcoming message (see Banas and Rains 
2010 for a meta-analysis). In the “real-world” context, calling out the “mainstream” 
media’s dishonesty and bias is one of the tactics used most frequently by conspiracy 
theorists, commentators in partisan media and (some) politicians (see Jamieson and 
Cappella 2008). Doing so may lead people to think that contradictory information simply 
proves the other side is biased, and thus reinforce their prior opinions. Two well-known 
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cases of misbeliefs (about vaccines’ effect on autism and the presence of WMD in Iraq) 
that “backfired” (Coppock 2016; Nyhan and Reifler 2010; 2015; Wood and Porter 2016) 
were, perhaps, of this variety.  
On the other hand, Chong and Druckman (2007, 651) found “competing frames tend 
to stimulate individuals to deliberate on the merits of alternative interpretations” making 
the effect of argument strength more pronounced. It is also worth noting that the 
observational replication of the ACA experiment did show that people sensibly shifted 
their opinions in the wake of the premium increase story that broke right toward the end 
of the 2016 presidential campaign—arguably one of the most fiercely combative 
moments in the modern history of American politics. A potentially fruitful avenue for 
future research is to examine the effects of evidence in competitive environments where 
participants receive both pro and con arguments, but one side offers clearly better 
evidence. The understanding of voter rationality will be further sharpened by exploring 
whether people start ignoring even strong counterevidence in favor of much more 
dubious, or irrelevant evidence supporting congenial arguments, and if so, under what 
conditions. 
Secondly, the generalizability of the experiments presented in Chapter 3 should 
depend on the extent to which the effects of evidence certainty are moderated by the 
characteristics of the political issue in question. However, to the extent that there is 
heterogeneity across issues, the evidence provided in Chapter 3 would be closer to the 
lower bound. People are expected to have strong priors as well as the motivation to 
defend the priors for polarized and salient issues such as the Affordable Care Act and the 
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economic performance of the parties—conditions that are likely to attenuate the treatment 
effects of new information, according to the motivated reasoning hypothesis (Taber and 
Lodge 2006). Indeed, the two issues were chosen precisely for this reason. And it seems 
unlikely that new evidence would be less consequential when people update their beliefs 
about non-partisan issues for which people possess even less baseline knowledge, and 
less desire to maintain their pre-existing opinions.  
That is not to deny the possibility that, for some issues, empirical evidence would 
not matter much. Importantly, my experiments focused on “valence issues” for which the 
end goals are relatively unambiguous. Most people want better and cheaper healthcare 
that covers all. And no one would want to see slower income growth. The disagreement is 
largely about the means—e.g., can the Affordable Care Act make health care less 
expensive? One can at least imagine some piece of strong empirical evidence that can 
provide a straightforward answer to questions like this. But when it comes to “position 
issues” such as the pro-life/pro-choice controversy, the core disagreement between the 
competing sides comes down to the normative question of what’s right and what’s wrong. 
It is more difficult to fathom what “strong” evidence would create the kind of opinion 
shifts observed in Chapter 3 for such value-laden issues. But at this point, we have moved 
passed the scope of this dissertation. To the extent that people fail to build consensus 
about moral issues after much deliberation, it would be extremely difficult (and perhaps 
impossible) to tease out whether the remaining disagreement reflects motivated bias or 
value differences. 
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Third, certain features of the treatment messages may have made them amenable to 
finding support for the Bayesian model. The messages were probably outside the norm of 
the usual political discourse than what people are accustomed to, in that statistical facts 
were put in the forefront of the arguments instead of partisan talking points mixed with 
emotional appeals and ad hominem attacks. One can imagine a different version of the 
treatment messages that could have made people’s partisan identity more salient, 
triggering more defensive motivated reasoning. Perhaps consistent with this possibility is 
the finding that the effect of argument strength disappears when participants are told that 
Democratic and Republican politicians are polarized on the issue at hand (Druckman et 
al. 2013).  
On the other hand, the partisan nature of the issues themselves (Obamacare and the 
economic performance of the parties) must have been unambiguous to most participants, 
and it is doubtful that making the messages more partisan would have made much 
difference. Tellingly, in the ACA experiment, calling the law “Obamacare” versus “the 
Affordable Care Act” in the treatment messages—the former presumably being the more 
partisan label—made no discernable difference in how people responded to the messages. 
Also, Coppock’s (2016) survey experiment shows that insulting language did not keep 
people from rationally updating their opinions in light of new information. Taken 
together, to the extent that the treatment messages were unique in their rather reserved 
and analytical tone, prior research does not provide enough evidence to think that the 
patterns of opinion updating would have been much different had the messages been 
designed to instigate “hot cognition” (Redlawsk 2002; Taber and Lodge 2006).  
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To be sure, participants in the experiments did receive a wealth of statistical 
evidence that is more detailed and probably better explained than they typically would 
find in other contexts. Political persuasion in the “real world” is likely to be less dramatic 
than what was reported above. But that was precisely the point of the three experiments 
to begin with—examining how people behave in a counterfactual condition that gives 
them a better chance to see evidence clearly and make up their minds. The fact that under 
these conditions they do follow a rational belief updating model has important normative 
implications about citizen competence and political environments, which I further 
elaborate in my concluding remarks.  
All in all, while there are issues with the external validity of the findings shown in 
Chapter 3 vis-à-vis the motivated reasoning hypothesis, they could cut both ways. One 
can think of a situation where people become more defensive about their priors, as well 
as a situation where people give even more weight to new information. This means more 
research is needed to establish the boundary conditions of evidence-based reasoning 
versus motivated reasoning. Previous understanding has been that people would be 
motivated to defend their opinions about polarized partisan issues. But this was simply 
not the case in my experiments. Identifying what else is needed to trigger motivated 
reasoning remains an important avenue for future research. 
Finally, Chapters 2 and 3 provide evidence that has important implications for the 
growing scholarship on public deliberation. While expanding the range of arguments and 
counterarguments that people are exposed to is often offered as a central mechanism for 
the positive benefits of deliberation on opinion formation (Fishkin 1995; 2009), this 
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proposition has remained unsubstantiated, largely because it requires strong and often 
problematic normative assumptions to determine a priori what collective opinions are to 
be held by the “considered” or “enlightened” public (see Kulinski and Quirk 2001; Price 
and Neijens 1998). The approach taken in Chapter 2 helps to resolve this issue by 
advancing hypotheses that do not depend on such normative assumptions. Additionally, 
the supporting findings suggest that deliberation does lead to more “considered 
preferences,” not only in the sense that the procedural requirements such as balanced 
argument pools are met, but also in that the outcomes closely resemble the hypothetical 
collective opinions that correct for the absence and imbalance of considerations.  
Perhaps more importantly, Chapter 3 provides evidence for the central 
assumption of deliberative democracy that citizens are capable of weighing different 
ideas, and forming meaningful public opinion led by “the force of the better argument” 
(Habermas 1984; Fishkin 1995; Mercier and Landemore 2012). Despite the importance 
of this assumption for the theoretical framework, there has been little empirical evidence 
that directly supports it—and plenty that calls it into question (Delli Carpini et al 2004; 
Mendelsberg 2002; Mutz 2008). The key difficulty again is a normative one; that is, the 
subjectivity involved in predetermining what is “the better argument” toward which 
public opinion should converge after deliberation. I avoided making strong, and 
potentially problematic normative assumptions, by focusing on evidence certainty, a sub-
element of the umbrella concept of argument strength stripped of the value-laden 
components. My research, thereby, provides the empirical evidence to believe in “the 
force of the better evidence” at least. 
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Overall, I believe that these findings represent an important step forward in the 
long process of resolving the controversy around how to set the benchmark of civic 
competence, and how people measure up. Nonetheless, it is only a step. There are several 
important limitations that require future research.  
First, the approach taken in Chapter 2 to revisit the classic definition and 
measurement of political knowledge should not be considered the only way to go. While 
prior research provides theoretical justification of using “argument repertoire” as a 
measure of opinion quality, and for the empirical tests of its construct validity and 
reliability (Cappella et al. 2002; see also Mutz 2006 for an application of similar 
measures), I recognize that it has its limitations as an open-ended measure. For one, it can 
be confounded with irrelevant factors such as one’s engagement with the survey itself. 
On a more fundamental level, it may be a deficient proxy for accurate knowledge of 
“inconvenient” facts, because accuracy was not a part of the coding scheme. Future 
research should develop empirical strategies to measure being “well informed” in this 
particular sense—accurate understanding of congenial and uncongenial information—and 
examine its causes and effects. 
Another limitation of this dissertation has to do with the fact that only two issues 
(health care and the economy) were used across the studies. Particularly with respect to 
the discrepancy between information and consideration outlined in Chapter 2, it is 
important to keep in mind that one may reach a very different conclusion when looking at 
an issue that is less divided than the health care issue in the United States. This is because 
the discrepancy is assumed to arise when people fail to learn information that runs 
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counter to their partisan viewpoints. The match between the two dimensions of political 
knowledge, therefore, can very well be issue-dependent. But at least when it comes to 
“salient” issues of the day, the results may be more the rule than the exception because 
many public debates are often fueled by vehement disagreements among partisans. 
Nonetheless, more replications would be essential to better understand the potential 
heterogeneity across various issues.  
Moreover, the generalizability of findings from the Chapter 3 experiments can 
also be questioned due to the characteristics of the samples drawn from MTurk. It is well 
established from prior research (e.g., Berinsky et al. 2012) that MTurk respondents are 
less representative of U.S. population compared to national probability samples, although 
more so than in-person convenience samples. The estimates presented above, therefore, 
are the sample average treatment effect (SATE), which may or may not be close to the 
target estimates of the population average treatment effect (PATE). The correspondence 
between the two depends on (1) the observed and unobserved differences between the 
sample and the population, and (2) the treatment effect heterogeneity across such 
differences.  
 However, it is important to note that while the PATEs can very well be smaller or 
larger than the SATEs reported above, it is highly implausible that they approach zero, or 
even flip signs. The condition under which the worst case scenarios come true would be 
that some segments of population unrepresented in the sample have extremely deviant 
likelihood functions, which lead them to update their belief downward substantially in 
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face of strong pro arguments, and upward substantially in face of strong con arguments.68 
It is very difficult to imagine who these people might be. It is telling in that regard that 
the moderating effects of various individual factors that were examined above turned out 
to be mostly modest in size and statistically insignificant. In addition, recent studies have 
found considerable similarity between the results from online convenience samples and 
those from national samples (Berinsky et al. 2012; Coppock 2016; Krupnikov and Levine 
2014; Mullinix et al 2015), somewhat allaying the concerns about the generalizability of 
the results in Chapter 3. Even so, I recognize the possibility that some unobserved 
features of the samples may have led me to overstate (or understate) the treatment effects, 
and also the fact that it is not possible to quantify the uncertainty associated with this 
potential issue. Only future research replicating the results with more representative 
sample can put this concern to rest.  
 On a more fundamental level, one may argue that the treatments employed in the 
previous chapters do not really resemble how people learn about policy issues on a daily 
basis. People do not usually get together with those holding different viewpoints to refine 
their opinions (Chapter 2). And the political messages they do consume are often 
rhetorical points devoid of facts and substance (Chapter 3). What, then, do the findings 
say about democratic politics?  
 
 
 
                                                 
68 Recall that some treatment effects were above 20 percentage points.  
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4.2    Implications for Democratic Politics 
 
 The overarching conclusion of this dissertation is that citizens usually don’t—but 
can—form considered opinions about political issues. From a normative standpoint, the 
discouraging side of my argument is that there is little guarantee that even “informed” 
citizens—let alone less attentive citizens—would make well considered decisions. Of 
course, my study showed that some had considered both sides of arguments carefully 
enough to articulate the rationales for the competing perspectives in some detail. But the 
fact that their opinions significantly differed from other citizens (including informed 
ones), in conjunction with the imputed and experimental estimates of considered 
opinions, ultimately suggests the public as a whole may be holding policy opinions that 
they would not have held if they had a chance to go beyond their usual diet of political 
information consumption, and consider more carefully the competing arguments.  
 Arguably the most damaging blow to the prospects of deliberative democracy 
comes from the notion that it does not even matter whether people have balanced 
substantive information about policy issues because they are too uncritical and/or too 
biased to use it rationally anyway. But this skepticism, at least according to my argument 
and evidence provided in Chapter 3, is misplaced and exaggerated. People do not simply 
believe whatever they want to believe. Nor do they simply believe whatever politicians 
want them to. Rather, given the chance people appear capable of accounting for evidence 
and its (un)certainty, suggesting that public opinion would tend toward the best available 
evidence as the amount and clarity of information that people receive increase. It offers 
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some reason to believe that public opinion reflects (or can reflect) rational thinking on the 
part of the citizenry, at least for salient, widely covered, politically significant issues. This 
claim runs against the tide of much scholarly and popular thinking, but I would argue that 
it is consistent with some important observations from previous research on public 
opinion and voter behavior, such as that an incumbent party’s reelection prospects 
diminish dramatically in a failing economy (e.g., Kramer 1971; Hibbs 2000; Lewis-Beck 
1988; but see Healy and Lenz 2014); or that partisan disagreement about economic 
conditions recedes in face of indisputably clear signals (Parker-Stephen 2013; Stanig 
2013). These studies and my research here seem to suggest that, everything else being 
equal, citizens would give less credence to politicians’ claims when the evidence isn’t 
simply there—a reason to be at least cautiously optimistic about the prospect of 
democratic accountability. In short, the findings reported in Chapter 3 add (a hint of) 
optimism to the literature on public opinion that has tilted toward documenting voter 
irrationality (e.g., Bartels 2002; Campbell et al 1960; Berelson et al. 1954, Ch. 14; Taber 
and Lodge 2006; Zaller 1992) over rationality (e.g., Fiorina 1980; Gerber and Green 
1999; Key 1966; Page and Shapiro 1992). 
To the extent that citizens fail to act as competent decision makers, it is more 
likely so because they do not have the necessary (and necessary mix of) information 
(Chapter 2), than because they are unable to use information even if they have it (Chapter 
3). According to the findings, some of the more troubling tendencies observed in public 
opinion research, such as partisan differences in factual beliefs (e.g., Bartels 2002) and 
political misbeliefs (e.g., Berinsky 2015; Kuklinski et al. 2000), are likely to arise 
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because partisans infer these beliefs based on the talking points of their party leaders and 
not much else (Achen and Bartels 2016, 280)—but not because partisans refuse to 
recognize clear factual evidence that goes against their priors. There are two ways in 
which people exhibit partisan biases, failing to give due considerations to oppositional 
arguments: they may not receive them at all, or they may reject them outright upon 
reception. This dissertation confirms the former possibility, but not the latter. It thus 
underscores that improving the quality of public opinion, after all, comes down more to 
solving the problems of ignorance and partisan bias at the “reception” stage—
encompassing both exposure to and comprehension of information—, than at the 
“acceptance” stage.  
I realize that it may seem that I am proposing even loftier goals than the 
traditional model of informed citizenship—i.e., knowing “what the issues are, what their 
history is, what the relevant facts are, what alternatives are proposed, what the party 
stands for, and what the likely consequences are” (Berelson et al. 1954, 308)—by 
introducing an additional requirement that the mix of information be balanced. No one 
thinks that citizens have the time and energy to know every aspect of a political decision, 
let alone politics in general. But, as Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, 14) put it, “the value 
of political information is … relative and collective.” The point is that all else being 
equal, one’s opinion is more likely to be reflective of one’s interests when one takes 
uncongenial information more seriously. Perhaps more importantly, the collective 
opinions of a group of citizens with similar interests, and ultimately of the citizenry as a 
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whole are far more likely to be reflective of their collective interests when individuals 
take uncongenial information more seriously.  
Up to this point, I have focused almost exclusively on the civic competence of 
the public. But the best citizens can do is to form opinions reflective of available 
information; information which, for the most part, is supplied by political and media 
elites. Things can go awry on “the supply side.” Elites can intentionally or unintentionally 
“mislead” the public with biased, selective, and/or erroneous information and 
interpretations (Page and Shapiro 1992, Chap. 9). They can present competing arguments 
in ways that make it hard to take the other side seriously—for example, by yelling at each 
other simultaneously, or denigrating each other’s motives or values. They can also avoid 
communicating in ways that make clear the degree of certainty or uncertainty of their 
evidence and the implicit assumptions underlying their claims, instead sticking to partisan 
talking points. All these forms and styles of elite discourse—unfortunately and 
increasingly standard fare in political communication—may make it difficult for citizens 
to base their views on appropriate and appropriately balanced information, even if they 
wanted to do so.  
It is well beyond the purview of this dissertation to explicate the necessary 
features of political environments that would help citizens make decisions that are 
reflective of their individual and collective best interests in great detail. But these data 
and findings point at least indirectly to the features of political environments that would 
help citizens develop considered opinions. Specifically, the counterfactual situations 
simulated in the experiments, where people talked about policy options with those with 
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whom they disagreed (Chapter 2), and evaluated the strength of available evidence based 
on factual information (Chapter 3), provide good starting points. As such, I briefly 
discuss the implications of my findings for those envisioning an information environment 
that is more conducive to better political decision making than the status quo. 
The research presented in this dissertation identified deficits in what people know 
about political issues, but not in how people use information once they have it. The fact 
that the key challenge to competent decision making is at the “reception” stage 
underscores the importance of better civic education. And the challenge is not just that 
people are generally underinformed, but also that even when they do learn, they tend to 
learn particular sets of information that support their partisan opinions. This means that 
people may miss the opportunity to see why their party’s policy position is not in their 
best interests or in the larger public interest—even if they do follow politics and learn 
about the issues. While formal and ongoing public deliberation per se would not be a 
practical alternative for most citizens, there can be some (modest) changes to the 
information environment that may increase the likelihood of citizens considering a wider 
range of viewpoints.  
One possible way would be for columns, op-eds, and the growing number of 
partisan or ideological media outlets to regularly introduce its readers/viewers to the 
“other side’s” perspectives; not, as is often currently the case, to counter-argue, criticize, 
or make fun of these opposing viewpoints, but to give the audience the opportunity to 
understand why they disagree. For example, the left leaning Guardian launched the 
publication of a new weekly column called “Burst Your Bubble” that provides “five 
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conservative articles worth reading to expand your thinking each week” with some 
background information about the author and the story to its (liberal) readers. According 
to Wilson, the author of Burst Your Bubble, the column has become quite popular, and 
perhaps other press or networks can learn from its success.  
Another approach that the major social networking services such as Facebook 
and Twitter can take may be to tweak their news feed algorithms, so that their users’ 
information feeds contain more cross-cutting viewpoints than they would otherwise. 
While algorithmically ranked news feeds have been blamed for creating echo chambers 
by selecting ideologically similar content to share with their users, they could just as 
easily include dissimilar content to users’ information feeds in ways that parallel the 
Guardian’s approach. In the meantime, citizens need not wait for the social media 
services to rescue themselves from their echo chambers. New smartphone applications 
(e.g., Read Across The Aisle) and browser extensions (e.g., Escape Your Bubble) have 
been developed to help people monitor their “media diet” in terms of balance and receive 
more cross-cutting content. Such services make it easier for citizens to check if they are 
getting a healthy diet of quality information and well considered arguments. One can also 
go to the Wall Street Journal’s “Blue Feed, Red Feed” site to see stories shared by liberal 
and conservative Facebook users side by side.  
Perhaps more importantly, the willingness to consider and understand 
uncongenial arguments should be emphasized more emphatically as a hallmark of civic 
virtue and responsibility. The fact that people have been developing new tools to burst 
“filter bubbles” seems to suggest that the motivation to learn from the other side has been 
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growing lately—an encouraging development. But this change may be too modest to 
counterbalance the tides of partisan fragmentation and affective polarization that have 
swept political discourse and public opinion over the past decade (e.g., Iyengar et al. 
2012). It should be communicated more forcefully—in public education, by the media, 
and by public officials and other elites—that the more people fall deeply into their echo 
chambers, the more difficult it becomes to build consensus around common ground, or to 
understand if a political decision may ultimately backfire against one’s individual and 
collective interests.  
Much of scholarly work and conventional wisdom has focused on how the 
deliberative, informed citizen model fails. Much less is known about how it works at all, 
and less still about how to make it work better. I have sketched a few preliminary ways to 
give people better opportunities to form considered opinions. The analyses presented in 
this dissertation suggest that citizens are both willing and able to take advantage of such 
an information environment, and to do so in ways conducive to the practice of democratic 
politics.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A   The Health Dialogue Data (Chapter 2) 
 
Appendix A.1. Sample Characteristics 
 
Table A1. Health Dialogue Sample Characteristics Compared to ANES and CPS 
Variables 
Health Dialogue 
N = 2,193 
2004 ANES 
N = 1,211 
2004 CPS 
N = 226,672 
Age (Average) 44.7 47.3 43.7 
Female (%) 53.4 53.3 51.7 
Bachelor’s Degree (%) 34.7 29.9 23.7 
HH Income $ 50,000 or Higher (%) 52.5 48.0 52.3 
Access to Health Insurance (%) 86.8 85.9 84.2 
White (%) 78.7 72.7 81.7 
Black (%) 8.3 15.0 11.7 
Married (%) 64.2 51.6 53.2 
Northeast (%) 18.9 18.0 19.0 
Midwest (%) 22.2 25.9 22.6 
South (%) 35.2 34.4 35.8 
West (%) 23.4 21.7 22.6 
Strong Democrat (%) 16.5 17.0 NA 
Moderate Democrat (%) 16.4 15.0 NA 
Independent (%) 34.5 39.0 NA 
Moderate Republican (%) 16.4 12.9 NA 
Strong Republican (%) 16.5 16.2 NA 
Note.  CPS results were derived from CPS Table Creator.2 
 
This section compares characteristics of the Health Dialogue Project to 2004 
American National Election Study (ANES) against the American adult population as 
                                                 
2 http://www.census.gov/cps/data/cpstablecreator.html 
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documented by the 2004 Current Population Survey (CPS) from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Overall, as shown in Table A3, the characteristics of HD sample were fairly similar to the 
ANES sample, and the CPS benchmark. While those in the HD sample were somewhat 
more educated, and more likely to be married than the ANES and CPS data, the HD 
sample resembled the CPS benchmark more closely than the ANES sample on age, 
income, and race (White).  
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Appendix A.2. Balance Check 
 
 In this section, I provide balance statistics. Treatment and control groups are 
balanced on pre-treatment covariates among those responded to the baseline, and post 
surveys, minimizing the concern that differential attrition introduced imbalances. As 
shown in Table A4, the coefficients on each variable and the F-statistics are insignificant 
(at p < 0.05) and the R-squares are very small.  In addition, Table A4 shows that group 
assignment did not significantly affect attrition, further mitigating the concern that 
differential attrition is responsible for the results. 
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Table A2: Balance Check 
 DV= 
Assigned to 
Deliberate 
 
DV= 
Assigned to 
Deliberate 
(If Completed 
Post Survey) 
DV= 
Competed 
Post Survey 
 Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
Support for Universal Healthcare (0-1) 0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.05   
Pro arguments (0-42) 0.01+ 0.00 0.01 0.01   
Con arguments (0-48) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01   
Political Information (0-1) 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.08   
Party ID (0-1, 1=strong Dem) -0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.05   
Age (0-1, 0 = 18, 1=94) 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.08   
Years of Education (0-1)  0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08   
Gender (1=male) 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.03   
Income (0.02-1, percentile) 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.05   
Black (1=Black) 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.05   
Marital status (1=married) -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.03   
Political Interest (0-1) 0.11+ 0.06 0.08 0.08   
Political participation (0-1) -0.02 0.06 -0.12 0.08   
Political discussion (0-1) -0.08 0.05 0.02 0.07   
Attention to political news (0-1) -0.09 0.06 -0.02 0.08   
Attention to healthcare news (0-1) 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.07   
Access to health insurance (1=insured) 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.04   
Own serious disease (1=yes) -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03   
Family serious disease (1=yes) -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.03   
Healthcare satisfaction (0-1) -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.06   
Assigned to deliberate 0.48 0.06 0.61 0.08 -0.01 0.02 
Intercept 0.48* 0.06 0.61* 0.08 0.73* 0.02 
Observations 2,080 1,276 1,844 
R2 0.010 0.009 0.000 
F  1.08 0.60 0.30 
p 0.36 0.92 0.59 
Note. OLS estimates with standard errors. + p < 0.1 * p < 0.05. Second model excludes 
those who did not take post-treatment surveys. Third model excludes those uninvited (via 
random assignment) to take the post survey. F tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients are jointly zero.  
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Appendix A.3. Measurement and Survey Items 
 
This section provides information on the measurement of key variables and 
covariates. Since the measurement of the key independent and dependent variables is 
described in the main text, for these variables we simply provide the survey items here. 
Some basic demographic variables used in our analyses were provided by 
Knowledge Networks from the respondent profiles. These include age, education, 
gender, income, race, and marital status. Age was rescaled to vary between 0 and 1. 
Education was initially measured based on seven categories. We calculated years of 
education by assigning the following numbers to each category: less than high school (8 
years), some high school (10), high school graduate (12), some college (14), BA (16), 
master’s degree (18), doctorate (21). I rescaled this to 0-1. (Household) Income was 
measured on 19 categories, ranging from less than $5,000 to $175,000 or more. We took 
the percentile values, with 1 representing the highest income level. Dummy variables 
were created gender (male), race (i.e., Black), and marital status. 
Political interest was measured by combining the two items, which were coded on 
a 0-1 scale, with 1 indicating the highest interest level and averaged (Cronbach’s α=0.45).  
Political participation. I counted the number of participatory activities that 
respondents indicate that they engage in from the list of nine activities (Cronbach’s 
α=0.72), which was then rescaled to 0-1.  
Political discussion was measured based on two items, which was averaged and 
rescaled to 0-1 (Cronbach’s α=0.64). 
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Attention to political was measured based on three items, which was averaged and 
rescaled to 0-1, with 1 indicating “very closely” (Chronbach’s α=0.73). 
Attention to news about healthcare issues was constructed from a single item, 
which was scaled to 0-1, with 1 indicating “very closely.” 
Access to health insurance was measured based on a single item, asking if the 
respondent was covered by health insurance. 
Own serious disease was measured by asking if the respondent had a serious 
health condition. Those who noted “Yes” to both were coded 1, indicating having a 
serious disease or chronic health condition, and 0 otherwise.  
Family serious disease was measured by asking if “anyone living in the same 
household” had one of the serious health condition. Those who noted “Yes” to both were 
coded 1, indicating having a family member with serious disease or chronic health 
condition, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Survey Item Wordings 
 
Support for universal health insurance.  
Do you favor or oppose a universal, single-payer system of national health 
insurance, paid for by the federal government (that is, a publicly financed, but 
privately delivered heath care system)?  
1) Favor strongly 
2) Favor somewhat 
3) Oppose somewhat 
4) Oppose strongly 
5) Don’t know 
 
Consideration of pro and con arguments (argument repertoire) 
(If favorable) What are the reasons you have for being in favor of a universal, 
national health insurance program?  (Please list all the reasons that come to mind) 
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What reasons do you think other people might have for being opposed to a 
universal, national health insurance program?  (Please list all the reasons that 
come to mind) 
(If unfavorable) What are the reasons you have for being opposed to a universal, 
national health insurance program?  (Please list all the reasons that come to mind) 
What reasons do you think other people might have for being in favor of a 
universal, national health insurance program?  (Please list all the reasons that 
come to mind) 
(If don’t know) What are the reasons you think other people might have for being 
in favor of a universal, national health insurance program?  (Please list all the 
reasons that come to mind) 
What reasons do you think other people might have for being opposed to a 
universal, national health insurance program?  (Please list all the reasons that 
come to mind) 
 
Political information 
Which one of the parties would you say is more conservative than the other at the 
national level? 
1) Democrats  
2) Republicans 
3) Don’t know 
Do you happen to know what job or political office is currently held by Dick 
Cheney? 
1) U.S. Senator 
2) U.S. Vice President 
3) Energy Secretary 
4) Don’t know 
Which party has the most members in the United States House of 
Representatives? 
1) Democrats 
2) Republicans 
3) Don’t know 
Who has the final responsibility to decide whether a law is Constitutional or not? 
1) President 
2) Congress 
3) Supreme Court 
4) Don’t know 
How much of a majority is needed for the U.S. Senate and House to override a 
presidential veto? 
1) Simple majority (one more than half the votes) 
2) Two-thirds majority 
3) Three-fourths majority 
4) Don’t know 
Healthcare issue information 
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President Bush has signed a Medicare bill to help senior citizens with prescription 
drugs.  Which of the following is among the provisions of the new act offers a 
prescription drug discount program for Medicare beneficiaries 
1) Allows Medicare beneficiaries to buy prescription drugs from Canada 
2) Permits the federal government to negotiate with drug companies to get 
lower prices for those in Medicare 
3) Don’t know 
Which of the following has responsibility for deciding when drugs are ready for 
use by the public? 
1) FTC, Federal Trade Commission 
2) FDA, Food and Drug Administration 
3) APHA, American Public Health Association 
4) Don’t know 
Do you happen to know what job or political office is currently held by Tommy 
Thompson? 
1) State Governor 
2) U.S. Surgeon General  
3) U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary 
4) Don’t know  
Many experts say that Medicare’s main fund, the hospital insurance fund, will run 
out of money if there are no changes in the way it works.  According to 
Medicare’s public trustees, when is the fund now expected to run out of money? 
1) Within about 5 years 
2) In the next 10 to 30 years 
3) In the next 40 to 60 years  
4) Later than 70 years from now 
5) Don’t know 
Which of the following best characterizes the Bush administration’s policy 
concerning research on stem cells derived from human embryos? 
1) Federal funds cannot be used to support any research on stem cells derived 
from human embryos 
2) Federal funds can be used to support any research on stem cells derived 
from human embryos 
3) Federal funds can be used to support research on stem cells, but only on a 
limited number of cell lines derived from embryos before August 2001 
4) Don’t know 
The Medicare program provides health care coverage to the disabled and to older 
Americans who paid enough in payroll taxes while they worked.  Which of the 
following best describes who is generally eligible for Medicare? 
1) Age 55 or older, and earning less than $25,000 in income 
2) Age 65 or older, and earning less than $25,000 in income 
3) Age 65 or older, regardless of income 
4) Age 70 or older, regardless of income 
5) Don’t know 
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The percentage of Americans who do not have health care insurance is closest to 
… 
1) 5 percent 
2) 15 percent 
3) 33 percent 
4) 50 percent 
5) Don’t know 
 
Party identification 
Do you generally think of yourself as a … 
1) Republican 
2) Democrat 
3) Independent 
4) Something else 
 (If Republican) Do you consider yourself … 
1) A strong Republican 
2) Not a very strong Republican 
(If Democrat) Do you consider yourself …  
1) A strong Democrat 
2) Not a very strong Democrat 
 
Political interest 
Generally speaking, how much do you care which party wins the 2004 
presidential election?   
1) A great deal 
2) Somewhat 
3) Not very much 
4) Not at all 
Some people seem to follow what is going on in government and public affairs 
most of the time, whether there is an election or not.  Others are not that 
interested, or are interested in other things.  How much would you say you follow 
what is going on in government and public affairs? 
1) Most of the time 
2) Some of the time 
3) Only now and then 
4) Hardly at all 
 
Political participation 
In the last 12 months, have you personally done any of the following? 
1) Contacted or written a public official about an issue that concerned you 
2) Attended a public hearing or town meeting 
3) Talked to anyone and tried to show them why they should vote for or 
against a political candidate 
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4) Attended any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or similar 
events in support of a particular candidate 
5) Done any other work for a candidate 
6) Given money to a candidate 
7) Worn a candidate’s campaign button, put a campaign sticker on your car 
or placed a sign in your window or in front of your house 
8) Contacted a newspaper or television station about an issue that concerned you 
9) Tried to get another person to sign a petition 
 
Political discussion 
How many days in the past week did you discuss politics with your family or 
friends? 
How many days in the past week did you discuss politics with acquaintances or 
people at work? 
 
Attention to political news 
How much attention did you pay to news stories about each of the following last 
week? 
National politics 
Local news and events 
International affairs 
1) very closely 
2) fairly closely 
3) not too closely 
4) not at all 
 
 
 
Attention to news about healthcare issues 
How closely have you been following news about health care issues? 
5) very closely 
6) fairly closely 
7) not too closely 
8) not at all 
 
Access to health insurance 
Many Americans do not have health insurance.  Are you now covered by any 
form of health insurance, including any private insurance or a government 
program such as Medicare or Medicaid? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
 
Own serious disease 
In the past 10 years, have you been told by a doctor or nurse that you have a 
serious or chronic health condition or disease, such as any one of the following? 
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High blood pressure or high cholesterol 
A heart condition or heart disease 
A stroke 
Emphysema or other chronic respiratory condition 
Cancer or malignancy of any kind 
Diabetes or high sugar levels 
A liver or kidney condition 
Serious chronic neck, back, or joint pain 
Parkinson’s disease or other neurological disorder 
Lasting depression or other mental health condition 
Other serious or chronic health condition 
1) Yes 
2) No 
Do you now have a serious or chronic health condition or disease? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
 
Family serious disease 
Does anyone else now living in your household have a serious or chronic health 
condition or disease, such as any one of the following? 
High blood pressure or high cholesterol 
A heart condition or heart disease 
A stroke 
Emphysema or other chronic respiratory condition 
Cancer or malignancy of any kind 
Diabetes or high sugar levels 
A liver or kidney condition 
Serious chronic neck, back, or joint pain 
Parkinson’s disease or other neurological disorder 
Lasting depression or other mental health condition 
Other serious or chronic health condition 
1) Yes 
2) No 
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Appendix A.4. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table A3 reports descriptive statistics for our key variables and covariates. All 
variables are scaled to 0-1, except for pro and con arguments. As mentioned in the main 
text, pro and con arguments have skewed distribution. Table A2 shows frequencies and 
Figure A1 plots distributions. Majority of respondents named less than three pro 
arguments, and few named more than seven. Very similar patterns were found for con 
arguments. The distributions of pros and cons look nearly identical. 
 
Table A3: Descriptive statistics for key variables and covariates 
Variables (range) Mean SD N 
Support for Universal Healthcare (0-1) 0.59 0.33 2187 
Pro arguments (0-42) 2.30 2.69 2193 
Con arguments (0-48) 2.17 2.74 2193 
Political Information (0-1) 0.59 0.21 2193 
Party ID (0-1, 0=strong Rep, 1=strong Dem) 0.50 0.32 2170 
Age (0-1, 0 = 18, 1=94) 0.35 0.20 2193 
Years of Education (0-1)  0.47 0.20 2193 
Gender (1=male) 0.47 0.50 2193 
Income (0.02-1, percentile) 0.56 0.29 2193 
Black (1=Black) 0.08 0.28 2182 
Marital status (1=married) 0.64 0.48 2193 
Political Interest (0-1) 0.79 0.23 2193 
Political participation (0-1) 0.17 0.20 2192 
Political discussion (0-1) 0.28 0.25 2188 
Attention to political news (0-1) 0.62 0.22 2173 
Attention to news about healthcare issues (0-1) 0.57 0.24 2186 
Access to health insurance (1=insured) 0.87 0.34 2187 
Own serious disease (1=yes) 0.36 0.48 2190 
Family serious disease (1=yes) 0.42 0.49 2178 
Healthcare satisfaction (0-1) 0.52 0.23 2164 
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Table A4: Frequencies of Pro and Con Arguments 
 Pro Con Total 
0 16.8% 21.3% 12.9% 
1 32.0% 30.9% 6.8% 
2 19.7% 19.0% 18.3% 
3-4 18.9% 16.5% 26.3% 
5-6 6.4% 7.1% 15.0% 
7 or more 6.1% 5.3% 16.5% 
N = 2,193 
 
 
Figure A1: Distributions of Pro and Con Arguments 
 
Note: The maximum of pro arguments is 42. The maximum of con arguments is 48.
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Appendix A.5. Additional Information on Results in Chapter 2 
 
This Appendix supplements the results reported in Chapter 2 by providing 
additional information that was omitted in the main text. 
Table A5 supplements Figure 2 in the main text. In addition to what was shown in 
the figure, it describes specific group means, standard errors, and number of observations 
in each group. 
Table A6 reports the estimates of Equation 2.2 in the main text. The quantities in 
Table 2 in the main text are derived from this model.  
Table A7 reports the estimates of Equation 2.3 in the main text. The quantities in 
Table 3 in the main text are derived from this model.  
Tables A8 to A12 supplement Figure 3 in the main text.  
Table A8 reports the the estimates of Equation 6 in the Main Text, which were 
used to impute “fully informed” opinions. Four models are specified. All models allow 
the effect of information to vary by party ID.  Models 3 and 4 allow the effect of 
information to vary by other demographic factors (e.g., access to health insurance), which 
may affect evaluative criteria. Models (1) and (3) use the original political knowledge 
index. Models 2 and 4 use the percentile values. 
Table A9 reports the the estimates of Equation 7 in the Main Text, which were 
used to impute “fully considered” opinions. A total of 16 models are specified. All 
models allow the consideration of pros and cons to vary by party ID. In addition, Models 
9 to 16 allow the effect of information to vary by other demographic factors (e.g., access 
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to health insurance), which may affect evaluative criteria. Also, Models 5 to 8, and 13 to 
16 allow the effect of one side of argument to be heterogeneous by the awareness of the 
other side. In Models 1, 5, 9, 13, the number of pro (or con) arguments larger than three 
was recoded to three so that the maximum can be three, which was then divided by three. 
In Models 2, 6, 10, 14 values greater than five were recoded (to five). In Models 3, 7, 11, 
15 the collapsing cutoff was 7. In Models 4, 8, 12, 16, percentile values of pros and cons 
were used without collapsing.  
Table A10 reports four estimates of information effects, imputed in accordance 
with the 4 models on in Table 8. Among these, the estimates from Models 1 and 3 were 
shown in Figure 3, but the results are similar other specifications. 
Table A11 reports 16 estimates of consideration effects, imputed in accordance 
with the 16 models on in Table 9. Among these, the estimates from Models 2 and 10 were 
shown in Figure 3, but the results are similar in other specifications. 
Table 12 reports the estimates of Equation 8 in the Main Text, the experimental 
approach to estimating consideration effects based on deliberations. Six models are 
specified. Models 1 and 2 estimate the “intent-to-treat” effect by regressing opinion 
change on random assignment. Models 3 and 4 estimate the average treatment effect on 
the treated by using random assignment as instrument for attending deliberation 
meetings. Models 5 and 6 estimates average treatment effect by regressing opinion 
change on deliberation attendance. The identifying assumption for Models 5 and 6 are 
that the potential change over time in the outcome variable for attendees and absentees 
would have been without the treatment. We report the results with and without control 
 137 
variables for each approach. Models 1, 3 and 5 do not make covariate adjustments. 
Models 2,4 and 6 do. The results are robust.  
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Table A5: Pros and Cons by Political Information and Party Identification 
 Total Strong Rep Moderate Rep 
Pol Info Pro Con N Pro Con N Pro Con N 
Low 1.51 1.07 586 1.72 1.53 39 1.51 1.43 81 
 (0.82) (0.06)  (0.35) (0.36)  (0.22) (0.23)  
Lower 2.24 1.85 576 2.11 2.49 89 1.92 1.59 104 
 (0.09) (0.09)  (0.20) (0.33)  (0.19) (0.15)  
Higher 2.65 2.74 613 1.98 3.26 112 2.42 2.65 100 
 (0.13) (0.14)  (0.21) (0.41)  (0.23) (0.25)  
High 2.95 3.29 418 1.86 3.74 110 2.63 3.52 73 
 (0.14) (0.15)  (0.13) (0.36)  (0.35) (0.34)  
 Independent Moderate Dem Strong Dem 
Pol Info Pro Con N Pro Con N Pro Con N 
Low 1.44 0.94 165 1.44 0.94 165 1.44 0.94 165 
 (0.13) (0.08)  (0.13) (0.08)  (0.13) (0.08)  
Lower 2.35 1.84 140 2.35 1.84 140 2.35 1.84 140 
 (0.21) (0.16)  (0.21) (0.16)  (0.21) (0.16)  
Higher 2.79 2.65 165 2.79 2.65 165 2.79 2.65 165 
 (0.31) (0.20)  (0.31) (0.20)  (0.31) (0.20)  
High 2.84 2.54 109 2.84 2.54 109 2.84 2.54 109 
 (0.22) (0.21)  (0.22) (0.21)  (0.22) (0.21)  
Entries are average number of pro and con arguments listed by each partisan group across 
different levels of political information, with standard errors in parentheses. Figure 2 in 
the main text is generated based on these estimates.
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Table A6. Partisan bias in consideration of pro versus con arguments  
 Coef. SE p 
Pro -1.08 0.15 0.00 
Moderate Republican -0.78 0.20 0.00 
Independent -1.11 0.17 0.00 
Moderate Democrat -1.19 0.20 0.00 
Strong Democrat -0.90 0.20 0.00 
Pro × Moderate Republican 0.95 0.22 0.00 
Pro × Independent 1.41 0.19 0.00 
Pro × Moderate Democrat 1.61 0.22 0.00 
Pro × Strong Democrat 1.84 0.22 0.00 
Constant 3.03 0.14 0.00 
N = 4340 responses (i.e., 2,170 individuals). This regression model tests Equation 2.2 in 
the main text. Estimates reported in Table 2 in the main text are derived from this model. 
“Pro” is a within-individual factor indicating whether the response is the number of pros 
(or cons). Dummies for PID were created and used, with the base category representing 
Strong Republicans. Entries are maximum likelihood estimates. Individual-specific 
random effects are accounted for. 
 140 
Table A7. Political information and partisan bias in consideration of pro versus con 
arguments  
 Coef. SE p 
Information 4.23 0.78 0.00 
Pro 1.77 0.61 0.00 
Info × Pro -4.15 0.85 0.00 
Moderate Republican -0.31 0.71 0.66 
Independent -0.10 0.61 0.87 
Moderate Democrat -0.16 0.67 0.81 
Strong Democrat -0.82 0.71 0.25 
Info × Moderate Republican -0.22 1.04 0.83 
Info × Independent -0.84 0.88 0.34 
Info × Moderate Democrat -0.74 1.02 0.47 
Info × Strong Democrat 0.35 1.03 0.74 
Pro × Moderate Republican -0.77 0.78 0.32 
Pro × Independent -1.19 0.67 0.07 
Pro × Moderate Democrat -1.03 0.73 0.16 
Pro × Strong Democrat -1.61 0.77 0.04 
Info × Pro × Moderate Republican 2.28 1.14 0.05 
Info × Pro × Independent 3.71 0.97 0.00 
Info × Pro × Moderate Democrat 3.74 1.12 0.00 
Info × Pro × Strong Democrat 5.14 1.13 0.00 
Constant 0.12 0.55 0.82 
N = 4340 responses (i.e., 2,170 respondents). This regression model tests Equation 2.3 in 
the main text. Estimates reported in Table 3 in the main text are derived from this model. 
“Pro” is a within-individual factor indicating whether the response is the number of pros 
(or cons). Dummies for PID were created and used, with the base category representing 
Strong Republicans. Entries are maximum likelihood estimates. Individual-specific 
random effects are accounted for. 
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Table A8: Regression models for imputation of informed opinions 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
 Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
Intercept 0.84 0.04 0.68 0.03 0.70 0.09 0.64 0.06 
Political Information -0.68 0.06 -0.50 0.04 -0.21 0.14 -0.15 0.11 
PID -0.24 0.07 -0.01 0.05 -0.19 0.07 0.02 0.05 
Information×PID 0.97 0.10 0.69 0.07 0.84 0.11 0.60 0.08 
Age     0.14 0.11 0.10 0.08 
Education     0.00 0.11 0.01 0.08 
Male     0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 
Income     0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 
Black     -0.08 0.07 -0.06 0.04 
Married     -0.06 0.04 -0.06 0.03 
Insured     0.02 0.06 0.00 0.04 
Satisfied     -0.02 0.08 -0.09 0.06 
Own Health     0.14 0.04 0.11 0.03 
Family Health     -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.03 
Information×Age     -0.20 0.17 0.60 0.08 
Information×Education     0.05 0.17 -0.14 0.12 
Information×Male     -0.04 0.06 0.05 0.12 
Information×Income     -0.09 0.12 -0.03 0.05 
Information×Black     0.14 0.12 -0.08 0.09 
Information×Married     0.05 0.07 0.13 0.09 
Information×Insured     -0.11 0.10 0.05 0.05 
Information×Satisfied     -0.32 0.13 -0.09 0.08 
Information×Own Health     -0.18 0.07 -0.24 0.10 
Information×Family Health     0.09 0.06 -0.13 0.05 
Information measure Original Percentile Original Percentile 
N 2165 2165 2109 2109 
Note. All variables were scaled to 0-1.  All variables are scaled to 0-1. In Models 1 and 3, 
the original political information score (% correct) was used. In Models 2 and 4, 
percentile values of political information was used. 
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Table A9: Regression models for imputation of considered opinions 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
Intercept 0.51 0.02 0.48 0.02 0.47 0.02 0.54 0.03 0.52 0.02 0.49 0.02 0.47 0.02 0.55 0.03 
Pro  0.29 0.04 0.40 0.04 0.50 0.05 0.46 0.05 0.27 0.05 0.38 0.05 0.48 0.06 0.44 0.06 
Con -0.45 0.03 -0.54 0.04 -0.61 0.04 -0.66 0.05 -0.47 0.04 -0.55 0.04 -0.62 0.05 -0.67 0.06 
PID 0.11 0.04 0.18 0.03 0.22 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.18 0.03 0.22 0.03 0.07 0.04 
Pro×PID -0.01 0.06 -0.09 0.07 -0.13 0.08 -0.08 0.08 0.00 0.06 -0.08 0.07 -0.12 0.08 -0.08 0.08 
Con×PID 0.43 0.06 0.45 0.07 0.47 0.08 0.59 0.08 0.42 0.06 0.44 0.07 0.46 0.08 0.58 0.08 
Pro×Con         0.03 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.08 
 Model (9) Model (10) Model (11) Model (12) Model (13) Model (14) Model (15) Model (16) 
 Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
(Intercept) 0.54 0.05 0.56 0.05 0.55 0.04 0.53 0.06 0.54 0.05 0.56 0.05 0.55 0.04 0.54 0.06 
Pro 0.36 0.09 0.43 0.10 0.49 0.12 0.47 0.12 0.34 0.09 0.41 0.10 0.48 0.12 0.44 0.12 
Con -0.26 0.09 -0.31 0.10 -0.31 0.12 -0.32 0.12 -0.29 0.09 -0.33 0.10 -0.33 0.12 -0.36 0.12 
PID 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.05 
Age -0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.08 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.08 
Education 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08 
Male 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Income -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 
Black -0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.05 -0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.05 
Married -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.03 
Insured -0.11 0.05 -0.15 0.05 -0.17 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.11 0.05 -0.15 0.05 -0.17 0.04 -0.01 0.04 
Satisfied 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.09 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.09 0.06 
Own Health -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.03 
Family Health 0.12 0.04 0.18 0.03 0.22 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.18 0.03 0.22 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
Pro×PID -0.01 0.07 -0.07 0.07 -0.10 0.08 -0.06 0.08 0.00 0.07 -0.06 0.07 -0.09 0.09 -0.05 0.08 
Pro×Age -0.19 0.11 -0.22 0.12 -0.28 0.14 -0.26 0.14 -0.21 0.11 -0.23 0.12 -0.28 0.14 -0.28 0.14 
Pro×Education -0.01 0.10 -0.09 0.11 -0.15 0.13 -0.03 0.13 -0.03 0.10 -0.12 0.12 -0.16 0.13 -0.06 0.13 
Pro×Male -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.05 
Pro×Income 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.10 0.03 0.10 
Pro×Black 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.09 -0.01 0.09 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.09 
Pro×Married 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 
Pro×Insured -0.02 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.08 -0.02 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.08 
Pro×Satisfied 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.11 0.18 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.11 0.17 0.11 
Pro×Own Health -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.02 0.06 0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.02 0.06 0.00 0.06 
Pro×Family Health -0.06 0.04 -0.07 0.05 -0.07 0.05 -0.08 0.05 -0.06 0.04 -0.08 0.05 -0.07 0.05 -0.08 0.05 
Con×PID 0.37 0.06 0.37 0.07 0.36 0.08 0.49 0.08 0.36 0.06 0.36 0.07 0.35 0.08 0.47 0.08 
Con×Age -0.03 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.01 0.14 -0.03 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.00 0.14 
Con×Education 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.00 0.13 
Con×Male -0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.05 -0.05 0.05 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.05 -0.05 0.05 
Con×Income -0.08 0.07 -0.09 0.08 -0.08 0.10 -0.10 0.10 -0.08 0.07 -0.09 0.08 -0.08 0.10 -0.10 0.10 
Con×Black 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.10 
Con×Married 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.06 
Con×Insured 0.01 0.06 -0.07 0.07 -0.17 0.08 -0.03 0.08 0.01 0.06 -0.06 0.07 -0.17 0.08 -0.03 0.08 
Con×Satisfied -0.28 0.09 -0.27 0.10 -0.27 0.11 -0.40 0.11 -0.28 0.09 -0.27 0.10 -0.27 0.11 -0.40 0.11 
Con×Own Health -0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.05 -0.08 0.06 -0.05 0.06 -0.03 0.04 -0.06 0.05 -0.08 0.06 -0.05 0.06 
Con×Family Health 0.11 0.04 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.05 
Pro×Con         0.07 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.08 
Cutoffs for Pro/Con 3 or more 5 or more 7 or more NA 3 or more 5 or more 7 or more NA 
Consideration 
measure 
# of Arguments Percentile # of Arguments Percentile 
Note. N = 2165 for Models 1 through 6. N = 2019 for Models 7 through 12. All variables, 
including Pro and Con, are scaled to 0-1. In Models 1, 5, 9, 13, the number of pro (or 
con) arguments larger than three was recoded to three so that the maximum can be three, 
which was then divided by three. In Models 2, 6, 10, 14 values greater than five were 
recoded (to five). In Models 3, 7, 11, 15 the collapsing cutoff was 7. In Models 4, 8, 12, 
16, percentile values of pros and cons were used without collapsing.  
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Table A10: Estimates of Information Effects  
 Model (1) Model (1) Model (3) Model (4) 
Point Estimate -0.071 -0.068 -0.044 -0.041 
Standard Error 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.013 
95% CI (Upper bound)  -0.050 -0.045 -0.019 -0.017 
90% CI (Upper bound)  -0.053 -0.049 -0.023 -0.020 
90% CI (Lower bound)  -0.090 -0.086 -0.066 -0.063 
95% CI (Lower bound) -0.093 -0.089 -0.070 -0.067 
Moderators PID  PID and demographics 
Information measure Original Percentile Original Percentile 
Note. Entries are the estimates of (imputed) informed opinion minus (observed) baseline. 
Estimates in bold are reported in the main text. The confidence intervals and standard 
errors are calculated using bootstrapping.  Each set of analyses—i.e., regression and 
imputation—are replicated on 2000 bootstrap samples drawn from the original sample 
with replacement.  Thus, the standard error and confidence interval for fully informed 
preference are standard deviation, and 5th and 95th quintiles of its values from the 2000 
samples. Models 1 and 3 are reported in Figure 3 in the main text.  
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Table A11: Estimates of Consideration Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) Moderators 
Point Estimate 0.015 0.029 0.038 0.031 PID 
Standard Error 0.009 0.014 0.019 0.012 PID 
95% CI (Upper bound)  0.032 0.057 0.076 0.053 PID 
90% CI (Upper bound)  0.030 0.053 0.059 0.050 PID 
90% CI (Lower bound)  0.0001 0.006 0.008 0.011 PID 
95% CI (Lower bound) -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.007 PID 
 (5) (6) (7) (8)  
Point Estimate 0.020 0.040 0.053 0.038 PID and Demographics 
Standard Error 0.013 0.023 0.033 0.021 PID and Demographics 
95% CI (Upper bound)  0.044 0.085 0.117 0.081 PID and Demographics 
90% CI (Upper bound)  0.041 0.077 0.106 0.073 PID and Demographics 
90% CI (Lower bound)  -0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.002 PID and Demographics 
95% CI (Lower bound) -0.005 -0.004 -0.012 -0.004 PID and Demographics 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) Moderators 
Point Estimate 0.027 0.049 0.070 0.048 PID 
Standard Error 0.010 0.015 0.022 0.013 PID 
95% CI (Upper bound)  0.047 0.079 0.112 0.073 PID 
90% CI (Upper bound)  0.044 0.074 0.105 0.069 PID 
90% CI (Lower bound)  0.016 0.025 0.036 0.027 PID 
95% CI (Lower bound) 0.009 0.020 0.027 0.023 PID 
 (13) (14) (15) (16)  
Point Estimate 0.038 0.068 0.091 0.068 PID and Demographics 
Standard Error 0.013 0.025 0.034 0.023 PID and Demographics 
95% CI (Upper bound)  0.065 0.118 0.160 0.112 PID and Demographics 
90% CI (Upper bound)  0.061 0.110 0.148 0.107 PID and Demographics 
90% CI (Lower bound)  0.016 0.026 0.035 0.069 PID and Demographics 
95% CI (Lower bound) 0.012 0.020 0.025 0.025 PID and Demographics 
Pro×Con Term Included Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Cutoffs for collapsing 3 5 7 NA  
Consideration measure # of arguments Percentile  
 
 
Note. Entries are the estimates of (imputed) informed opinion minus (observed) baseline. 
Estimates in bold are reported in the main text. The confidence intervals and standard 
errors are calculated using bootstrapping.  Each set of analyses—i.e., regression and 
imputation—are replicated on 2000 bootstrap samples drawn from the original sample 
with replacement.  Thus, the standard error and confidence interval for fully informed 
preference are standard deviation, and 5th and 95th quintiles of its values from the 2000 
samples. Estimates in bold are reported in Figure 3 of the main text. 
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Table A12: Deliberation Effect on Support for Universal Healthcare System  
 Intend-to-treat effect 
Average treat. effect on 
treated 
Average treat. effect 
 Assign. Assign. as IV for Attend. Attend. 
 Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
Deliberation 0.03+ 0.02 0.03+ 0.02 0.08+ 0.04 0.08+ 0.04 0.04+ 0.02 0.05* 0.02 
Covariates       
Pros   -0.01 0.00   -0.01 0.00   -0.01 0.00 
Cons   0.01 0.00   0.01 0.00   0.01 0.00 
Info   0.00 0.05   -0.02 0.05   -0.01 0.05 
PID   -0.04 0.03   -0.04 0.03   -0.04 0.03 
Age   0.01 0.04   0.01 0.04   0.01 0.04 
Education   0.04 0.04   0.03 0.04   0.03 0.04 
Male   0.02 0.02   0.03 0.02   0.02 0.02 
Income   -0.01 0.03   -0.01 0.03   -0.01 0.03 
Black   0.03 0.03   0.03 0.03   0.03 0.03 
Married   0.00 0.02   0.00 0.02   0.00 0.02 
Pol. interest   -0.02 0.04   -0.02 0.04   -0.02 0.04 
Participation   -0.10 0.05   -0.10 0.05   -0.10 0.05 
Pol. 
Discussion 
  0.07 0.04   0.08 0.04   0.08 0.04 
pol. news   0.02 0.05   0.02 0.05   0.02 0.05 
HC. news   -0.05 0.04   -0.05 0.04   -0.05 0.04 
Insured   -0.01 0.03   -0.01 0.03   -0.01 0.03 
Own disease   -0.01 0.02   -0.01 0.02   -0.01 0.02 
Family 
disease 
  0.03 0.02   0.03 0.02   0.03 0.02 
HC 
satisfaction 
  0.06 0.04   0.06 0.04   0.06 0.04 
Intercept -0.06 0.01 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.05 
N 1,325 1,266 1,325 1,266 1,325 1,266 
Estimator OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS 
+ p <0.1 * p < 0.05. P-values are omitted for covariates.  
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Appendix B   Experiment 1 (Chapter 3) 
 
Appendix B.1. Message Wordings 
 
Appendix B.1.1. Con Argument 
 
Many health economists argue that Obamacare will accelerate growth in health care 
costs. Here's why: Obamacare requires health insurance providers to offer health 
insurance policies at the same price to all persons, regardless of their health conditions. 
This regulation will almost certainly increase medical costs for healthy people and lead 
some of them to exit the insurance market, causing costs to rise even more. It is 
extremely important to have enough healthy people in the market to control the rising 
health care prices, but Obamacare does just the opposite. Because of this “adverse 
selection” problem, the health economists think that the law will make medical care even 
more expensive than would have been the case otherwise, and we will see much faster 
growth in health spending over the next ten years. 
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Appendix B.1.2. Pro Argument 
 
Many health economists argue that Obamacare will slow down growth in health care 
costs. Here's why: Obamacare provides several incentives for previously uninsured 
healthy people to join the insurance pool. Before Obamacare, medical costs were so high 
mainly because those buying insurance were sicker than average, which in turn led some 
healthy people to exit the insurance market, causing costs to rise even more. It is 
extremely important to have enough healthy people in the market to control the rising 
health care prices, and Obamacare does just that. Since Obamacare solves this “adverse 
selection” problem, the health economists think that the law will make medical care less 
expensive than would have been the case otherwise, and we will see much slower growth 
in health spending over the next ten years.        
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Appendix B.2 List of Evidence and Sources69 
 
• In 2016, premiums in the Obamacare Marketplaces decrease by 0.7% nationwide, 
whereas the national average premium in the individual health insurance market 
had increased by 10 to 12% per year before the reform (Kaiser Family Foundation 
2015). 
• In 2016, premiums in the Obamacare Marketplace increase by 7.1% in Louisville, 
Kentucky (Kaiser Family Foundation and HRET 2015), whereas the national 
average premium in the individual health insurance market had increased by 10 to 
12% per year before the reform (Gruber 2014). 
• During the first two quarters after the reform, premiums in the individual health 
insurance market increased by 24.4% than what they would have without 
Obamacare across all states (Kowalski 2014). 
• During the first two quarters after the reform, premiums in the individual health 
insurance market increased by 1.4% than what they would have without 
Obamacare in Maryland (Kowalski 2014). 
• The latest annual growth in national out-of-pocket spending (1.3%) is lower than 
the Bush years (5.6% on average) (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
2015; my calculation). 
• The latest annual growth in spending on cosmetic surgeries (8.5%) is lower than 
the Bush years (9.8% on average) (American Society for Aesthetic Plastic 
Surgery 2015; my calculation) 
• The latest annual growth in national spending on health insurance (6.2%) is higher 
than the year prior to the reform (3.0%) (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services 2015; my calculation). 
• The latest annual growth in spending on cosmetic surgeries (8.5%) is higher than 
the year prior to the reform (7.5%) (American Society for Aesthetic Plastic 
Surgery 2015; my calculation). 
• The average deductible for employer-sponsored health insurance has increased by 
22% over the two years after the reform (Kaiser Family Foundation and HRET 
2015). 
• The average premium for employer-sponsored health insurance has increased by 
7.3% over the two years after the reform (Kaiser Family Foundation and HRET 
2015). 
• The uninsured rate for non-elderly adults (ages 18 to 64) has decreased by 
43%, over the two years after the reform (Department of Health and Human 
Services 2016). 
• The uninsured rate for U.S. adults (ages 18 or older) has decreased by 1% over 
the preceding year (Gallup 2016).  
                                                 
69 The sources shown here were not provided to the participants of Experiment 1. 
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• The latest annual growth in premiums for employer-sponsored health insurance 
(3.8% on average) is lower than the Bush years (8.8% on average) (Kaiser Family 
Foundation and HRET 2015). 
• The latest annual growth in private sector spending on medical research (5.2% on 
average) is lower than the Bush years (7.2% on average) (American Society for 
Aesthetic Plastic Surgery 2015; my calculation). 
• In 2016, premiums in the Obamacare Marketplaces increase by 10.1%, 
nationwide and above 30% in some states (Kaiser Family Foundation 2015). 
• In 2016, premiums in the Obamacare Marketplaces increase by 4.7%, in 
Cheyenne, Wyoming (Kaiser Family Foundation 2015). 
• Before the reform, the five U.S. states with similar regulations as Obamacare were 
among the states with the highest insurance premiums (Rosenbaum and Gruber 
2010). 
• Premiums for individuals decreased by 10.5% in Massachusetts when it 
implemented a health care reform similar to Obamacare, while premiums 
increased by 12.8% in neighboring states at the same period of time (between 
2004 and 2010) (Hackmann et al. 2015). 
• In a recent national survey, 52% of Americans say they are not worried about not 
being able to afford prescription drugs while 48% say they are worried (Kaiser 
Family Foundation 2016).      
• Before the reform, 64% of Americans were worried about having to pay more for 
health care, and now 67% are worried (Kaiser Family Foundation 2016). 
• Canada spends less on health care than the US. 
• US national health spending accounted for 17.1% of GDP before the reform, and 
17.5% after the reform (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2015; my 
calculation). 
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Appendix B.3. Survey Wordings 
 
Attitudes toward the ACA (pre-treat) 
 
In general, do you support or oppose the health care reform law passed in 2010? 
This law is called the Affordable Care Act, and sometimes referred to as 
Obamacare. 
1) Strongly support 
2) Moderately support 
3) Neither support nor oppose 
4) Moderately oppose 
5) Strongly oppose 
 
Conditional Probabilities was measured by the following 22 questions and was scaled 
0.05-0.95 where 0.95 indicates a 95% probability that the health economists’ theory turns 
out to be right given the presented evidence. The questions were presented in the random 
order. 
 
Now let's assume that a group of independent researchers conduct a new study. 
Its findings may or may not be useful in refining your long-term predictions, 
depending on how you interpret the implications. Please indicate how you would 
assess the probability that the health economists' prediction (Obamacare 
accelerating [slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten 
years, if and when the new study finds each of the followings.   
 
If the new study finds the following...      
In 2016, premiums in the Obamacare Marketplaces decrease by 0.7% 
nationwide,  the national average premium in the individual health 
insurance market had increased by 10 to 12% per year before the 
reform     
I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years is…  
1) Extremely high (95% chance) 
2) Fairly high (80% chance) 
3) A little high (65% chance) 
4) Neither high nor low (50/50) 
5) A little low (35% chance) 
6) Fairly low (20% chance) 
7) Extremely low (5% chance) 
 
If the new study finds the following...      
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In 2016, premiums in the Obamacare Marketplaces decrease by 0.7% 
nationwide,  the national average premium in the individual health 
insurance market had increased by 10 to 12% per year before the 
reform     
I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is… (same multiple choice options as above) 
 
If the new study finds the following...       
In 2016, premiums in the Obamacare Marketplace increase by 7.1% in 
Louisville, Kentucky, whereas the national average premium in the 
individual health insurance market had increased by 10 to 12% per year 
before the reform     
 I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years is…  (same multiple 
choice options as above) 
 
If the new study finds the following...    
During the first two quarters after the reform, premiums in the individual 
health insurance market increased by 24.4% than what they would have 
without Obamacare across all states     
I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is…  (same multiple choice options as above) 
 
If the new study finds the following...    
During the first two quarters after the reform, premiums in the individual 
health insurance market increased by 1.4% than what they would have 
without Obamacare in Maryland     
I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is…  (same multiple choice options as above) 
 
If the new study finds the following...    
The latest annual growth in national out-of-pocket spending (1.3%) is 
lower than the Bush years (5.6% on average)    
 I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is…  (same multiple choice options as above) 
 
If the new study finds the following...    
The latest annual growth in spending on cosmetic surgeries (8.5%) is 
lower than the Bush years (9.8% on average)     
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I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is…  (same multiple choice options as above) 
 
If the new study finds the following...    
The latest annual growth in national spending on health insurance 
(6.2%) is higher than the year prior to the reform (3.0%).    
 I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is… (same multiple choice options as above)  
 
If the new study finds the following...   
The latest annual growth in spending on cosmetic surgeries (8.5%) is 
higher than the year prior to the reform (7.5%)    
I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is… (same multiple choice options as above)  
 
If the new study finds the following...    
The average deductible for employer-sponsored health insurance has 
increased by 22% over the two years after the reform     
I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is… (same multiple choice options as above)  
 
If the new study finds the following...    
The average premium for employer-sponsored health insurance has 
increased by 7.3% over the two years after the reform     
I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
c[slowing down] ost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is… (same multiple choice options as above)  
 
If the new study finds the following...    
The uninsured rate for non-elderly adults (ages 18 to 64) has decreased 
by 43%, over the two years after the reform     
I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is…  (same multiple choice options as above) 
 
If the new study finds the following...    
The uninsured rate for U.S. adults (ages 18 or older) has decreased by 
1% over the preceding year     
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I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is… (same multiple choice options as above)  
 
If the new study finds the following...    
The latest annual growth in premiums for employer-sponsored health 
insurance (3.8% on average) is lower than the Bush years (8.8% on 
average)      
I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is…  (same multiple choice options as above) 
 
If the new study finds the following...    
The latest annual growth in private sector spending on medical research 
(5.2% on average) is lower than the Bush years (7.2% on average)      
I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is… (same multiple choice options as above)  
 
If the new study finds the following...    
In 2016, premiums in the Obamacare Marketplaces increase by 10.1%, 
nationwide and above 30% in some states     
I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is… (same multiple choice options as above)  
 
If the new study finds the following...     
In 2016, premiums in the Obamacare Marketplaces increase by 4.7%, in 
Cheyenne, Wyoming      
I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is… (same multiple choice options as above)  
 
If the new study finds the following...    
Before the reform, the five U.S. states with similar regulations as 
Obamacare were among the states with the highest insurance 
premiums      
I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is… (same multiple choice options as above)  
 
If the new study finds the following...    
Premiums for individuals decreased by 10.5% in Massachusetts when it 
implemented a health care reform similar to Obamacare, while 
 154 
premiums increased by 12.8% in neighboring states at the same period 
of time (between 2004 and 2010)     
I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is… (same multiple choice options as above)  
 
If the new study finds the following...    
In a recent national survey, 52% of Americans say they are not worried 
about not being able to afford prescription drugs while 48% say they are 
worried     
I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is… (same multiple choice options as above)  
 
If the new study finds the following...    
Before the reform, 64% of Americans were worried about having to pay 
more for health care, and now 67% are worried     
I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is…  (same multiple choice options as above) 
 
If the new study finds the following...    
Canada spends less on health care than the US     
I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is… (same multiple choice options as above)  
 
If the new study finds the following...    
US national health spending accounted for 17.1% of GDP before the 
reform, and 17.5% after the reform     
I will say probability that the health economists’ theory (Obamacare accelerating 
[slowing down] cost growth) turns out to be right over the next ten years 
is… (same multiple choice options as above)  
 
Message Recall 
 
Which of the followings is consistent with the message you read above? (If you 
are not sure, you can mark that too) 
1) Many health economists argue that Obamacare will accelerate growth 
in health care costs 
2) Many health economists argue that Obamacare will slow down 
growth in health care costs 
3) Not sure 
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Which of the following terms did the message use to explain the health 
economists' theory? (If you are not sure, you can mark that too) 
1) The free rider problem 
2) Adverse selection 
3) Risk aversion 
4) Not sure 
 
 
Screener (Those who failed this were underweighted) 
 
When a big news story breaks people often go online to get up-to-the-minute 
details on what is going on. We want to know which websites people trust to get 
this information. We also want to know if people are paying attention to the 
question. To show that you’ve read this much, please ignore the question 
and select the Drudge Report and none of the above as your two answers. 
 
1) New York Times website (1) 
2) Huffington Post (2) 
3) Washington Post website (3) 
4) Cnn.com (4) 
5) FoxNews.com (5) 
6) MSNBC.com (6) 
7) The Associated Press website (7) 
8) Reuters website (8) 
9) New York Post online (9) 
10) The Drudge Report (10) 
11) Google News (11) 
12) ABC News website (12) 
13) CBS News website (13) 
14) NBC News website (14) 
15) Yahoo! News (15) 
16) NPR website (16) 
17) USA Today website (17) 
18) None of the above (18) 
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Appendix B.4. Additional Information on Results from Experiment 1  
 
In Columns 1, 3, and 5 of Table A13, I report the regression models on which 
Figure 4 is based. The dependent variable (conditional probability that the health 
economists’ prediction turns out to be correct) was regressed on the position of the 
presented argument (between-subject factor), the dummies for each piece of evidence (22 
within-subject factors), and the interactions between the argument and evidence factors.70 
Standard errors were clustered at the respondent level. The table shows the coefficients 
on each of these terms. As noted in the main text, those who exhibited low attention by 
failing the screener question (see Appendix B.3) were underweighted. Those who chose 
only one of the two correct options were weighted by 0.5, and those who choose none of 
the two were weighted by 0 (i.e., dropped). 
Column 2, 4, and 6 of Table A13 repeats the same model, but this time without 
underweighting the low-attention respondents. As can be seen, the results are very similar 
across this specification choice. 
 
                                                 
70 The reference category for the evidence factor was “Premiums in ACA marketplaces 
increase 10% nationwide (SC[h]).” 
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Table A13-1: Conditional Probabilities Given Evidence   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Subset All Opponents Proponents 
Pro Argument  -0.368* -0.317* -0.646* -0.591* -0.133* -0.113*  
(0.035) (0.033) (0.038) (0.044) (0.050) (0.044) 
SC(b): Individual premiums increased 24% after ACA nationwide -0.010 -0.012 -0.018 -0.009 0.026 0.013 
 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.028) (0.030) (0.034) (0.030) 
SC(e): Employee deductibles have increased 20% 2 years into ACA -0.036* -0.036* -0.034 -0.018 -0.026 -0.046 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.028) (0.036) (0.033) 
SC(d): National health spending is higher than pre-ACA -0.043* -0.032* -0.063* -0.048* -0.023 -0.013 
 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.024) (0.025) (0.032) (0.026) 
SC: States with ACA provisions had highest premiums before ACA -0.053* -0.044* -0.080* -0.078* -0.016 -0.005 
 
(0.022) (0.020) (0.036) (0.032) (0.031) (0.027) 
WC(e): Employee premiums have increased 7% 2 years into ACA -0.056* -0.044* -0.063* -0.048* -0.046 -0.041 
 
(0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.023) (0.034) (0.028) 
WC: 64% were worried health cost before ACA, now 67% are worried  -0.105* -0.089* -0.146* -0.129* -0.058 -0.058 
 
(0.024) (0.022) (0.026) (0.027) (0.042) (0.036) 
WC(h): Premiums in ACA marketplaces increase 5% in Cheyenne -0.140* -0.131* -0.143* -0.117* -0.138* -0.147* 
 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.030) (0.033) (0.041) (0.038) 
WC: Share of health spending in GDP changed from 17.1 to 17.5 -0.154* -0.135* -0.137* -0.102* -0.168* -0.160* 
 
(0.019) (0.021) (0.030) (0.034) (0.030) (0.034) 
WP(a): Premiums in ACA marketplaces increase 7% in Louisville -0.192* -0.162* -0.224* -0.192* -0.176* -0.145* 
 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.034) (0.036) (0.040) (0.034) 
WC(b): Individual premiums increased 1.4% after ACA in Maryland  -0.145* -0.125* -0.186* -0.147* -0.127* -0.122* 
 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.032) (0.033) (0.038) (0.033) 
WP: 52% are not worried prescription drug cost -0.154* -0.130* -0.168* -0.132* -0.145* -0.132* 
 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) 
WP: Canada spends less on health care than the US -0.158* -0.145* -0.217* -0.192* -0.110* -0.119* 
 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.028) (0.029) (0.046) (0.042) 
WC (d): Cosmetic surgery spending growth is higher than pre ACA -0.179* -0.161* -0.224* -0.192* -0.150* -0.147* 
 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.035) 
WP(g): Research spending growth is lower than Bush years -0.203* -0.188* -0.251* -0.222* -0.175* -0.170* 
 
(0.029) (0.026) (0.043) (0.041) (0.044) (0.039) 
WP(f): Uninsured rate dropped 1% past year -0.224* -0.204* -0.296* -0.252* -0.165* -0.160* 
 
(0.027) (0.025) (0.041) (0.040) (0.039) (0.036) 
WP(c): Cosmetic surgery spending growth is lower than Bush years -0.227* -0.205* -0.277* -0.240* -0.171* -0.165* 
 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.038) (0.037) (0.039) (0.035) 
SP Premiums went down in MA after health reform -0.202* -0.192* -0.242* -0.216* -0.190* -0.196* 
 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.036) (0.036) (0.041) (0.036) 
SP(a): Premiums in ACA marketplaces decrease .7% nationwide -0.258* -0.230* -0.325* -0.288* -0.209* -0.188* 
 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.045) (0.043) (0.042) (0.039) 
SP(f): Uninsured rate 43% has dropped since ACA -0.269* -0.225* -0.336* -0.285* -0.237* -0.198* 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.046) (0.047) (0.042) (0.039) 
SP(c): Out of pocket spending growth is lower than Bush years -0.302* -0.257* -0.360* -0.309* -0.241* -0.201* 
 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.045) (0.044) (0.038) (0.036) 
SP(g): Employee premium growth is lower than Bush years -0.335* -0.298* -0.432* -0.375* -0.257* -0.239*  
(0.028) (0.027) (0.042) (0.044) (0.040) (0.036) 
Low Attention Participants Underweighted Yes No Yes No Yes No 
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Table A13-2: Conditional Probabilities Given Evidence (Continued)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Subset All Opponents Proponents 
Pro Argument × SC(b): Individual premiums increased 24% after ACA nationwide 0.019 0.004 0.091* 0.081* -0.072 -0.079* 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.042) 
Pro Argument × SC(e): Employee deductibles have increased 20% 2 years into ACA 0.054* 0.036 0.050 0.021 0.041 0.036 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.040) (0.042) (0.048) (0.044) 
Pro Argument × SC(d): National health spending is higher than pre-ACA 0.092* 0.057* 0.122* 0.096* 0.056 0.010 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.038) (0.038) (0.043) (0.039) 
Pro Argument × SC: States with ACA provisions had highest premiums before ACA 0.096* 0.079* 0.153* 0.163* 0.021 -0.007 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) 
Pro Argument × WC(e): Employee premiums have increased 7% 2 years into ACA 0.110* 0.084* 0.105* 0.089* 0.111* 0.074* 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.034) (0.035) (0.047) (0.042) 
Pro Argument × WC: 64% were worried health cost before ACA, now 67% are worried  0.164* 0.139* 0.217* 0.194* 0.102* 0.089* 
 (0.031) (0.029) (0.038) (0.040) (0.053) (0.047) 
Pro Argument × WC(h): Premiums in ACA marketplaces increase 5% in Cheyenne 0.214* 0.207* 0.236* 0.206* 0.189* 0.207* 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.039) (0.042) (0.052) (0.047) 
Pro Argument × WC: Share of health spending in GDP changed from 17.1 to 17.5 0.235* 0.202* 0.232* 0.204* 0.237* 0.198* 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.037) (0.042) (0.044) (0.046) 
Pro Argument × WP(a): Premiums in ACA marketplaces increase 7% in Louisville 0.267* 0.232* 0.313* 0.284* 0.253* 0.212* 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.044) (0.046) (0.052) (0.047) 
Pro Argument × WC(b): Individual premiums increased 1.4% after ACA in Maryland  0.271* 0.236* 0.307* 0.266* 0.252* 0.224* 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.043) (0.045) (0.050) (0.046) 
Pro Argument × WP: 52% are not worried prescription drug cost 0.272* 0.219* 0.298* 0.255* 0.267* 0.204* 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.046) (0.045) (0.054) (0.050) 
Pro Argument × WP: Canada spends less on health care than the US 0.279* 0.248* 0.353* 0.332* 0.220* 0.193* 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.046) (0.050) (0.063) (0.059) 
Pro Argument × WC (d): Cosmetic surgery spending growth is higher than pre ACA 0.296* 0.259* 0.350* 0.315* 0.254* 0.221* 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.047) 
Pro Argument × WP(g): Research spending growth is lower than Bush years 0.350* 0.319* 0.405* 0.379* 0.312* 0.277* 
 (0.037) (0.035) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.051) 
Pro Argument × WP(f): Uninsured rate dropped 1% past year 0.360* 0.315* 0.423* 0.378* 0.297* 0.255* 
 (0.036) (0.034) (0.051) (0.050) (0.053) (0.049) 
Pro Argument × WP(c): Cosmetic surgery spending growth is lower than Bush years 0.394* 0.355* 0.438* 0.414* 0.339* 0.294* 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.050) (0.052) (0.057) (0.050) 
Pro Argument × SP Premiums went down in MA after health reform 0.395* 0.360* 0.445* 0.417* 0.385* 0.351* 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.052) (0.052) (0.058) (0.050) 
Pro Argument × SP(a): Premiums in ACA marketplaces decrease .7% nationwide 0.464* 0.412* 0.467* 0.445* 0.454* 0.371* 
 (0.042) (0.039) (0.063) (0.062) (0.062) (0.056) 
Pro Argument × SP(f): Uninsured rate 43% has dropped since ACA 0.468* 0.391* 0.545* 0.500* 0.440* 0.341* 
 (0.042) (0.040) (0.062) (0.062) (0.064) (0.058) 
Pro Argument × SP(c): Out of pocket spending growth is lower than Bush years 0.526* 0.448* 0.583* 0.541* 0.467* 0.363* 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.060) (0.058) (0.055) (0.053) 
Pro Argument × SP(g): Employee premium growth is lower than Bush years 0.569* 0.499* 0.675* 0.627* 0.482* 0.401* 
 (0.042) (0.040) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.055) 
Intercept 0.704* 0.680* 0.838* 0.788* 0.582* 0.589* 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028) 
N 4708 5412 1914 2068 2200 2684 
Low Attention Participants Underweighted Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Note. OLS estimates. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the respondent level. The reference category for 
the evidence factor is “Premiums in ACA marketplaces increase 10% nationwide (SC[h]).” “S” indicates “Strong.” 
“W” indicates “Weak.” “P” indicates “Pro.” “C” indicates “Con.” Lower case letters in parentheses pair a piece of 
strong evidence with its weaker version. For example, SP(a) and WP(a) are a pair. 
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Appendix C   Experiment 2 (Chapter 3) 
 
Appendix C.1. Message Wordings 
 
Appendix C.1.1 Strong Con 
 
A checkup for Obamacare reveals a warning sign 
 
Since the passage of Obamacare, health experts have been keeping close taps on how the 
law is changing America’s health care system.  
 
What is the prognosis, almost three years into implementation? Despite some successes, 
Obamacare is failing to address one of the most serious problems of America’s health 
care system: the rising costs. 
 
This isn't surprising to many health economists who had argued that Obamacare would 
accelerate growth in health care costs from the beginning.  
 
Here’s why: Obamacare requires health insurance providers to offer health insurance 
policies at the same price to all persons, regardless of their health conditions. This 
regulation would almost certainly increase medical costs for healthy people and lead 
some of them to exit the insurance market, causing costs to rise even more.  
 
It is extremely important to have enough healthy people in the market to control the rising 
health care prices, but Obamacare does just the opposite.  
 
Because of this “adverse selection” problem, the health economists have said that the law 
would make medical care even more expensive than would have been the case otherwise, 
and we would see much faster growth in health spending over the next ten years.  
 
Now, there is mounting evidence that that the health economists were right. 
 
1. Earlier this year, the Kaiser Family Foundation released an analysis showing 
that premiums in Obamacare Marketplaces were rising by 10.1% on average 
nationwide, and above 30% in some states.  
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2. A new study by a Yale economist finds that, during the first two quarters after 
the reform, premiums in the individual health insurance market increased by 
24.4% than what they would have without Obamacare across all states. 
 
3. According to the 2015 annual health benefits survey by the Kaiser Family 
Foundation, the average deductible for employer-sponsored health insurance has 
increased by 22.0% over the two years after the reform. 
 
4. The latest national health expenditure data released by the Centers for Medicaid 
and Medicare Services shows that the annual growth in national spending 
on health insurance was 6.2% in 2014. This was much higher than the annual 
growth rate before the reform (3.0%). 
 
So no matter how you look at the data, the evidence is clear. Obamacare is not 
sustainable, and is likely to implode down the road if the current trend continues.  
 
Then, what should be done? This question continues to frustrate many legislators and 
experts. What is unhelpful, though, is the unwillingness to recognize the warning signs.
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Appendix C.1.2 Weak Con 
 
A checkup for Obamacare reveals a warning sign 
 
Since the passage of Obamacare, health experts have been keeping close taps on how the 
law is changing America’s health care system.  
 
What is the prognosis, almost three years into implementation? Despite some successes, 
Obamacare is failing to address one of the most serious problems of America’s health 
care system: the rising costs. 
 
This isn't surprising to many health economists who had argued that Obamacare would 
accelerate growth in health care costs from the beginning.  
 
Here’s why: Obamacare requires health insurance providers to offer health insurance 
policies at the same price to all persons, regardless of their health conditions. This 
regulation would almost certainly increase medical costs for healthy people and lead 
some of them to exit the insurance market, causing costs to rise even more.  
 
It is extremely important to have enough healthy people in the market to control the rising 
health care prices, but Obamacare does just the opposite.  
 
Because of this “adverse selection” problem, the health economists have said that the law 
would make medical care even more expensive than would have been the case otherwise, 
and we would see much faster growth in health spending over the next ten years.  
 
Now, there is mounting evidence that that the health economists were right. 
 
1. Earlier this year, the Kaiser Family Foundation released an analysis showing 
that premiums in Obamacare Marketplaces were rising by 4.7% in Cheyenne, 
Wyoming. 
 
2. A new study by a Yale economist finds that, during the first two quarters after 
the reform, premiums in the individual health insurance market increased by 
1.4% than what they would have without Obamacare in Maryland. 
 
3. According to the 2015 annual health benefits survey by the Kaiser Family 
Foundation, the average premium for employer-sponsored health insurance has 
increased by 7.3% over the two years after the reform. 
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4, The latest data released by the American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery 
shows that the annual growth in spending on cosmetic surgeries was 8.5% in 
2015. This was higher than the annual growth rate before the reform (7.5%). 
 
So no matter how you look at the data, the evidence is clear. Obamacare is not 
sustainable, and is likely to implode down the road if the current trend continues.  
 
Then, what should be done? This question continues to frustrate many legislators and 
experts. What is unhelpful, though, is the unwillingness to recognize the clear warning 
signs. 
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Appendix C.1.3. Strong Pro 
 
A checkup for Obamacare reveals a positive prognosis 
 
Since the passage of Obamacare, health experts have been keeping close taps on how the 
law is changing America’s health care system.  
 
What is the prognosis, almost three years into implementation? Despite some problems, 
Obamacare is successfully addressing one of the most serious problems of America’s 
health care system: the rising costs. 
 
This isn’t surprising to many health economists who had argue that Obamacare would 
slow down growth in health care costs from the beginning.  
 
Here's why: Obamacare provides several incentives for previously uninsured healthy 
people to join the insurance pool. Before the ACA, medical costs were so high mainly 
because those buying insurance were sicker than average, which in turn led some healthy 
people to exit the insurance market, causing costs to rise even more.  
 
It is extremely important to have enough healthy people in the market to control the rising 
health care prices, and Obamacare does just that.  
 
Since Obamacare solves this “adverse selection” problem, the health economists have 
said that the law would make medical care less expensive than would have been the case 
otherwise, and we would see much slower growth in health spending over the next ten 
years.  
 
Now, there is mounting evidence that that the health economists were right. 
 
1. Confirming the health economists’ key assumption about expanding the 
insurance pool, an analysis by the Department of Health and Human Services 
indicates that the uninsured rate for non-elderly adults has decreased by 
43%, over the two years after the reform. 
 
2. According to a report by the Kaiser Family Foundation, the overall premium 
for employer-sponsored health insurance rose by 3.8% each year since the 
reform. By contrast, during the Bush years, premiums increased on average by 
8.8 % each year. 
 
3. According to the latest data released by the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare 
Services, the annual growth in national out-of-pocket spending was 1.3% in 2014. 
Again this is lower than the annual growth rates under Bush (5.6% on average). 
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4. Earlier this year, Kaiser Family Foundation released an analysis showing 
premiums in the Obamacare Marketplaces decreased by 0.7% nationwide, after 
accounting for tax credits. In comparison, the national individual health insurance 
premium had increased by 10 to 12% per year before the reform, according to an 
analysis by an MIT economist. 
 
So no matter how you look at the data, the evidence is clear. Obamacare is fixing the 
problem that would have made the system far worse than it is now.  
 
Of course, the law is not perfect by any means and there should be debates about how to 
make more progresses. What is unhelpful, though, is the unwillingness to recognize the 
positive signs. 
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Appendix C.1.4. Weak Pro 
 
A checkup for Obamacare reveals a positive prognosis 
 
Since the passage of Obamacare, health experts have been keeping close taps on how the 
law is changing America’s health care system.  
 
What is the prognosis, almost three years into implementation? Despite some problems, 
Obamacare is successfully addressing one of the most serious problems of America’s 
health care system: the rising costs. 
 
This isn’t surprising to many health economists who had argue that Obamacare would 
slow down growth in health care costs from the beginning.  
 
Here's why: Obamacare provides several incentives for previously uninsured healthy 
people to join the insurance pool. Before Obamacare, medical costs were so high mainly 
because those buying insurance were sicker than average, which in turn led some healthy 
people to exit the insurance market, causing costs to rise even more.  
 
It is extremely important to have enough healthy people in the market to control the rising 
health care prices, and Obamacare does just that.  
 
Since Obamacare solves this “adverse selection” problem, the health economists think 
that the law would make medical care less expensive than would have been the case 
otherwise, and we would see much slower growth in health spending over the next ten 
years.  
 
Now, there is mounting evidence that that the health economists were right. 
 
1. Confirming the health economists’ key assumption about expanding the 
insurance pool, a recent Gallup poll indicates that the uninsured rate for U.S. 
adults (ages 18 or older) has decreased by 1% point over 2015. 
 
2. According to the data released by the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare 
Services, private sector spending on medical research rose by 5.2% since the 
reform. By contrast, during the Bush years, private sector spending on medical 
research increased on average by 7.2% each year. 
 
3. According to the 2015 survey by the American Society for Aesthetic Plastic 
Surgery, the annual growth in spending on cosmetic surgeries was 8.5% in 2015. 
Again this was lower than the annual growth rates under Bush (9.8% on average). 
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4. Earlier this year, the Kaiser Family Foundation released an analysis showing 
premiums in the Obamacare Marketplaces increased by 7.1% in Louisville, 
Kentucky. In comparison, the national individual health insurance premium had 
increased by 10 to 12% per year before the reform, according to an analysis by an 
MIT economist. 
 
So no matter how you look at the data, the evidence is clear. The Obamacare is fixing the 
problem that would have made the system far worse than it is now.  
 
Of course, the law is not perfect by any means and there should be debates about how to 
make more progresses. What is unhelpful, though, is the unwillingness to recognize the 
positive signs.  
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Appendix C.1.5. Placebo 
 
Germans Forget Postwar History Lesson on Debt Relief in Greece Crisis 
  
It is not hard to notice hypocrisy in Germany’s insistence that Athens must agree to more 
painful austerity before any sort of debt relief can be put on the table: The main creditor 
demanding that Greeks be made to pay for past profligacy benefited not so long ago from 
more lenient terms. 
 
But beyond serving as a reminder of German hypocrisy, the history offers a more 
important lesson: These sorts of things have been dealt with successfully before. The 20th 
century offers a rich road map of policy failure and success addressing sovereign debt 
crises. 
  
The good news is that by now economists generally understand the contours of a 
successful approach. “I’ve seen this movie so many times before,” said Carmen M. 
Reinhart, a professor at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard who is perhaps 
the world’s foremost expert on sovereign debt crises. “It is very easy to get hung up on 
the idiosyncrasies of each individual situation and miss the recurring pattern.”  
  
The recurring, historical pattern? Major debt overhangs are only solved after deep write-
downs of the debt’s face value. The longer it takes for the debt to be cut, the bigger the 
necessary write-down will turn out to be. Nobody should understand this better than the 
Germans. It’s not just that they benefited from the deal in 1953, which underpinned 
Germany’s postwar economic miracle.  
  
Twenty years earlier, Germany defaulted on its debts from World War I, after undergoing 
a bout of hyperinflation and economic depression that helped usher Hitler to power. It is a 
general lesson about the nature of debt from the World War I defaults of more than a 
dozen countries in the 1930s to the Brady write-downs of the early 1990s. 
 
Both of these episodes were preceded by a decade or more of negotiations and 
rescheduling plans that — not unlike Greece’s first bailout programs — extended the 
maturity of debts and lowered their interest rate. But crises ended and economies 
improved only after the debt was cut. A new study found sharp economic rebounds after 
the 1934 defaults — which cut debtors’ foreign indebtedness by at least 43 percent, on 
average — and the Brady plan, which sliced debtors’ burdens by an average of 36 
percent.  
  
The crisis exit in both episodes came only after deep face-value debt write-offs had been 
implemented. Softer forms of debt relief, such as maturity extensions and interest rate 
reductions, are not generally followed by higher economic growth or improved credit 
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ratings. 
 
Yet Policy makers have yet to get this. It took a decade or more from the onset of the 
Latin American debt crisis to the Brady deal. Brazil alone had six debt restructurings. 
Similarly, the generalized defaults of 1934 followed more than a decade of failed half-
measures. Does Greece have to wait that long, too? 
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Appendix C.2. Measurement and Survey Wordings 
 
Appendix C.2.1. Pre-treat Covariates (Control Variables) 
 
Attitudes toward the ACA (Wave 1) was constructed by combining the five items, and 
scaled to 0-1 where 1 indicates the strongest support (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.96). 
In general, do you support or oppose the health care reform law passed in 2010? 
This law is called the Affordable Care Act, and sometimes referred to as 
Obamacare. 
1) Support 
2) Oppose 
3) Neither support nor oppose 
Is your support [opposition] strong or not so strong? 
1) Strong 
2) Not so strong 
Do you lean toward supporting or opposing the health care reform 
law, or do you not lean either way? 
1) Supporting 
2) Opposing 
3) Do not lean either way 
 
Would you vote to repeal the health care reform law, if you were in Congress 
today? 
1) Definitely yes 
2) Probably yes 
3) Might or might not 
4) Probably not 
5) Definitely not 
6) Not sure 
 
On the whole, the health care reform law is changing the American health care 
system... 
1) Definitely for the better 
2) Probably for the better 
3) Neither for the better nor worse 
4) Probably for the worse 
5) Definitely for the worse 
 
In the long run, the overall impacts of the health care reform law on the 
American people will be... 
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1) Definitely good 
2) Probably good 
3) Neither good nor bad 
4) Probably bad 
5) Definitely bad 
 
In the long run, the overall impacts of the health care reform law on you and your 
family will be... 
1) Definitely good 
2) Probably good 
3) Neither good nor bad 
4) Probably bad 
5) Definitely bad 
 
Belief that the ACA saves costs (Wave 1) was measured by combining the following three 
items, and scaled to run from 0 to 1 where 1 indicates the strongest belief that the ACA 
saves health care costs (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.77). “Not sure” responses were coded 0.5. 
 
In terms of health care costs, the reform law is changing the American health care 
system... 
1) Definitely for the better 
2) Probably for the better 
3) Neither better nor worse 
4) Probably for the worse 
5) Definitely for the worse 
6) Not sure 
 
Based on what you have heard, the probability that the law slows down growth in 
health care costs over the next ten years is... 
1) Extremely high (95% chance) 
2) Fairly high (80% chance) 
3) A little high (65% chance) 
4) Neither high nor low (50/50) 
5) A little low (35% chance) 
6) Fairly low (20% chance) 
7) Extremely low (5% chance) 
8) Not sure 
 
Based on what you have heard, the probability that the law accelerates growth in 
health care costs over the next ten years is... 
1) Extremely high (95% chance) 
2) Fairly high (80% chance) 
3) A little high (65% chance) 
4) Neither high nor low (50/50) 
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5) A little low (35% chance) 
6) Fairly low (20% chance) 
7) Extremely low (5% chance) 
8) Not sure 
 
Vote Choice 1 (Wave 1) was measured by the following questionnaire. When controlling 
for this pre-treatment covariate, I estimated the fixed effects terms of each choice, 
treating “The Democratic Party” as the reference category. 
 
If you had to choose now, for which party would you vote in the 2016 
Presidential Election? 
1) The Democratic Party (whoever wins the nomination among the current 
candidates) 
2) The Republican Party (whoever wins the nomination among the current 
candidates) 
3) Either Party (depending on the primary results) 
4) Neither Party 
5) Will not vote 
6) Not sure 
 
Vote Choice 2 (Wave 1) was measured by the following questionnaire. When controlling 
for this pre-treatment covariate, I estimated the fixed effects terms of each choice, 
treating “Hillary Clinton” as the reference category. 
 
If Hillary Clinton were the Democratic Party's candidate and Donald Trump were 
the Republican Party's candidate, who would you vote for? 
1) Hillary Clinton 
2) Donald Trump 
3) Someone else 
4) Will not vote 
5) Not sure 
 
Party Identification (Wave 1) was measured by the following questionnaire, and scaled 0-
1 where 1 indicates “Strong Democrat” 
 
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an 
Independent or something else?  
1) Democrat 
2) Republican 
3) Independent 
4) Other 
Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong 
Democrat [Republican]? 
1) Strong Democrat [Republican]  
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2) Not very strong Democrat [Republican] 
Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party, the 
Republican Party, or neither?  
1) Closer to the Democratic Party 
2) Closer to the Republican Party 
3) Neither 
 
Approval of Obama (Wave 1) was measured by the following questionnaire, and scaled 0-
1 where 1 indicates “strongly approve.” 
 
Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as 
President? 
1) Strongly approve 
2) Somewhat approve 
3) Neither approve nor disapprove 
4) Somewhat disapprove 
5) Strongly disapprove 
 
Approval of Obama’s Handling of Healthcare (Wave 1) was measured by the following 
questionnaire, and scaled 0-1 where 1 indicates “strongly approve.” 
 
Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling health care? 
1) Strongly approve 
2) Somewhat approve 
3) Neither approve nor disapprove 
4) Somewhat disapprove 
5) Strongly disapprove 
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Appendix C.2.2. Dependent Variables 
 
Attitudes toward the ACA (wave 2) was measured in the same way as the pre-treatment 
measurement (see above for survey wordings; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.96). 
 
 
Belief that the ACA saves costs (wave 2) was measured in the same way as the pre-
treatment measurement (see above for survey wordings; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83). 
 
Vote Choice (wave 2) was measured the same survey item as the pre-treatment 
measurement (see above the survey wordings). In the analyses presented below in this 
appendix, “The Democratic Party” was coded 1, and other choices were coded 0. 
 
Approval of Obama (Wave 2) was measured in the same way as the pre-treatment 
measurement (see above for survey wording). 
 
Approval of Obama’s Handling of Healthcare (Wave 2) was measured in the same way 
as the pre-treatment measurement (see above for survey wording. 
 
Perceived Argument Strength was measured using the following six items, and scaled to 
vary between 0-1 where 1 indicates the highest score (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.94). Similar 
questions were asked for the placebo group, although their responses were not included in 
the analyses. 
[Treatment Groups] Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the 
following statements about the argument about the 2010 health care reform law 
called the Affordable Care Act, sometimes referred to as Obamacare. 
 
The argument provided evidence that seems certain to me. 
1) Strongly agree 
2) Agree 
3) Somewhat agree 
4) Neither agree nor disagree 
5) Somewhat disagree 
6) Disagree 
7) Strongly disagree 
8) Not sure 
 
The argument provided clear evidence (same multiple choices as above). 
 
The argument provided strong evidence (same multiple choices as 
above). 
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The argument provided a convincing reason for its position (same 
multiple choices as above). 
 
The argument provided an important reason for me to consider when I 
form my opinion about the health care reform law (same multiple choices 
as above).  
 
The argument would help me form my opinion about the health care 
reform law (same multiple choices as above). 
 
 [Placebo Group; not part of analysis] Please indicate how much you agree or 
disagree with the following statements about the argument about Greece's debt 
crisis. 
 
The argument provided evidence that seems certain to me. 
 
The argument provided clear evidence. 
 
The argument provided strong evidence. 
 
The argument provided a convincing reason for its position. 
 
The argument would help me form my opinion about Greece's debt 
crisis. 
 
The argument put thoughts in my mind about supporting debt relief for 
Greece.  
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Appendix C.2.3. Moderating Variables 
 
Importance of Health care issue (Wave 1) was measured by the following questionnaire. 
In the moderation analyses, “not at all” to “one of the five” were coded 0; and “one of the 
two or three” and “single most important” was coded 1. 
 
As compared to your feelings on other political issues, how important is health 
care to you?  
1) It is the single most important political issue to me 
2) One of the two or three most important political issues 
3) One of the five most important political issues 
4) Not among the issues I consider important 
5) Not at all important 
 
Importance of Health care cost (Wave 1) was measured by the following questionnaire. 
In the moderation analyses, “not at all” to “very important” were coded 0; and “single 
most important” was coded 1. 
 
Please rate the importance of each of the following considerations in evaluating 
the health care reform law. 
Its impacts on health care costs 
1) Single most important 
2) Very important 
3) Moderately important 
4) Slightly important 
5) Not at all important 
 
Political Knowledge was measured by counting the percentage of correct answers to the 
following questionnaires (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.59). In the moderation analyses 0% to 
67% were coded 0; and 68% to 100% were coded 1. 
 
Please answer the following yes/no questions based on what you have heard 
about the health care reform law. If you don't know the answer, you can mark 
that too. 
Did some people get their health care policies cancelled due to the new 
regulations implemented by the law? (Wave 1) 
1) Yes 
2) No 
3) Not sure 
 
Has the number of uninsured Americans declined since the implementation of the 
law? (Wave 1) 
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1) Yes 
2) No 
3) Not sure 
 
Does the law require that if a U.S. citizen does NOT have health insurance, that 
person will have to pay a fine on his or her federal income taxes? (Wave 1) 
1) Yes 
2) No 
3) Not sure 
 
Does the law allow health insurance companies to refuse to sell health insurance 
to U.S. citizens who have a serious medical problem? (Wave 1) 
1) Yes 
2) No 
3) Not sure 
 
Which one of the parties would you say is more conservative than the other at the 
national level? (If you don’t know the answer, you can mark that too) (Wave 1) 
1) Democrats (1) 
2) Republicans (2) 
3) Not sure (3) 
 
Do you happen to know what job or political office is currently held by John 
Kerry? (If you don’t know the answer, you can mark that too) (Wave 2; before 
treatment) 
1) U.S. Senator (1) 
2) U.S. Vice President (2) 
3) U.S. State Secretary (3) 
4) U.S Energy Secretary (4) 
5) Not sure (5) 
 
Do you happen to know what job or political office is currently held by Ernest 
Moniz? (If you don’t know the answer, you can mark that too) (Wave 2; before 
treatment) 
1) U.S. Senator (1) 
2) U.S. Vice President (2) 
3) U.S. State Secretary (3) 
4) U.S Energy Secretary (4) 
5) Not sure (5) 
 
Which party has the most members in the United States House of 
Representatives? (If you don’t know the answer, you can mark that too) (Wave 2; 
before treatment) 
1) Democrats (1) 
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2) Republicans (2) 
3) Not sure (3) 
 
Who has the final responsibility to decide whether a law is Constitutional or 
not? (If you don’t know the answer, you can mark that too) (Wave 2; before 
treatment)  
1) President (1) 
2) Congress (2) 
3) Supreme Court (3) 
4) Not sure (4) 
 
How much of a majority is needed for the U.S. Senate and House to override a 
presidential veto?  (If you don’t know the answer, you can mark that too) (Wave 
2; before treatment) 
1) Simple majority (one more than half the votes) (1)  
2) Two-thirds majority (2) 
3) Three-fourths majority (3) 
4) Not sure (4) 
 
Need for cognition (wave 2; after treatment) was measured by combining the following 
items, and scaled 0-1 where 1 indicates highest score (0.86). In the moderation analyses 0 
to 0.7 were coded 0; and 0.71 to 1 were coded 1. 
 
Please indicate whether or not you agree with each of the following statements 
about you or your beliefs. (Wave 2; after treatment) 
1) Strongly agree 
2) Somewhat agree 
3) Neither agree nor disagree 
4) Somewhat disagree 
5) Strongly disagree 
 
I prefer complex to simple problems (same multiple choices as above).  
 
Thinking is NOT my idea of fun (same multiple choices as above). 
 
I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours (same multiple choices 
as above).  
 
I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of 
thinking (same multiple choices as above). 
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Income (Wave 2; after treatment) was measured by the following question. In the 
moderation analyses, “less than 30,000” to “49,999” were coded 0; and “50,000” or 
higher were coded 1.  
 
What is your combined annual household income? 
1) Less than 30,000 (1) 
2) 30,000 – 39,999 (2) 
3) 40,000 – 49,999 (3) 
4) 50,000 – 59,999 (4) 
5) 60,000 – 69,999 (5) 
6) 70,000 – 79,999 (6) 
7) 80,000 – 89,999 (7) 
8) 90,000 – 99,999 (8) 
9) 100,000 or more (9) 
 
Age (Wave 2; after treatment) was measured by the following question. In the moderation 
analyses, 18 to 34 were coded 0; 35 or higher were coded 1. There was no respondent 
under 18. 
 
How old are you? 
1) Under 18 (1) 
2) 18-25 (2) 
3) 26-34 (3) 
4) 35-44 (4) 
5) 45-54 (5) 
6) 55-64 (6) 
7) 65 or older (7) 
 
Gender (Wave 2; after treatment) was measured by the following question. 
 
What is your gender? 
1) Male (1) 
2) Female (2) 
 
Race (Wave 2; after treatment) was measured by the following question. In the 
moderation analyses, “White/Caucasian” was coded 0; other choices were coded 1. 
 
What is your race? 
1) White/Caucasian (1) 
2) African American (2) 
3) Hispanic (3) 
4) Asian (4) 
5) Native American (5) 
6) Pacific Islander (6) 
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7) Multiracial (7) 
8) Other (8) 
 
Problems with medical bills (Wave 2; after treatment) was measured by the following 
two questions. In the moderation analyses, those who indicated “Yes” to either question 
were coded 1; those who indicated “No” to both were coded were coded 0. “Not sure” 
was treated as “No.” 
 
In the past 12 months, did you or another family member in your household have any 
problems paying medical bills? 
1) Yes (1) 
2) No (2) 
3) Not sure (3) 
 
In the past 12 months, have you or someone else in your household ever put off or 
postponed seeking health care you felt you needed but could not afford? 
1) Yes (1) 
2) No (2) 
3) Not sure (3) 
 
Insured (Wave 2; after treatment) was measured by the following question 
Are you covered by any form of health insurance? 
1) Yes (1) 
2) No (2) 
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Appendix C.2.4. Message Recalls 
Evidence Recall 
 
Which of the followings is consistent with the message you read above? (If you 
are not sure, you can mark that too) 
1) Premiums in the ACA Marketplaces rose by 10.1% on average 
nationwide in 2016. 
2) Premiums in the ACA Marketplaces rose by 4.7% in Cheyenne, 
Wyoming in 2016. 
3) The uninsured rate has decreased by 43%, over the two years after the 
reform. 
4) The uninsured rate has decreased by 1% point over 2015. 
5) In the 1930s, the German economy improved after debt relief 
6) Not sure  
 
Key Term Recall 
 
Which of the following terms did the message use to explain the health 
economists' theory? (If you are not sure, you can mark that too) 
1) The free rider problem 
2) Adverse selection 
3) Risk aversion  
4) I din't read anything about the health economist' theory  
5) Not sure 
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Appendix C.2.5. Screeners 
 
Wave 1 Attention Screener (Those who failed this question were not invited to Wave 2) 
 
Recent research on decision making shows that choices are affected by context. 
To help us understand how people make decisions, we are interested in 
information about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually 
take the time to read the directions. To show that you have read the instructions, 
please ignore the question below about how you are feeling and instead check 
Interested, Bored and none of the above option as your three choices. 
 
Please check all words that describe how you are currently feeling. 
1) Excited 
2) Distressed 
3) Interested 
4) Upset 
5) Bored 
6) Guilty 
7) Scared 
8) Hostile 
9) Enthusiastic 
10) None of the above 
 
Citizenship (Wave 1; non-US citizens were not invited to Wave 2) 
 
Are you a U.S. citizen? (Your answer will NOT affect HIT approval) 
1) Yes 
2) No 
 
Wave 2 Attention Screener (Before Treatment; those who failed this question were 
underweighted in the analyses) 
 
When a big news story breaks people often go online to get up-to-the-minute 
details on what is going on. We want to know which websites people trust to get 
this information. We also want to know if people are paying attention to the 
question. To show that you’ve read this much, please ignore the question 
and select the Drudge Report and the NPR website and none of the above as your 
three answers. 
 
When there is a big news story, which is the one news website you visit first? 
(Please only choose one) 
1) New York Times website (1) 
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2) Huffington Post (2) 
3) Washington Post website (3) 
4) Cnn.com (4) 
5) FoxNews.com (5) 
6) MSNBC.com (6) 
7) The Associated Press website (7) 
8) Reuters website (8) 
9) New York Post online (9) 
10) The Drudge Report (10) 
11) Google News (11) 
12) ABC News website (12) 
13) CBS News website (13) 
14) NBC News website (14) 
15) Yahoo! News (15) 
16) NPR website (16) 
17) USA Today website (17) 
18) None of the above (18) 
 
 183 
Appendix C.2.4. Exposure to the 2017 Premium Increase Story 
 
Exposure to the Premium Increase Story (Wave 4) was measured by the following 
questionnaire. In the moderation analyses, “No” and “Not Sure” was coded 0; “yes” was 
coded 1. 
 
The Obama administration released the prices for Obamacare health plans. 
Over the past few days, have you seen or heard any news about the 2017 
health insurance rates?  
 
1) Yes 
2) No 
3) Not Sure 
 
Follow-up Question 
 
According to the news reports, the 2017 premiums for health plans under the 
Affordable Care Act will… 
1) Decrease 
2) Stay about the same 
3) Increase 
4) I don’t remember the specifics 
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Appendix C.3. Additional Information, Robustness Checks, and Additional Analyses  
 
This section provides additional information, and robustness checks and 
additional analyses for the results from Experiment 2, reported in Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation. 
Tables A14 and A15 describes the full report on the regression models reported in 
Panels A and B Table 8. in the main text. In Table A14, the dependent variables (belief 
and attitudes) are regressed on the dummies for the experimental condition, for which the 
control group serves as the reference, and pre-treatment covariates. Covariates include 
prior attitudes toward ACA, prior belief about the ACA’s effect on health care costs, 
approval of Obama’s performance as the President, approval of Obama’s handling of 
health care, and dummies for vote choice. As noted in the main text, those who exhibited 
low attention by failing the screener question (see Appendix C.2.5) were underweighted. 
Those who chose one or two of the three correct options were weighted by 0.5, and those 
who choose none of the two were weighted by 0 (i.e., dropped). 
In Table A15, the experiment conditions were operationalized as a single 
continuous variable representing a scale of evidence direction and strength (0 = strong 
con; 0.25 = weak con; 0.5 = control; 0.75= weak pro 1=strong pro).  
Tables A16 and A17 demonstrate that the results are robust across two important 
model specification choices. In Table A16, the same analyses as those reported in Table 
8. are repeated, but this time without underweighting those who failed to choose the tree 
correct options in the screener question. In Table A17, I estimate the treatment effects 
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without controlling for the treatment covariates. As can be seen, the results are largely 
similar to those reported in Table 8.   
In Table A18, I report the regression models summarizing the treatment effects on 
perceived argument strength. Figure 7 is based on these models. Perceived argument 
strength scales were regressed on experimental conditions, and the same set of pre-
treatment covariates as prior analyses. Also, low-attention participants were 
underweighted. Control group was excluded from this analysis.  
Table A19 provides supplementary analyses examining the “carry-over” treatment 
effects on additional outcome variables, other than the key dependent variables used in 
the analyses reported in the main text. Specifically, I focus on vote choice in Coumns1 to 
3, and overall support for Obama in Columns 4 to 6, and support for Obama’s handling of 
healthcare in columns 7 to 9. All models included the same set of pre-treatment 
covariates as prior analyses; and low-attention participants were underweighted. As the 
table shows, the treatment effects on vote choice, and overall approval of Obama were 
fairly small. The coefficients on each experimental condition were not statistically 
significant, although correctly signed for the most part (see Columns 1 to 6 of Panel A).  
While the effects of the experimental conditions as a whole, operationalized as a single 
continuous variable, were significant for these dependent variables, the effects were 
modest in size. This presumably reflects the fact that the Affordable Care Act as a 
political issue accounts for only a part of people’s evaluations of the president, and their 
voting decisions. In Columns 7 to 9, I report more sizable effects on approval of Obama’s 
handling of health care, to which the contents of the arguments more relevant.  
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To address the concern that those with treatment effects may be weaker for those 
with strong prior opinions, I repeat the main analyses this time using strong proponents 
and opponents (Table A20-1). Strong proponents were defined as those scored 0.75 or 
higher in the baseline measure of attitudes toward the ACA. Strong opponents are those 
scored 0.25 or lower. As the table shows, I find no evidence that those with strong 
opinions ignore or backlash against uncongenial arguments.  
In Table A20-2, I show similar treatment effects across candidate support (during 
the 2016 primary season), in contrast to the conventional wisdom that the supporters of a 
certain presidential candidate tend to ignore uncongenial facts through motivated 
reasoning (e.g., Ignatius 2016). 
In Table A20-3, I show the treatment effects for each partisan group. Consistent 
with the analyses presented in the main text (Table 8), I find that the treatments had 
similar effects for both Republicans and Democrats, for both outcome variables. 
Treatment effect heterogeneity was fairly small in comparison to the overall effect sizes. 
And to the extent there is heterogeneity, people were influenced more by the arguments 
that challenge their party’s positions.  
In Table A21, I report the regression models summarizing the “long-run” effects 
of the treatments measured 80 days (Wave 3) and 160 days (Wave 4) after the main 
experiment. Figure 8 is based on these models. In these analyses, the experiment 
conditions were operationalized as a single continuous variable representing a scale of 
evidence direction and strength (0 = strong con; 0.25 = weak con; 0.5 = control; 0.75= 
weak pro 1=strong pro). The estimates were adjusted for covariates include baseline 
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attitudes toward ACA, baseline belief about the ACA’s effect on health care costs, 
approval of Obama’s performance as the President, approval of Obama’s handling of 
health care, and dummies for vote choice. As noted in the main text, those who exhibited 
low attention by failing the screener question (see Appendix C.2.5) were underweighted. 
Low-attention participants were underweighted. 
In Table A22, I report the estimated effect of the premium increase story. I 
regressed beliefs and attitudes measured in Wave 4 on a dummy variable indicating 
whether one received the news and the lagged dependent variables measured in the prior 
three waves. In the upper panel, I show results unadjusted for other covariates. Reported 
in the lower panel are estimates adjusted for other covariates including approval of 
Obama’s performance as the President, approval of Obama’s handling of health care, and 
dummies for vote choice. Receiving the news lowered people’s belief in ACA’s cost 
saving effect and overall support for the law, across prior attitudes and party ID—a 
finding that remains robust to the inclusion of additional controls.  
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Table A14: Full Reports on Panel A of Table 8 (Treatment Effects [Experiment 2]) 
 
Note.  OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Low attention 
participants are underweighted. The reference categories for Vote Choice 1 and Vote 
Choice 2 are respectively “the Democratic Party” and “Hilary Clinton.” 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Belief in Cost Saving Effect Attitudes toward ACA 
Subset All Opponent Supporter All Opponent Supporter 
Strong Con (𝛽1) -0.130* -0.089* -0.156* -0.082* -0.030* -0.109* 
 (0.014) (0.024) (0.017) (0.011) (0.017) (0.015) 
Weak Con (𝛽2) -0.092* -0.061* -0.105* -0.038* -0.029* -0.041* 
 (0.014) (0.025) (0.016) (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) 
Weak Pro (𝛽3) 0.084* 0.088* 0.082* 0.035* 0.072* 0.013 
 (0.014) (0.024) (0.016) (0.010) (0.018) (0.012) 
Strong Pro (𝛽4) 0.126* 0.137* 0.119* 0.060* 0.101* 0.032* 
 (0.014) (0.025) (0.017) (0.011) (0.019) (0.012) 
Prior Attitudes toward ACA 0.214* 0.236* 0.340* 0.689* 0.698* 0.735* 
 (0.037) (0.086) (0.058) (0.033) (0.072) (0.051) 
Prior Belief in Cost Saving Effects 0.418* 0.391* 0.421* 0.079* 0.075* 0.060* 
 (0.030) (0.049) (0.039) (0.024) (0.038) (0.030) 
Party ID 0.053* 0.016 0.066* 0.032 0.025 0.049* 
 (0.026) (0.042) (0.033) (0.022) (0.033) (0.029) 
Obama Support 0.042 0.031 0.026 0.042 0.104* -0.041 
 (0.028) (0.044) (0.034) (0.027) (0.040) (0.033) 
Obama Healthcare Support -0.027 0.075 -0.041 0.065* 0.058 0.092* 
 (0.035) (0.072) (0.038) (0.033) (0.063) (0.038) 
Vote Choice 1 (Republican) 0.017 -0.078* 0.066 -0.003 -0.010 -0.004 
 (0.027) (0.042) (0.042) (0.022) (0.035) (0.040) 
Vote Choice 1 (Either Party) 0.036* -0.011 0.054* -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.020) (0.035) (0.025) (0.015) (0.028) (0.020) 
Vote Choice 1 (Someone else) -0.010 -0.091* 0.038 -0.004 -0.012 0.008 
 (0.022) (0.040) (0.025) (0.018) (0.032) (0.024) 
Vote Choice 1 (Will not vote) -0.007 -0.077 0.007 0.007 0.008 -0.009 
 (0.029) (0.048) (0.040) (0.029) (0.044) (0.042) 
Vote Choice 1 (Not sure) 0.005 -0.077* 0.053* -0.001 -0.008 0.013 
 (0.026) (0.044) (0.032) (0.022) (0.034) (0.029) 
Vote Choice 2 (Trump) -0.015 0.078* -0.072* -0.023 0.003 -0.049* 
 (0.021) (0.033) (0.027) (0.018) (0.029) (0.026) 
Vote Choice 2 (Someone else) -0.004 0.057* -0.019 -0.014 -0.007 -0.017 
 (0.015) (0.032) (0.017) (0.012) (0.028) (0.013) 
Vote Choice 2 (Will not vote) -0.020 0.072* -0.054* -0.036 -0.019 -0.044 
 (0.023) (0.042) (0.030) (0.025) (0.038) (0.036) 
Vote Choice (Not sure) 0.013 0.064 0.006 0.007 0.031 -0.013 
 (0.027) (0.045) (0.034) (0.018) (0.036) (0.021) 
Constant 0.120* 0.109* 0.036 0.074* 0.021 0.095* 
 (0.027) (0.046) (0.045) (0.021) (0.034) (0.038) 
N 1412 563 829 1412 563 829 
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Table A15: Full Reports on Panel B of Table 8 (Treatment Effects [Experiment 2]) 
 
 
Note.  * p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Low attention participants are underweighted. The reference categories for Vote Choice 1 
and Vote Choice 2 are respectively “the Democratic Party” and “Hilary Clinton.” 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Belief in Cost Saving Effect Attitudes toward ACA 
Subset All Opponent Supporter All Opponent Supporter 
Experimental Condition 0.275* 0.242* 0.295* 0.143* 0.147* 0.135* 
 (0.013) (0.023) (0.015) (0.011) (0.018) (0.013) 
Prior Attitudes toward ACA 0.213* 0.242* 0.341* 0.687* 0.706* 0.731* 
 (0.038) (0.086) (0.058) (0.033) (0.073) (0.051) 
Prior Belief in Cost Saving Effects 0.418* 0.391* 0.415* 0.078* 0.073* 0.056* 
 (0.030) (0.049) (0.039) (0.024) (0.038) (0.030) 
Party ID 0.057* 0.014 0.072* 0.034 0.022 0.045 
 (0.026) (0.042) (0.033) (0.022) (0.033) (0.029) 
Obama Support 0.039 0.028 0.024 0.041 0.101* -0.041 
 (0.028) (0.044) (0.034) (0.027) (0.040) (0.033) 
Obama Healthcare Support -0.025 0.074 -0.038 0.066* 0.055 0.097* 
 (0.035) (0.072) (0.038) (0.033) (0.063) (0.037) 
Vote Choice 1 (Republican) 0.017 -0.079* 0.061 -0.003 -0.012 -0.010 
 (0.027) (0.042) (0.043) (0.022) (0.034) (0.040) 
Vote Choice 1 (Either Party) 0.037* -0.012 0.056* -0.002 -0.007 -0.004 
 (0.020) (0.035) (0.025) (0.015) (0.028) (0.019) 
Vote Choice 1 (Someone else) -0.007 -0.088* 0.041 -0.004 -0.010 0.005 
 (0.022) (0.040) (0.025) (0.018) (0.033) (0.024) 
Vote Choice 1 (Will not vote) -0.004 -0.078 0.012 0.008 0.005 -0.010 
 (0.029) (0.048) (0.040) (0.029) (0.043) (0.042) 
Vote Choice 1 (Not sure) 0.005 -0.084* 0.056* -0.000 -0.018 0.014 
 (0.026) (0.045) (0.034) (0.021) (0.035) (0.030) 
Vote Choice 2 (Trump) -0.015 0.079* -0.072* -0.023 0.004 -0.051* 
 (0.021) (0.033) (0.027) (0.018) (0.029) (0.027) 
Vote Choice 2 (Someone else) -0.004 0.058* -0.019 -0.014 -0.006 -0.018 
 (0.015) (0.032) (0.017) (0.012) (0.028) (0.014) 
Vote Choice 2 (Will not vote) -0.021 0.075* -0.056* -0.037 -0.014 -0.046 
 (0.022) (0.042) (0.029) (0.025) (0.037) (0.036) 
Vote Choice (Not sure) 0.012 0.064 0.002 0.007 0.031 -0.015 
 (0.027) (0.045) (0.034) (0.018) (0.037) (0.021) 
Constant -0.022 0.005 -0.126* -0.003 -0.028 0.012 
 (0.026) (0.046) (0.044) (0.020) (0.033) (0.037) 
N 1412 563 829 1412 563 829 
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Table A16: Robustness Check on Table 8 (No Underweighting of Low-attention 
Participants)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Belief in Cost Saving Effect Attitudes toward ACA 
Subset All Opponents Supporters All Opponents Supporters 
Panel A 
      
Strong Con (𝛽1) -0.123* -0.083* -0.152* -0.085* -0.039* -0.111* 
 (0.013) (0.023) (0.016) (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) 
Weak Con (𝛽2) -0.090* -0.061* -0.104* -0.044* -0.027* -0.053* 
 (0.013) (0.024) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) 
Weak Pro (𝛽3) 0.084* 0.089* 0.082* 0.030* 0.066* 0.008 
 (0.013) (0.023) (0.015) (0.010) (0.018) (0.011) 
Strong Pro (𝛽4) 0.128* 0.133* 0.123* 0.053* 0.088* 0.030* 
 (0.013) (0.023) (0.016) (0.010) (0.018) (0.011) 
Panel B       
Linear Slope 0.272* 0.233* 0.295* 0.140* 0.140* 0.137* 
  (0.012) (0.021) (0.015) (0.010) (0.017) (0.013) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1514 602 890 1514 602 890 
* p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Covariates include the lagged values of the dependent variables, party ID, evaluations of 
Obama (overall and healthcare), and vote choice. Low attention participants are 
underweighted. 
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Table A17: Robustness Check on Table 8 (No Covariates)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Belief in Cost Saving Effect Attitudes toward ACA 
Subset All Opponents Supporters All Opponents Supporters 
Panel A 
      
Strong Con (𝛽1) -0.125* -0.111* -0.137* -0.072* -0.043* -0.097* 
 (0.020) (0.027) (0.021) (0.027) (0.024) (0.021) 
Weak Con (𝛽2) -0.099* -0.110* -0.089* -0.042 -0.066* -0.031 
 (0.021) (0.029) (0.021) (0.029) (0.023) (0.020) 
Weak Pro (𝛽3) 0.066* 0.055* 0.093* 0.011 0.040 0.022 
 (0.021) (0.029) (0.020) (0.027) (0.026) (0.017) 
Strong Pro (𝛽4) 0.110* 0.109* 0.126* 0.035 0.079* 0.028 
 (0.021) (0.029) (0.020) (0.028) (0.028) (0.018) 
Panel B       
Linear Slope 0.254* 0.243* 0.284* 0.107* 0.141* 0.123* 
  (0.018) (0.026) (0.018) (0.024) (0.025) (0.018) 
Covariates No No No No No No 
N 1414 563 831 1414 563 831 
* p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Covariates are not. Low attention participants are underweighted. 
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Table A18: Perceived Argument Strength by Experimental Condition and Prior Attitudes 
(Experiment 2) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Subset All Opponents Supporters 
Weak Con -0.074* -0.052* -0.087* 
 (0.020) (0.026) (0.024) 
Weak Pro -0.081* -0.340* 0.097* 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.022) 
Strong Pro -0.004 -0.273* 0.170* 
 (0.018) (0.026) (0.019) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes 
N 1137 454 666 
* p < 0.1 (two-tailed). Figure 7 in the main text is based on these results. OLS estimates 
with robust standard errors in parentheses. The reference category is the Strong Con 
condition. Entries report the mean differences between the reference category the other 
conditions. Covariates include the lagged values of beliefs and attitudes about the ACA, 
party ID, evaluations of Obama (overall and healthcare), and vote choice. Low attention 
participants are not underweighted.  
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Table A19: Treatment Effects on Other Outcomes (Experiment 2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (89) (9) 
DV Vote Democratic Obama Approval Obama Healthcare Approval 
Subset All Opponents Supporters All Opponents Supporters All Opponents Supporters 
Panel A 
      
   
Strong Con (𝛽1) -0.033 -0.031 -0.047 -0.010 -0.004 -0.015 -0.046* 0.005 -0.073* 
 (0.023) (0.031) (0.032) (0.011) (0.021) (0.013) (0.014) (0.021) (0.018) 
Weak Con (𝛽2) -0.036 -0.018 -0.042 -0.008 -0.029 0.003 -0.028* -0.027 -0.029* 
 (0.024) (0.031) (0.033) (0.010) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.016) 
Weak Pro (𝛽3) 0.006 -0.022 0.014 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.059* 0.078* 0.045* 
 (0.023) (0.032) (0.030) (0.010) (0.017) (0.012) (0.013) (0.022) (0.015) 
Strong Pro (𝛽4) 0.009 0.010 0.016 0.008 0.003 0.009 0.057* 0.054* 0.052* 
 (0.024) (0.033) (0.033) (0.012) (0.022) (0.013) (0.014) (0.023) (0.016) 
Panel B          
Linear Slope 0.050* 0.032 0.074* 0.022* 0.021 0.023* 0.117* 0.084* 0.131* 
  (0.022) (0.027) (0.031) (0.011) (0.020) (0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.016) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1514 602 890 1514 602 890 1514 602 890 
* p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Covariates include the lagged values of the dependent variables, party ID, evaluations of 
Obama (overall and healthcare), and vote choice. Low attention participants are not 
underweighted. 
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Table A20-1: Treatment Effects for Strong Supporters and Strong Opponents of the ACA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Subset 
Strong 
Supporters 
Strong 
Opponents 
Strong 
Supporters 
Strong 
Opponents 
Panel A 
    
Strong Con (𝛽1) -0.088* -0.143* -0.013 -0.096* 
 (0.031) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) 
Weak Con (𝛽2) -0.052* -0.105* -0.008 -0.030* 
 (0.031) (0.021) (0.018) (0.013) 
Weak Pro (𝛽3) 0.087* 0.082* 0.078* 0.003 
 (0.029) (0.019) (0.020) (0.012) 
Strong Pro (𝛽4) 0.145* 0.120* 0.090* 0.017 
 (0.032) (0.020) (0.023) (0.014) 
Panel B 
    
Linear Slope 0.244* 0.286* 0.121* 0.105* 
  (0.028) (0.018) (0.022) (0.015) 
Covariates No No No No 
N 394 590 394 590 
* p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Covariates are not included. Low attention participants are underweighted. Strong 
proponents are defined as those scored 0.75 or higher in the baseline measure of attitudes 
toward the ACA. Strong opponents scored 0.25 or lower. 
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Table A20-2: Treatment Effects by Favorite Candidates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Belief in Cost Saving Effect Attitudes toward ACA 
Candidate Clinton Sanders Trump Clinton Sanders Trump 
Panel A 
      
Strong Con (𝛽1) -0.139* -0.140* -0.115* -0.114* -0.099* -0.040 
 (0.037) (0.021) (0.044) (0.036) (0.017) (0.029) 
Weak Con (𝛽2) -0.137* -0.088* -0.036 -0.035 -0.050* -0.017 
 (0.033) (0.022) (0.046) (0.028) (0.014) (0.030) 
Weak Pro (𝛽3) 0.059* 0.099* 0.049 0.020 0.031* 0.050 
 (0.031) (0.020) (0.045) (0.022) (0.015) (0.034) 
Strong Pro (𝛽4) 0.072* 0.145* 0.116* 0.027 0.062* 0.071* 
 (0.034) (0.021) (0.043) (0.025) (0.015) (0.042) 
Panel B       
Linear Slope 0.251* 0.303* 0.217* 0.133* 0.162* 0.117* 
  (0.034) (0.019) (0.039) (0.032) (0.017) (0.034) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 208 631 190 208 631 190 
* p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Covariates include the lagged values of the dependent variables, party ID, evaluations of 
Obama (overall and healthcare), and vote choice. Low attention participants are 
underweighted. Support for the presidential candidate was measured at Wave 1.
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Table A20-3: Treatment Effects by Partisan Identity  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Belief in Cost Saving Effect Attitudes toward ACA 
Subset All Republicans Democrats All Republicans Democrats 
Panel A 
      
Strong Con (𝛽1) -0.130* -0.098* -0.153* -0.082* -0.028 -0.110* 
 (0.014) (0.029) (0.017) (0.011) (0.018) (0.015) 
Weak Con (𝛽2) -0.092* -0.029 -0.104* -0.038* -0.011 -0.046* 
 (0.014) (0.031) (0.017) (0.010) (0.019) (0.012) 
Weak Pro (𝛽3) 0.084* 0.063* 0.090* 0.035* 0.062* 0.016 
 (0.014) (0.028) (0.016) (0.010) (0.021) (0.012) 
Strong Pro (𝛽4) 0.126* 0.125* 0.122* 0.060* 0.086* 0.043* 
 (0.014) (0.029) (0.017) (0.011) (0.024) (0.012) 
Panel B       
Linear Slope 0.275* 0.216* 0.300* 0.143* 0.121* 0.148* 
  (0.013) (0.025) (0.016) (0.011) (0.020) (0.014) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1412 396 842 1412 396 842 
* p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Covariates include the lagged values of the dependent variables, party ID, evaluations of 
Obama (overall and healthcare), and vote choice. Low attention participants are 
underweighted. 
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Table A21: Long-Run Effects on Obamacare Opinions (Experiment 2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Belief in Cost Saving Effect Attitudes toward ACA 
Subset All Opponent Supporter All Opponent Supporter 
Linear Slope (Wave 3) 0.064* 0.022 0.096* -0.002 -0.026 0.016 
  (0.016) (0.028) (0.019) (0.013) (0.022) (0.016) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 845 344 488 845 344 488 
Linear Slope (Wave 4) 0.019 -0.004 0.038* 0.002 -0.031 0.022 
  (0.018) (0.031) (0.023) (0.015) (0.025) (0.019) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 808 332 461 808 332 461 
Note. * p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Covariates include the lagged values of the dependent variables, party ID, evaluations of 
Obama (overall and healthcare), and vote choice. Support for the presidential candidate 
was measured at Wave 1. 
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Table A22-1: Effects of Exposure to the Coverage of 2017 ACA Premium Increases on   
Beliefs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV Belief in Cost Saving Effect 
Subset All Opponent Supporter Rep Dem 
Exposure to Story -0.043* -0.061* -0.031* -0.036 -0.036* 
  (0.014) (0.023) (0.018) (0.028) (0.018) 
Lagged DV (W3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other Covariates No No No No No 
Exposure to Story -0.036* -0.040* -0.038* -0.039 -0.041* 
  (0.014) (0.023) (0.018) (0.028) (0.018) 
Lagged DV (W3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 685 281 391 202 394 
Note. * p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Covariates include the lagged values of the dependent variables measured Wave 1 
through Wave 3, party ID, evaluations of Obama (overall and healthcare), and vote 
choice. Support for the presidential candidate was measured at Wave 1. 
 
Table A22-1: Effects of Exposure to the Coverage of 2017 ACA Premium Increases on   
Attitudes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV Attitudes toward ACA 
Subset All Opponent Supporter Rep Dem 
Exposure to Story -0.037* -0.043* -0.033* -0.040* -0.029* 
  (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015) 
Lagged DV (W3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other Covariates No No No No No 
Exposure to Story -0.024* -0.010 -0.036* -0.039* -0.027* 
  (0.011) (0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015) 
Lagged DV (W3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 685 391 281 202 394 
Note. * p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Covariates include the lagged values of the dependent variables measured Wave 1 
through Wave 3, party ID, evaluations of Obama (overall and healthcare), and vote 
choice. Support for the presidential candidate was measured at Wave 1. 
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Appendix D   Experiment 3 (Chapter 3) 
 
Appendix D.1. Message Wordings 
 
Appendix D.1.1. Income Strong 
 
On income inequality, Republicans have a data problem 
According to The Washington Post’s Philip Rucker and Dan Balz, “Economic mobility, 
and the feeling of many Americans that they are being shut out from the nation’s 
prosperity, will be a defining theme of the 2016 campaign.”  
  
Republican presidential hopefuls have signaled their interest in addressing the issue of 
stagnating working-class incomes. “[O]nly conservative principles can solve it by 
removing the barriers to upward mobility,” as one conservative Super PAC puts.     
  
How, exactly? Republicans offer the familiar recipe of smaller government, significant 
tax cuts across the board and fewer regulations — a strategy that would help business, 
boost growth, create jobs and ultimately boost working-class incomes.  
  
Democrats, of course, have different solutions — more active government, higher taxes 
on the rich, lower taxes on the poor, and higher minimum wages. They promise that these 
policies will raise incomes for the working class, which will in turn create a larger 
number of consumers and a more dynamic economy overall. 
  
Voters called upon to bet on these promises often find themselves much in the 
dark. Americans looking for skillful economic leadership from the White House would be 
better served by considering the long-term economic performance of Democratic and 
Republican presidents.  
  
People readily grasp the diagnostic value of long-term performance in other walks of life. 
A judge has ruled that poker is more skill than luck; though luck may beat skill in any 
given hand, the better player is very likely to win in the long run. And on this front, 
Republicans have a data problem. 
  
Economists and political scientists have demonstrated that, since the 1950s, low-income 
families have been much better off when a Democrat is president than when a Republican 
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is, in just about every aspect (faster income growth, lower unemployment, and so forth).  
  
The chart below is a prime example. It shows average income growth under Democratic 
presidents has been higher than Republican ones across the income spectrum, but 
especially for families at the bottom 20%. The average incomes of these families have 
grown more than 24 times as fast under Democratic presidents (2.512%) as they have 
under Republican presidents (0.103%). 
 
Annual income growth by income level under Democratic and Republican 
presidents (1949-2014)  
 
Source: Census Bureau Historical Income Tables 
  
Some may be tempted to attribute all this to random luck. But the odds are very slim; 
when a football team beats its “rival” team by wide margins, and do so again and again, 
over an extended period time, it becomes harder and harder to think it’s just a 
coincidence.  
  
More formally, a regression analysis (a standard statistical technique) indicates that there 
is about a 1 in 1000 chance that a difference this big would pop up simply because the 
Democrats got lucky, when there’s nothing inherently better about their policies.  
  
Of course, as investment advisers always say, “Past performance does not guarantee 
future results.” Nevertheless, for low-income voters making a bet on their financial 
future, the past performance of Democrats and Republicans in the White House provides 
important evidence about how a Democratic or a Republican president would be likely to 
play whatever cards they are dealt over the next four years. 
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Appendix D.1.2. Income Weak 
 
 
On income inequality, Republicans have a data problem 
According to The Washington Post’s Philip Rucker and Dan Balz, “Economic mobility, 
and the feeling of many Americans that they are being shut out from the nation’s 
prosperity, will be a defining theme of the 2016 campaign.”  
  
Republican presidential hopefuls have signaled their interest in addressing the issue of 
stagnating working-class incomes. “[O]nly conservative principles can solve it by 
removing the barriers to upward mobility,” as one conservative Super PAC puts.     
  
How, exactly? Republicans offer the familiar recipe of smaller government, significant 
tax cuts across the board and fewer regulations — a strategy that would help business, 
boost growth, create jobs and ultimately boost working-class incomes.  
 
Democrats, of course, have different solutions — more active government, higher taxes 
on the rich, lower taxes on the poor, and higher minimum wages. They promise that these 
policies will raise incomes for the working class, which will in turn create a larger 
number of consumers and a more dynamic economy overall. 
 
Voters called upon to bet on these promises often find themselves much in the dark. 
Americans looking for skillful economic leadership from the White House would be 
better served by considering the long-term economic performance of Democratic and 
Republican presidents.  
 
People readily grasp the diagnostic value of long-term performance in other walks of life. 
A judge has ruled that poker is more skill than luck; though luck may beat skill in any 
given hand, the better player is very likely to win in the long run. And on this front, 
Republicans have a data problem. 
2 
Economists and political scientists have demonstrated that, since the 1950s, l0w-income 
families have been slightly better off when a Democrat is president than when a 
Republican is.  
 
The chart below is a prime example. It shows average income growth under Democratic 
presidents has been higher than Republican ones across the income spectrum, but 
especially for families at the bottom 20%. The average incomes of these families have 
grown more than 1.2 times as fast under Democratic presidents (1.066%) as they have 
under Republican presidents (0.895%). 
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Annual income growth by income level under Democratic and Republican 
presidents (1953-2014)  
 
Source: Census Bureau Historical Income Tables  
 
Some may be tempted to attribute all this to random luck. But the odds are arguably slim. 
When a football team beats its “rival” team more than half the time over an extended 
period of time, it may no longer be a coincidence.  
 
More formally, a regression analysis (a standard statistical technique) indicates that there 
is less than a 3 in 7 chance that a difference like this would pop up simply because the 
Democrats got lucky, when there’s nothing inherently better about their policies.  
 
Of course, as investment advisers always say, “Past performance does not guarantee 
future results.” Nevertheless, for low-income voters making a bet on their financial 
future, the past performance of Democrats and Republicans in the White House provides 
important evidence about how a Democratic or Republican president would be likely to 
play whatever cards they are dealt over the next four years. 
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Appendix D.1.3. GDP Strong 
 
 
On the economy, Republicans have a data problem     
 
Primary season far from over. Both major parties will be doing a lot of politicking, 
voting, and arm-twisting between now and the conventions in July.  
 
But, when all is said and done, the presidential race is likely to come down to the 
economy as usual. Republicans and Democrats will make their pitch to claim superior 
economic know-how over the opponent using the generic talking points many voters have 
heard all too much. 
 
Republican presidential hopefuls offer the familiar recipe of smaller government, 
significant tax cuts across the board and fewer regulations — a strategy that would help 
business, boost growth, and create jobs.  
 
Democrats, of course, have different solutions —more active government, higher taxes 
on the rich, lower taxes on the poor, and higher minimum wages. They promise that these 
policies will strengthen the middle class and create a more dynamic economy overall. 
 
Voters called upon to bet on these promises often find themselves much in the dark. 
Americans looking for skillful economic leadership from the White House would be 
better served by considering the long-term economic performance of Democratic and 
Republican presidents.  
 
People readily grasp the diagnostic value of long-term performance in other walks of life. 
A judge has ruled that poker is more skill than luck; though luck may beat skill in any 
given hand, the better player is very likely to win in the long run. And on this front, 
Republicans have a data problem. 
 
Economists and political scientists have demonstrated that, since the 1950s, the U.S. 
economy has performed much better when a Democrat is president than when a 
Republican is in just about every aspect (faster growth, lower unemployment, higher 
stock market returns and so forth).  
 
The chart below is a prime example. It shows that real GDP has grown twice as fast 
under Democrats (4.624%) as it has under Republicans (2.123%), over a span of six 
decades. It is clear at a glance that GDP growth rises when Democrats get elected and 
falls when Republicans do, across all 8 cases of party changes in the White House. There 
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are no exceptions.       
 
Average annual growth by Democratic and Republican terms (1949-2015) 
 
Source: National Bureau of Economic Research  
 
Some may be tempted to attribute all this to random luck. But the odds are very slim; just 
like winning 8 hands in a row in a one-on-one poker game is a very unlikely thing to 
happen, unless the winning player has better skills.  
 
More formally, a regression analysis (a standard statistical technique) indicates that there 
is less than 1 in 1000 chance that a difference like this would pop up, simply because 
Democrats got lucky, when there’s nothing inherently better about their policies.  
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Of course, as investment advisers always say, “Past performance does not guarantee 
future results.” Nevertheless, for voters making a bet on America’s economic future, the 
past performance of Democrats and Republicans in the White House provides important 
evidence about how a Democratic or Republican president would be likely to play 
whatever cards they are dealt over the next four years. 
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Appendix D.1.3. GDP Weak 
 
 
On the economy, Republicans have a data problem 
  
Primary season is far from over. Both major parties will be doing a lot of politicking, 
voting, and arm-twisting between now and the conventions in July.  
  
But, when all is said and done, the presidential race is likely to come down to the 
economy as usual. Republicans and Democrats will make their pitch to claim superior 
economic know-how over the opponent using the generic talking points many voters have 
heard all too much. 
  
Republican presidential hopefuls offer the familiar recipe of smaller government, 
significant tax cuts across the board and fewer regulations — a strategy that would help 
business, boost growth, and create jobs.  
  
Democrats, of course, have different solutions —more active government, higher taxes 
on the rich, lower taxes on the poor, and higher minimum wages. They promise that these 
policies will strengthen the middle class and create a more dynamic economy overall. 
  
Voters called upon to bet on these promises often find themselves much in the dark. 
Americans looking for skillful economic leadership from the White House would be 
better served by considering the long-term economic performance of Democratic and 
Republican presidents.  
  
People readily grasp the diagnostic value of long-term performance in other walks of life. 
A judge has ruled that poker is more skill than luck; though luck may beat skill in any 
given hand, the better player is very likely to win in the long run. And on this front, 
Republicans have a data problem. 
  
Economists and political scientists have demonstrated that, since the 1950s, the U.S. 
economy has performed slightly better when a Democrat is president than when a 
Republican is.  
  
The chart below is a prime example. It shows that real GDP has grown 1.06 times as fast 
under Democrats (3.233%) as it has under Republicans (3.043%), over a span of six 
decades. It is may be noticeable at a glance that GDP growth usually rises when 
Democrats get elected (with the exception of Carter) and falls when Republicans do (with 
the exceptions of Nixon and Regan). Across all 8 cases of party changes in the White 
House there are are only 3 exceptions.   
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Average annual GDP growth by Democratic and terms (1951-2015) 
 
Source: National Bureau of Economic Research 
  
Some may be tempted to attribute all this to random luck. But the odds are arguably slim; 
just like winning 5 hands out of 8 in a one-on-one poker game could be an unlikely thing 
to happen, unless the winning player has better skills.  
  
More formally, a regression analysis (a standard statistical technique) indicates that there 
is about 2 in 5 chance that a difference like this would pop up, simply because Democrats 
got lucky, when there’s nothing inherently better about their policies.  
  
Of course, as investment advisers always say, “Past performance does not guarantee 
future results.” Nevertheless, for voters making a bet on America’s economic future, the 
past performance of Democrats and Republicans in the White House provides important 
evidence about how a Democratic or Republican president would be likely to play 
whatever cards they are dealt over the next four years. 
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Appendix D.1.5. Placebo 
 
 
Germans Forget Postwar History Lesson on Debt Relief in Greece Crisis 
  
It is not hard to notice hypocrisy in Germany’s insistence that Athens must agree to more 
painful austerity before any sort of debt relief can be put on the table: The main creditor 
demanding that Greeks be made to pay for past profligacy benefited not so long ago from 
more lenient terms. 
 
But beyond serving as a reminder of German hypocrisy, the history offers a more 
important lesson: These sorts of things have been dealt with successfully before. The 20th 
century offers a rich road map of policy failure and success addressing sovereign debt 
crises. 
  
The good news is that by now economists generally understand the contours of a 
successful approach. “I’ve seen this movie so many times before,” said Carmen M. 
Reinhart, a professor at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard who is perhaps 
the world’s foremost expert on sovereign debt crises. “It is very easy to get hung up on 
the idiosyncrasies of each individual situation and miss the recurring pattern.”  
  
The recurring, historical pattern? Major debt overhangs are only solved after deep write-
downs of the debt’s face value. The longer it takes for the debt to be cut, the bigger the 
necessary write-down will turn out to be. Nobody should understand this better than the 
Germans. It’s not just that they benefited from the deal in 1953, which underpinned 
Germany’s postwar economic miracle.  
  
Twenty years earlier, Germany defaulted on its debts from World War I, after undergoing 
a bout of hyperinflation and economic depression that helped usher Hitler to power. It is a 
general lesson about the nature of debt from the World War I defaults of more than a 
dozen countries in the 1930s to the Brady write-downs of the early 1990s. 
 
Both of these episodes were preceded by a decade or more of negotiations and 
rescheduling plans that — not unlike Greece’s first bailout programs — extended the 
maturity of debts and lowered their interest rate. But crises ended and economies 
improved only after the debt was cut. The chart below shows sharp economic rebounds 
after the 1934 defaults — which cut debtors’ foreign indebtedness by at least 43 percent, 
on average — and the Brady plan, which sliced debtors’ burdens by an average of 36 
percent.  
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The crisis exit in both episodes came only after deep face-value debt write-offs had been 
implemented. Softer forms of debt relief, such as maturity extensions and interest rate 
reductions, are not generally followed by higher economic growth or improved credit 
ratings. 
 
Yet Policy makers have yet to get this. It took a decade or more from the onset of the 
Latin American debt crisis to the Brady deal. Brazil alone had six debt restructurings. 
Similarly, the generalized defaults of 1934 followed more than a decade of failed half-
measures. Does Greece have to wait that long, too? 
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Appendix D.2. Measurement and Survey Wordings 
 
Appendix D.2.1. Pre-treatment Covariates (Control Variables) 
 
Retrospective Evaluation (National Economy) was measured using the following 
questionnaire, and was rescaled to 0-1, where 1 indicates “Definitely Democrats.” 
 
Over the past few decades, which party do you think has done a better job of 
handling the national economy? 
1) Definitely Democrats 
2) Probably Democrats 
3) Not much difference between them 
4) Probably Republicans 
5) Definitely Republicans 
6) Not sure 
 
Retrospective Evaluation (Income Inequality) was measured using the following 
questionnaire, and was rescaled to 0-1, where 1 indicates “Definitely Democrats.” 
 
Over the past few decades, which party do you think has done a better job of 
handling income inequality? 
1) Definitely Democrats 
2) Probably Democrats 
3) Not much difference between them 
4) Probably Republicans 
5) Definitely Republicans 
6) Not sure 
 
Retrospective Evaluation (Pocketbook) was measured using the following questionnaire, 
and was rescaled to 0-1, where 1 indicates “Definitely Democrats Presidents.” 
 
Over the past few decades, people like you have been better off under... 
1) Definitely Democratic Presidents 
2) Probably Democratic Presidents 
3) Not much difference between them 
4) Probably Republican Presidents 
5) Definitely Republican Presidents 
6) Not sure 
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Party Identification was measured by the following questionnaire, and scaled 0-1 where 1 
indicates “Strong Democrat” 
 
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an 
Independent or something else?  
1) Democrat 
2) Republican 
3) Independent 
4) Other 
Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong 
Democrat [Republican]? 
1) Strong Democrat [Republican]  
2) Not very strong Democrat [Republican] 
Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party, the 
Republican Party, or neither?  
1) Closer to the Democratic Party 
2) Closer to the Republican Party 
3) Neither 
 
Approval of Obama was measured by the following questionnaire, and scaled 0-1 where 
1 indicates “strongly approve.” 
 
Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as 
President? 
1) Strongly approve 
2) Somewhat approve 
3) Neither approve nor disapprove 
4) Somewhat disapprove 
5) Strongly disapprove 
 
Approval of Obama’s Handling of Economy was measured by the following 
questionnaire, and scaled 0-1 where 1 indicates “strongly approve.” 
 
Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling the national 
economy? 
1) Strongly approve 
2) Somewhat approve 
3) Neither approve nor disapprove 
4) Somewhat disapprove 
5) Strongly disapprove 
 
Approval of Obama’s Handling of Inequality was measured by the following 
questionnaire, and scaled 0-1 where 1 indicates “strongly approve.” 
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Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling income 
inequality? 
1) Strongly approve 
2) Somewhat approve 
3) Neither approve nor disapprove 
4) Somewhat disapprove 
5) Strongly disapprove 
 
Favorite Candidate was measured using the following question, and coded into five 
categories (Clinton; Sanders; Trump; Cruz; Kasich; all else). When controlling for this 
pre-treatment covariate, I estimated the fixed effects terms of each category, treating “all 
else” as the reference category. 
 
In the current election cycle, which presidential candidate do you support the 
most? 
1) Hilary Clinton 
2) Bernie Sanders 
3) Donald Trump 
4) Ted Cruz 
5) John Kasich 
6) Someone else 
7) None of them 
8) Not sure 
 
 
2012 Vote Choice was measured using the following question, and coded into three 
categories (Romney; Obama; all else). When controlling for this pre-treatment covariate, 
I estimated the fixed effects terms of each category, treating “all else” as the reference 
category. 
 
For which candidate did you vote in the 2012 Presidential Election? 
1) Barack Obama 
2) Mitt Romney 
3) Someone else 
4) Didn't vote 
5) Not sure 
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Appendix D.2.2. Dependent Variables 
 
Retrospective Evaluation was measured based on the following three items, and rescaled 
to 0-1 where 1 indicates the pro-Democratic side. 
 
Over the past few decades, which party do you think has done a better job of 
handling the national economy? 
1) Definitely Democrats 
2) Probably Democrats 
3) Not much difference between them 
4) Probably Republicans 
5) Definitely Republicans 
6) Not sure 
 
Over the past few decades, which party do you think has done a better job of 
handling income inequality? 
1) Definitely Democrats 
2) Probably Democrats 
3) Not much difference between them 
4) Probably Republicans 
5) Definitely Republicans 
6) Not sure 
 
Over the past few decades, people like you have been better off under... 
1) Definitely Democratic Presidents 
2) Probably Democratic Presidents 
3) Not much difference between them 
4) Probably Republican Presidents 
5) Definitely Republican Presidents 
6) Not sure 
 
Retrospective Evaluation was measured based on the following twelve items, and 
rescaled to 0-1 where 1 indicates the pro-Democratic side. 
 
Which party do you think will do a better job of handling the national 
economy over the next four years? 
1) Definitely Democrats 
2) Probably Democrats 
3) Not much difference between them 
4) Probably Republicans 
5) Definitely Republicans 
6) Not sure 
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Do you expect the national economy to get better, stay about the same, or get 
worse than now, if a Democratic candidate wins the 2016 Presidential Election? 
1) Definitely better 
2) Probably better 
3) About the same 
4) Probably worse 
5) Definitely worse 
6) Not sure 
 
Do you expect the national economy to get better, stay about the same, or get 
worse than now, if a Republican candidate wins the 2016 Presidential Election? 
1) Definitely better 
2) Probably better 
3) About the same 
4) Probably worse 
5) Definitely worse 
6) Not sure 
 
Between Democratic and Republican economic policies, which do you think will 
generate faster economic growth? 
1) Definitely Democratic 
2) Probably Democratic 
3) Not much difference between them 
4) Probably Republican 
5) Definitely Republican 
6) Not sure 
 
Which party do you think will do a better job of handling income inequality over 
the next four years? 
1) Definitely Democrats 
2) Probably Democrats 
3) Not much difference between them 
4) Probably Republicans 
5) Definitely Republicans 
6) Not sure 
 
Do you expect income distribution to become more equal, or less equal than now, 
if a Democratic candidate wins the 2016 Presidential Election? 
1) Definitely more equal 
2) Probably more equal 
3) About the same 
4) Probably less equal 
5) Definitely less equal 
6) Not sure 
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Do you expect income distribution to become more equal, or less equal than now, 
if a Republican candidate wins the 2016 Presidential Election? 
1) Definitely more equal 
2) Probably more equal 
3) About the same 
4) Probably less equal 
5) Definitely less equal 
6) Not sure 
 
Between Democratic and Republican economic policies, which do you think 
will reduce income inequality more? 
1) Definitely Democratic 
2) Probably Democratic 
3) Not much difference between them 
4) Probably Republican 
5) Definitely Republican 
6) Not sure 
 
Thinking about the next President, people like you will be better off financially 
under... 
1) Definitely a Democrat 
2) Probably a Democrat 
3) Not much difference between them 
4) Probably a Republican 
5) Definitely a Republican 
6) Not sure 
 
Do you expect the total income of your household will go up or down, if a 
Democratic candidate wins the presidential election? 
1) Definitely up 
2) Probably up 
3) About the same 
4) Probably down 
5) Definitely down 
6) Not sure 
 
Do you expect the total income of your household will go up or down, if a 
Republican candidate wins the presidential election? 
1) Definitely up 
2) Probably up 
3) About the same 
4) Probably down 
5) Definitely down 
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6) Not sure 
 
Between Democratic and Republican economic policies, which do you think will 
make the total income of your household grow faster? 
1) Definitely Democratic 
2) Probably Democratic 
3) Not much difference between them 
4) Probably Republican 
5) Definitely Republican 
6) Not sure 
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Appendix D.2.3. Moderating Variables 
 
Importance of the National Economy was measured by the following questionnaire. In the 
moderation analyses, “not at all” to “one of the five” were coded 0; and “one of the two 
or three” and “single most important” was coded 1. 
 
As compared to your feelings on other political issues, how important is the 
national economy to you?  
1) It is the single most important political issue to me 
2) One of the two or three most important political issues 
3) One of the five most important political issues 
4) Not among the issues I consider important 
5) Not at all important 
 
Importance of the Income Inequality was measured by the following questionnaire. In the 
moderation analyses, “not at all” to “one of the five” were coded 0; and “one of the two 
or three” and “single most important” was coded 1. 
 
As compared to your feelings on other political issues, how important is income 
inequality to you?  
1) It is the single most important political issue to me 
2) One of the two or three most important political issues 
3) One of the five most important political issues 
4) Not among the issues I consider important 
5) Not at all important 
 
Political Knowledge was measured by counting the percentage of correct answers to the 
following questionnaires (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.67). In the moderation analyses 0% to 
80% were coded 0; and 100% was coded 1. 
 
 
Which one of the parties would you say is more conservative than the other at the 
national level? (If you don’t know the answer, you can mark that too)  
1) Democrats (1) 
2) Republicans (2) 
3) Not sure (3) 
 
Do you happen to know what job or political office is currently held by John 
Kerry? (If you don’t know the answer, you can mark that too)  
1) U.S. Senator (1) 
2) U.S. Vice President (2) 
3) U.S. State Secretary (3) 
4) U.S Energy Secretary (4) 
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5) Not sure (5) 
 
Which party has the most members in the United States House of 
Representatives? (If you don’t know the answer, you can mark that too)  
1) Democrats (1) 
2) Republicans (2) 
3) Not sure (3) 
 
Who has the final responsibility to decide whether a law is Constitutional or 
not? (If you don’t know the answer, you can mark that too)  
1) President (1) 
2) Congress (2) 
3) Supreme Court (3) 
4) Not sure (4) 
 
How much of a majority is needed for the U.S. Senate and House to override a 
presidential veto?  (If you don’t know the answer, you can mark that too) 
1) Simple majority (one more than half the votes) (1)  
2) Two-thirds majority (2) 
3) Three-fourths majority (3) 
4) Not sure (4) 
 
Need for cognition (wave 2; after treatment) was measured by combining the following 
items, and scaled 0-1 where 1 indicates highest score (0.86). In the moderation analyses 0 
to 0.7 were coded 0; and 0.71 to 1 were coded 1. 
 
Please indicate whether or not you agree with each of the following statements 
about you or your beliefs. (Wave 2; after treatment) 
1) Strongly agree 
2) Somewhat agree 
3) Neither agree nor disagree 
4) Somewhat disagree 
5) Strongly disagree 
 
I prefer complex to simple problems (same multiple choices as above).  
 
Thinking is NOT my idea of fun (same multiple choices as above). 
 
I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours (same multiple choices 
as above).  
 
I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of 
thinking (same multiple choices as above). 
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Income (Wave 2; after treatment) was measured by the following question. In the 
moderation analyses, “less than 30,000” to “49,999” were coded 0; and “50,000” or 
higher were coded 1.  
 
What is your combined annual household income? 
1) Less than 30,000 (1) 
2) 30,000 – 39,999 (2) 
3) 40,000 – 49,999 (3) 
4) 50,000 – 59,999 (4) 
5) 60,000 – 69,999 (5) 
6) 70,000 – 79,999 (6) 
7) 80,000 – 89,999 (7) 
8) 90,000 – 99,999 (8) 
9) 100,000 or more (9) 
 
Age (Wave 2; after treatment) was measured by the following question. In the moderation 
analyses, 18 to 34 were coded 0; 35 or higher were coded 1. There was no respondent 
under 18. 
 
How old are you? 
1) Under 18 (1) 
2) 18-25 (2) 
3) 26-34 (3) 
4) 35-44 (4) 
5) 45-54 (5) 
6) 55-64 (6) 
7) 65 or older (7) 
 
Gender (Wave 2; after treatment) was measured by the following question. 
 
What is your gender? 
1) Male (1) 
2) Female (2) 
 
Race (Wave 2; after treatment) was measured by the following question. In the 
moderation analyses, “White/Caucasian” was coded 0; other choices were coded 1. 
 
What is your race? 
1) White/Caucasian 
2) African American 
3) Hispanic 
4) Asian 
5) Native American 
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6) Pacific Islander  
7) Multiracial  
8) Other
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Appendix D.2.4. Message Recalls 
 
Argument Recall 
 
Thinking about the message you read and evaluated above, which of the following 
did it say? 
1) Working class incomes have grown faster under Democrats than 
Republicans. 
2) GDP has grown faster under Democrats than Republicans. 
3) In the 1930s, the German economy improved after debt relief. 
4) I didn't read a message that says any of the above. 
5) Not sure 
 
Chart Recall 
 
Which of the following charts did you see in the message above? 
 
1)  
2)  
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3)  
4)  
5)  
6) I didn't see any of these charts. 
7) Not sure 
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Appendix D.2.5. Screener 
 
Attention Screener (Before Treatment). Those who exhibited low attention by failing this 
screening test were underweighted. Those who chose one or two of the three correct 
options were weighted by 0.5, and those who choose none of the two were weighted by 0 
(i.e., dropped). 
 
When a big news story breaks people often go online to get up-to-the-minute 
details on what is going on. We want to know which websites people trust to get 
this information. We also want to know if people are paying attention to the 
question. To show that you’ve read this much, please ignore the question 
and select the Drudge Report and the NPR website and none of the above as your 
three answers. 
 
When there is a big news story, which is the one news website you visit first? 
(Please only choose one) 
1) New York Times website (1) 
2) Huffington Post (2) 
3) Washington Post website (3) 
4) Cnn.com (4) 
5) FoxNews.com (5) 
6) MSNBC.com (6) 
7) The Associated Press website (7) 
8) Reuters website (8) 
9) New York Post online (9) 
10) The Drudge Report (10) 
11) Google News (11) 
12) ABC News website (12) 
13) CBS News website (13) 
14) NBC News website (14) 
15) Yahoo! News (15) 
16) NPR website (16) 
17) USA Today website (17) 
18) None of the above (18) 
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Appendix D.3. Replications of Bartels (2008) and Blinder and Watson (2016) for the 
Economy Arguments 
 
Table A23-1: Replications of Bartels (2008)  
 (1) 
Strong 
(2) 
Weak 
Income: 20% 0.024* 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.007) 
Income: 40% 0.004* 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.006) 
Income: 60% 0.008* 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.006) 
Income: 80% 0.011* 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.006) 
Income: Top 95% 0.015* 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
Democratic President × Income: 40% -0.007 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.009) 
Democratic President × Income: 60% -0.010* -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.009) 
Democratic President × Income: 80% -0.013* -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.009) 
Democratic President × Income: Top 95% -0.017* -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
Year (linear) -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
DV (1 Year Lag) 0.038 0.099* 
 (0.125) (0.058) 
DV (2 Year Lag) -0.202* -0.209* 
 (0.088) (0.059) 
House Majority  -0.076* 
  (0.033) 
Senate Majority  0.054* 
  (0.032) 
Intercept 0.028* 0.048* 
 (0.009) (0.018) 
Year 1949-2014 1953-2014 
Clustered Standard Errors (by Year) Yes No 
Presumed Lag between Election and Responsibility  No 1 year 
N 330 310 
Note. * p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates. Column 1 is close, although not identical, to 
Bartels’ (2008) analyses. Column 2 is an intentionally bad reproduction of Bartels’ 
(2008) results that makes the evidence seem weaker than the closer replication. Figures in 
Appendices D.1.1, and D.1.2 are based on these models. The data is from U.S. Census 
Bureau’s Income Limits for Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent of Families (All Races): 1947 
to 2014.71 
                                                 
71 https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/tables/time-series/historical-income-fa
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Table A23-2: Replications of Blinder and Watson (2016)  
 
Note. * p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates. Column 1 is close, although not identical, to 
Blinder and Watson’s (2016) analyses. Column 2 is an intentionally bad reproduction of 
Blinder and Watson (2016) that makes the evidence seem weaker than the closer 
replication. The bars representing Democratic and Republican averages in Figure 10 in 
the main text (and the figures in Appendices D.1.3, and D.1.4) are based on these models. 
The bars associated with each presidential term also use 3 months and 15 months as the 
presumed lags between the election of a new president, and the time at which GDP 
growth is attributed to the newly elected president’s responsibility. The data are from 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Current-Dollar and "Real" Gross Domestic 
Product.72 
\
                                                 
milies/f01ar.xls. 
72 https://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gdplev.xls. 
 (1) 
Strong 
(2) 
Weak 
Democratic President  0.025* 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Year -0.004*  
 (0.002)  
Year2 0.000*  
 (0.000)  
Year3 -0.000*  
 (0.000)  
DV (1 year lag) -0.194  
 (0.121)  
DV (2 year lag) -0.243*  
 (0.117)  
DV (2 ear lag) -0.183  
 (0.115)  
Intercept 0.083* 0.030* 
 (0.021) (0.004) 
Presumed Lag between Election and Responsibility  3 Months 15 Months 
N 65 64 
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Appendix D.4. Additional Information, Robustness Checks, and Additional Analyses  
 
This section provides additional information, and robustness checks and 
additional analyses for the results from Experiment 3, reported in Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation. 
Tables A24 and A25 describes the full report on the regression models reported in 
Panels A and B Table 11. in the main text. In Table A24, the dependent variables 
(retrospective and prospective economic evaluations) are regressed on the dummies for 
the experimental condition, for which the control group serves as the reference, and pre-
treatment covariates. Covariates include prior retrospective evaluations, approval of 
Obama’s performance as the President, approval of Obama’s handling of the economy, 
approval of Obama’s handling of the income inequality, and dummies for vote choice and 
favorite candidates. As noted in the main text, those who exhibited low attention by 
failing the screener question (see Appendix D.2.4) were underweighted. Those who chose 
one or two of the three correct options were weighted by 0.5, and those who choose none 
of the two were weighted by 0 (i.e., dropped). 
In Table A25, the experiment conditions were operationalized as a single 
continuous variable representing a scale of evidence strength (0 = control; 0.5= weak 1= 
pro).  
Tables A26 and A27 demonstrate that the results are robust across two important 
model specification choices. In Table A26, the same analyses as those reported in Table 
11. are repeated, but this time without underweighting those who failed to choose the tree 
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correct options in the screener question. In Table A27, I estimate the treatment effects 
without controlling for the treatment covariates. As can be seen, the results are largely 
similar to those reported in Table 11.   
Tables A28 and A29 provide supplementary analyses examining the “carry-over” 
treatment effects on additional outcome variables, other than the key dependent variables 
used in the analyses reported in the main text. Specifically, I focus on vote choice in 
Table A28, and preferences for redistributive fiscal policies that are often associated with 
the Democratic Party. All models included the same set of pre-treatment covariates as 
prior analyses; and low-attention participants were underweighted.  
As Table A28 shows, the treatment effects on vote choice are statistically 
significant, and larger than those observed in the ACA experiment. The argument with 
weak evidence increased the intention to vote for the Democratic Party by 5.9 percentage 
points on average, and the argument with stronger evidence by 7.6 points. Interestingly, I 
find no evidence that the arguments changed Republicans’ voting intentions, despite the 
fact that their economic evaluations were affected by the arguments. Presumably, this 
reflects the fact that convincing people to vote for the out-party is more difficult than 
changing their beliefs about policies. As shown in Table A29, I find little evidence that 
the treatments changed people’s opinions about redistributive policies. Apparently, 
people did not attribute the Democratic edge in the economic performance to these policy 
options.  
 In the main text (Table 11), I reported the findings based on my preferred 
specification that collapsed experimental conditions into three categories. In Table A30, I 
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offer the estimates of the effects of each experimental condition by regression the 
dependent variables on the four dummies indicating each argument type (Weak GDP 
Evidence; Strong GDP Evidence; Weak Income Evidence; Strong Income Evidence), and 
the same set of covariates as previous analyses. While the estimates are noisier than the 
collapsed models, due the decrease in sample size in each category, they remain correctly 
signed and statistically significant. Despite some exceptions, I also find that the 
arguments with stronger evidence produced larger impacts than their weaker counterparts 
by and large. 
I focused on overall economic evaluations as the dependent variable in the main 
text. Table A31 to A33 present an alternative specification that further categorizes 
economic evaluations into sub-elements; socio-tropic (the national economy), 
pocketbook, and income inequality. In each of these tables, Panel A presents the models 
using the four dummies for each treatment condition, Panel B presents the models using 
two (collapsed) dummies, and Panel C presents the models using a single continuous 
variable. While there are some exceptions, the key findings—significant and positive 
effects of arguments, especially those with stronger evidence—hold up here. 
Interestingly, I find that the GDP arguments were more effective for socio-tropic 
evaluations (Table A31), and the Income arguments were more effective for evaluations 
of the handling of the income inequality issue (Table A33). This is consistent with what 
should happen, when the arguments are assigned with more discriminating likelihood 
functions for more pertinent outcome variables. 
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Table A24: Full Reports on Panel A of Table 11 (Treatment Effects on Economic 
Evaluations) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Retrospective Evaluations Prospective Evaluations 
Subset All Republicans Democrats All Republicans Democrats 
Weak Evidence 0.037* 0.070* 0.017 0.017* 0.040* 0.007 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.012) (0.007) (0.014) (0.009) 
Strong Evidence 0.055* 0.074* 0.037* 0.034* 0.033* 0.031* 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009) 
Party ID 0.110* 0.234* 0.061 0.117* 0.127* 0.153* 
 (0.035) (0.102) (0.043) (0.021) (0.062) (0.033) 
Favorite Candidate (Clinton) 0.013 -0.036 0.040* 0.028* -0.024 0.050* 
 (0.017) (0.058) (0.024) (0.012) (0.031) (0.016) 
Favorite Candidate (Sanders) 0.037* 0.058 0.056* 0.040* 0.012 0.059* 
 (0.015) (0.038) (0.022) (0.011) (0.028) (0.015) 
Favorite Candidate (Trump) -0.043* -0.054* 0.010 -0.081* -0.103* -0.066* 
 (0.019) (0.027) (0.061) (0.014) (0.019) (0.038) 
Favorite Candidate (Cruz) -0.048* -0.055* -0.019 -0.018 -0.040* -0.012 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.044) (0.014) (0.019) (0.026) 
Favorite Candidate (Kasich) 0.005 -0.008 0.023 -0.001 -0.032 0.035 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.042) (0.014) (0.019) (0.026) 
2012 Vote Choice (Obama) 0.014 0.011 0.003 0.020* 0.023* 0.018 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.055) (0.011) (0.013) (0.042) 
2012 Vote Choice (Romney) 0.020 0.077* -0.010 0.014 0.012 0.014 
 (0.017) (0.035) (0.055) (0.012) (0.022) (0.042) 
Obama Approval -0.012 -0.089* 0.021 0.018 -0.024 0.035 
 (0.028) (0.051) (0.034) (0.023) (0.041) (0.027) 
Obama Economy Approval 0.060* 0.093* 0.044 0.047* 0.069* 0.035 
 (0.025) (0.052) (0.033) (0.020) (0.035) (0.027) 
Obama Inequality Approval -0.025 -0.007 -0.033 -0.018 0.029 -0.044* 
 (0.017) (0.038) (0.021) (0.013) (0.026) (0.018) 
Retrospective Evaluation (Economy) 0.169* 0.246* 0.133* 0.084* 0.095* 0.077* 
 (0.027) (0.051) (0.034) (0.018) (0.035) (0.023) 
Retrospective Evaluation (Inequality) 0.166* 0.139* 0.145* 0.113* 0.120* 0.088* 
 (0.024) (0.046) (0.032) (0.018) (0.030) (0.026) 
Retrospective Evaluation (Pocketbook) 0.262* 0.177* 0.315* 0.183* 0.172* 0.211* 
 (0.029) (0.048) (0.038) (0.021) (0.034) (0.028) 
Constant 0.148* 0.134* 0.200* 0.244* 0.248* 0.211* 
 (0.020) (0.034) (0.070) (0.014) (0.024) (0.050) 
N 1100 319 654 1100 319 654 
Note. * p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Low-attention participants are underweighted. All covariates were measured before 
treatment. Reference categories for Favorite Candidate and 2012 Vote Choice are other 
options.  
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Table A25: Full Reports on Panel B of Table 11 (Treatment Effects on Economic 
Evaluations) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Belief in Cost Saving Effect Attitudes toward ACA 
Subset All Opponent Supporter All Opponent Supporter 
Experimental Conditions (0-1) 0.055* 0.077* 0.037* 0.034* 0.035* 0.031* 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009) 
Party ID 0.109* 0.222* 0.061 0.116* 0.118* 0.154* 
 (0.035) (0.102) (0.043) (0.021) (0.061) (0.033) 
Favorite Candidate (Clinton) 0.015 -0.026 0.040* 0.028* -0.017 0.047* 
 (0.017) (0.058) (0.024) (0.012) (0.031) (0.016) 
Favorite Candidate (Sanders) 0.038* 0.070* 0.056* 0.040* 0.021 0.057* 
 (0.015) (0.039) (0.021) (0.010) (0.029) (0.015) 
Favorite Candidate (Trump) -0.042* -0.050* 0.010 -0.081* -0.100* -0.067* 
 (0.019) (0.027) (0.061) (0.014) (0.019) (0.038) 
Favorite Candidate (Cruz) -0.048* -0.054* -0.019 -0.018 -0.039* -0.014 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.044) (0.014) (0.019) (0.026) 
Favorite Candidate (Kasich) 0.005 -0.004 0.023 -0.001 -0.029 0.036 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.042) (0.014) (0.019) (0.026) 
2012 Vote Choice (Obama) 0.014 0.012 0.003 0.020* 0.024* 0.020 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.055) (0.010) (0.013) (0.041) 
2012 Vote Choice (Romney) 0.020 0.075* -0.010 0.014 0.010 0.016 
 (0.017) (0.035) (0.054) (0.012) (0.022) (0.041) 
Obama Approval -0.012 -0.084* 0.021 0.018 -0.021 0.034 
 (0.028) (0.050) (0.034) (0.023) (0.040) (0.027) 
Obama Economy Approval 0.060* 0.088* 0.044 0.047* 0.066* 0.034 
 (0.025) (0.052) (0.033) (0.020) (0.035) (0.027) 
Obama Inequality Approval -0.026 -0.008 -0.033 -0.018 0.028 -0.044* 
 (0.017) (0.038) (0.021) (0.013) (0.026) (0.018) 
Retrospective Evaluation (Economy) 0.168* 0.248* 0.133* 0.084* 0.096* 0.078* 
 (0.028) (0.052) (0.035) (0.018) (0.035) (0.023) 
Retrospective Evaluation (Inequality) 0.166* 0.146* 0.145* 0.113* 0.125* 0.088* 
 (0.024) (0.044) (0.032) (0.018) (0.029) (0.026) 
Retrospective Evaluation (Pocketbook) 0.260* 0.173* 0.315* 0.183* 0.168* 0.213* 
 (0.029) (0.050) (0.038) (0.021) (0.035) (0.028) 
Constant 0.151* 0.140* 0.199* 0.244* 0.252* 0.205* 
 (0.020) (0.034) (0.068) (0.014) (0.024) (0.049) 
N 1100 319 654 1100 319 654 
Note. * p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Low-attention participants are underweighted. All covariates were measured before 
treatment. Reference categories for Favorite Candidate and 2012 Vote Choice are other 
options.  
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Table A26: Robustness Check on Table 11 (No Underweighting of Low-attention 
Participants) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Retrospective Beliefs Prospective Beliefs 
Subset All Rep Dem All Rep Dem 
Panel A       
Weak 0.030* 0.063* 0.010 0.016* 0.034* 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.011) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) 
Strong 0.050* 0.065* 0.034* 0.033* 0.027* 0.033* 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) 
Panel B       
Linear Slope 0.050* 0.067* 0.034* 0.033* 0.029* 0.033* 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Low Attention Participants Underweighted No No No No No No 
N 1100 319 654 1100 319 654 
Note. * p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Covariates include party ID, favorite Presidential candidate (among Clinton, Sanders, 
Trump, Cruz and Kasich), vote choice in 2012, evaluations of Obama (overall, economy 
and inequality), pre-treatment retrospective evaluations of the two parties. The 
coefficients on the intercepts and covariates are not shown. 
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Table A27: Robustness Check on Table 11 (No Pre-treatment Covariates) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Retrospective Beliefs Prospective Beliefs 
Subset All Rep Dem All Rep Dem 
Panel A       
Weak 0.022 0.065* -0.006 0.008 0.035* -0.011 
 (0.020) (0.028) (0.016) (0.015) (0.021) (0.013) 
Strong 0.068* 0.058* 0.028* 0.046* 0.022 0.022* 
 (0.020) (0.027) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.013) 
Panel B       
Linear Slope 0.068* 0.061* 0.029* 0.045* 0.024 0.022* 
 (0.020) (0.027) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.013) 
Covariates No No No No No No 
Low Attention Participants Underweighted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1100 319 654 1100 319 654 
Note. * p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Covariates are not included. Low-attention participants are underweighted. The 
coefficients on the intercepts are not shown. 
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Table A28: “Carryover” Treatment Effects on Vote Choice 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Subset All Republicans Independent Democrats 
Panel A     
Weak 0.059* 0.039 -0.089 0.097* 
 (0.023) (0.032) (0.071) (0.031) 
Strong 0.076* 0.007 0.167* 0.081* 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.079) (0.032) 
Panel B     
Linear Slope 0.077* 0.010 0.170* 0.080* 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.080) (0.032) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1100 319 127 654 
Note. * p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Covariates include party ID, favorite Presidential candidate (among Clinton, Sanders, 
Trump, Cruz and Kasich), vote choice in 2012, evaluations of Obama (overall, economy 
and inequality), pre-treatment retrospective evaluations of the two parties. Low-attention 
participants are underweighted. The coefficients on the intercepts and covariates are not 
shown. 
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Table A29-1: “Carryover” Treatment Effects on Redistributive Policy Preferences (1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Minimum Wage Rich Tax 
Subset All Rep Dem All Rep Dem 
Panel A       
Weak -0.014 0.037 -0.020 0.003 0.029 -0.010 
 (0.019) (0.033) (0.023) (0.018) (0.036) (0.023) 
Strong -0.030* -0.032 -0.017 0.038* 0.034 0.049* 
 (0.017) (0.033) (0.021) (0.018) (0.037) (0.022) 
Panel B       
Linear Slope -0.030* -0.028 -0.017 0.038* 0.035 0.049* 
 (0.017) (0.033) (0.021) (0.018) (0.037) (0.022) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1075 311 644 1100 319 654 
 
Table A29-2: “Carryover” Treatment Effects on Redistributive Policy Preferences (2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Income Gap Government Responsibility 
Subset       
Panel A       
Weak 0.004 -0.004 -0.003 0.000 0.051 -0.024 
 (0.017) (0.027) (0.023) (0.020) (0.040) (0.022) 
Strong -0.012 -0.050* 0.004 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.016) (0.026) (0.023) (0.019) (0.041) (0.022) 
Panel B       
Linear Slope -0.012 -0.048* 0.004 -0.006 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.016) (0.026) (0.023) (0.019) (0.041) (0.022) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1100 319 654 1100 319 654 
Note. * p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Covariates include party ID, favorite Presidential candidate (among Clinton, Sanders, 
Trump, Cruz and Kasich), vote choice in 2012, evaluations of Obama (overall, economy 
and inequality), pre-treatment retrospective evaluations of the two parties. Low-attention 
participants are underweighted. The coefficients on the intercepts and covariates are not 
shown. 
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Table A30: The Effects on Economic Evaluations by Each Treatment Condition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Retrospective Beliefs Prospective Beliefs 
Subset All Rep Dem All Rep Dem 
Panel A       
GDP Weak 0.070* 0.151* 0.031 0.035* 0.085* 0.018 
 (0.016) (0.032) (0.020) (0.011) (0.023) (0.013) 
GDP Strong 0.093* 0.181* 0.033* 0.056* 0.070* 0.039* 
 (0.016) (0.035) (0.016) (0.012) (0.025) (0.014) 
Income Weak 0.061* 0.087* 0.044* 0.028* 0.042* 0.022 
 (0.014) (0.032) (0.015) (0.011) (0.021) (0.014) 
Income Strong 0.055* 0.097* 0.028 0.045* 0.052* 0.043* 
 (0.015) (0.030) (0.019) (0.011) (0.022) (0.014) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1100 319 654 1100 319 654 
Note. * p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Covariates include party ID, favorite Presidential candidate (among Clinton, Sanders, 
Trump, Cruz and Kasich), vote choice in 2012, evaluations of Obama (overall, economy 
and inequality), pre-treatment retrospective evaluations of the two parties. Low-attention 
participants are underweighted. The coefficients on the intercepts and covariates are not 
shown. 
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Table A31: The Effects on Sociotropic Evaluations (the National Economy) by Each 
Treatment Condition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Retrospective Beliefs Prospective Beliefs 
Subset All Rep Dem All Rep Dem 
Panel A       
GDP Weak 0.070* 0.151* 0.031 0.035* 0.085* 0.018 
 (0.016) (0.032) (0.020) (0.011) (0.023) (0.013) 
GDP Strong 0.093* 0.181* 0.033* 0.056* 0.070* 0.039* 
 (0.016) (0.035) (0.016) (0.012) (0.025) (0.014) 
Income Weak 0.061* 0.087* 0.044* 0.028* 0.042* 0.022 
 (0.014) (0.032) (0.015) (0.011) (0.021) (0.014) 
Income Strong 0.055* 0.097* 0.028 0.045* 0.052* 0.043* 
 (0.015) (0.030) (0.019) (0.011) (0.022) (0.014) 
Panel B       
Weal 0.065* 0.116* 0.038* 0.031* 0.061* 0.020* 
 (0.012) (0.026) (0.015) (0.009) (0.018) (0.011) 
Strong 0.074* 0.139* 0.030* 0.051* 0.061* 0.041* 
 (0.012) (0.026) (0.014) (0.009) (0.019) (0.012) 
Panel C       
Slope 0.074* 0.143* 0.030* 0.051* 0.063* 0.041* 
 (0.012) (0.026) (0.014) (0.009) (0.019) (0.011) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1100 319 654 1100 319 654 
Note. * p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Covariates include party ID, favorite Presidential candidate (among Clinton, Sanders, 
Trump, Cruz and Kasich), vote choice in 2012, evaluations of Obama (overall, economy 
and inequality), pre-treatment retrospective evaluations of the two parties. Low-attention 
participants are underweighted. The coefficients on the intercepts and covariates are not 
shown. 
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Table A32: The Effects on Pocketbook Evaluations by Each Treatment Condition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Retrospective Beliefs Prospective Beliefs 
Subset All Rep Dem All Rep Dem 
Panel A       
GDP Weak 0.026 0.109* -0.010 0.023* 0.080* 0.006 
 (0.017) (0.031) (0.021) (0.012) (0.023) (0.015) 
GDP Strong 0.034* 0.038 0.013 0.018 0.002 0.019 
 (0.015) (0.030) (0.018) (0.012) (0.025) (0.015) 
Income Weak 0.020 0.039 0.008 -0.001 0.012 -0.007 
 (0.015) (0.033) (0.018) (0.012) (0.023) (0.016) 
Income Strong 0.051* 0.061* 0.041* 0.029* 0.022 0.035* 
 (0.014) (0.031) (0.017) (0.012) (0.024) (0.015) 
Panel B       
Weal 0.023* 0.070* -0.001 0.011 0.042* -0.000 
 (0.013) (0.027) (0.015) (0.010) (0.018) (0.013) 
Strong 0.042* 0.049* 0.027* 0.024* 0.011 0.027* 
 (0.012) (0.025) (0.014) (0.010) (0.019) (0.012) 
Panel C       
Slope 0.042* 0.053* 0.027* 0.024* 0.014 0.027* 
 (0.012) (0.025) (0.014) (0.010) (0.019) (0.012) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1100 319 654 1100 319 654 
Note. * p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Covariates include party ID, favorite Presidential candidate (among Clinton, Sanders, 
Trump, Cruz and Kasich), vote choice in 2012, evaluations of Obama (overall, economy 
and inequality), pre-treatment retrospective evaluations of the two parties. Low-attention 
participants are underweighted. The coefficients on the intercepts and covariates are not 
shown. 
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Table A33: The Effects on Performance on the Handling of Income Inequality by Each 
Treatment Condition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV Retrospective Beliefs Prospective Beliefs 
Subset All Rep Dem All Rep Dem 
Panel A       
GDP Weak 0.017 0.028 0.017 0.006 0.033 -0.002 
 (0.017) (0.037) (0.022) (0.014) (0.032) (0.016) 
GDP Strong 0.034* 0.012 0.040* 0.017 0.016 0.007 
 (0.016) (0.033) (0.019) (0.012) (0.028) (0.015) 
Income Weak 0.028* 0.022 0.015 0.014 0.006 0.005 
 (0.016) (0.037) (0.019) (0.012) (0.026) (0.015) 
Income Strong 0.064* 0.058 0.070* 0.040* 0.040 0.041* 
 (0.016) (0.036) (0.020) (0.012) (0.026) (0.015) 
Panel B       
Weal 0.022 0.025 0.016 0.010 0.018 0.001 
 (0.014) (0.031) (0.017) (0.010) (0.023) (0.013) 
Strong 0.049* 0.035 0.055* 0.028* 0.027 0.025* 
 (0.013) (0.028) (0.016) (0.010) (0.021) (0.012) 
Panel C       
Slope 0.049* 0.035 0.055* 0.028* 0.028 0.025* 
 (0.013) (0.028) (0.016) (0.010) (0.021) (0.012) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1100 319 654 1100 319 654 
Note. * p < 0.1 (two-tailed). OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Covariates include party ID, favorite Presidential candidate (among Clinton, Sanders, 
Trump, Cruz and Kasich), vote choice in 2012, evaluations of Obama (overall, economy 
and inequality), pre-treatment retrospective evaluations of the two parties. Low-attention 
participants are underweighted. The coefficients on the intercepts and covariates are not 
shown. 
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